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Abstract

This dissertation analyzes the relationship between the American public and the military
institution as a source of political information. As much of the study of international relations and domestic institutions suggests, leaders considering policy options are sensitive
to public opinion regarding those policies; as such, it is of considerable import to understand how the public forms those attitudes. Though traditional study has focused on the
influence of partisan leaders and media elites in shaping the public’s base of information,
comparatively little has been devoted to understanding the role of military elites in this
process. As the value and veracity of political information is subject to increased public
skepticism based on its source, the military is by contrast a highly trusted institution whose
representative figures – both active and retired – continue to play a public role in politics.

In this project, I examine not only the potential influence that such figures can have on
public political attitudes, but how the credibility of the military and its elites as a source of
information operates in an environment of partisan polarization, selective media exposure,
rising acceptance of illiberal norms, and falling confidence in government and traditional
expert communities. The dissertation that follows comprises three papers that incorporate
original survey experimentation, observational time-series and social media data, text-asdata, and qualitative case studies in order to contribute to our general understanding of
how politicization of the military affects – and is affected by – the credibility of military
elites in the political information space.

The first paper measures the potential political influence of military elites on public
attitudes towards proposed military interventions. Using original survey experimentation,
iv

Abstract

I build on previous knowledge of elite cuing and public attitudes for war by placing the
political preferences of the military and the president in opposition, providing the military
source a variety of mechanisms by which to challenge the stated preferences of the executive.
Not only do I find that the military voice is a potentially influential one, but that this effect
is tied considerably to impressions of the military elite as a credible source of information.
Military elites – both active and retired – possess not just an independently powerful voice,
but one that remains significant even when conditioning on the partisan identities of the
president and the individual.

The second paper envisions this concept of elite credibility not as a moderator, but as a
dependent variable in its own right, seizing on the empirical puzzle presented by the partisan “gap” in expressed confidence for the military. Using time-series data and text-as-data
on media reporting I find that partisans are likely to be exposed to widely different media
environments when acquiring information on military institutional quality. Furthermore,
using original survey experimentation, I find that even conditional on being presented with
negative information on the military, partisans exhibit different pathologies in using it to
update their impressions in a rational (Democrats, Independents) or biased (Republicans)
fashion.

The third paper takes this concept one step further, measuring not only the nature of
elite credibility, but its limits. This chapter captures how partisan activism by military
elites affects the perceived credibility of these figures and their parent institution. Using
the results of original survey experimentation, I find that the public, contrary to much of
the established literature on civil-military norms, is not normatively opposed to political
activism by retired military elites. Instead, partisans asymmetrically – and significantly
– reduce their estimations of credibility for military elites only on the other side of the
political aisle. Using analysis of social media data for several prominent military elites, I
further reveal an environment of weakened civil-military norms that is ripe for continued
politicization into the future.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

When we assumed the Soldier we did not lay aside the Citizen.
– George Washington, June 26, 1775

Project Overview
In making policy decisions, leaders in democratic societies such as the United States are politically accountable to a broad audience. In matters of security or foreign policy, however,
the preferences and “reasoned choices”of that audience are less likely to be informed by
first-hand expertise of such a wide and complex subject matter. Yet, as Lupia and Mathew
D. McCubbins (1998) offer, “reasoned choice does not require full information”, merely the
ability to heed and be persuaded by elite voices in society. The voices to which individuals
attend, the level of influence such elites have on public attitudes, and the limits of that
influence are of considerable import to the functioning of a democratic society and the aggregation of informed public preferences into policy choices. In a time of marked partisan
polarization, an increasingly crowded information space, and the discreditation of traditional ‘experts’, investigating why the public chooses certain voices to inform their thinking
over others is significant to academics and policy-makers alike. Furthermore, mapping the
limits of that influence can increase our understanding of not only those elite groups in
1
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question, but of the public itself.

This dissertation explores the nature of one of these voices, an institution that enjoys
high public trust, but whose influence on public attitudes has escaped a degree of academic
scrutiny: the military. As an elite community with unique institutional features, the military warrants a deeper examination in order to understand the potential influence that such
voices can have in shaping public opinion, particularly on matters of war that may hinge
on broad public support. Understanding the influence of this military elite bloc – which I
define broadly to include senior leaders both active and retired – is particularly important
given the high level of confidence that the public consistently expresses in them compared
to nearly every other political and social institution in the United States. However, this
dissertation also explores the limits of that very credibility among the public, which exists
alongside sharp political polarization, selective information environments, and a move away
from traditional political norms. It is of considerable importance to the fields of both public
opinion and civil-military relations to understand not only the magnitude of the military
elite voice, but why certain individuals attend to it. The implications of this process are
significant given long-standing norms against military politicization; an erosion of these important civil-military traditions would compound a broader shift in preferences for illiberal
governance and dissatisfaction with democratic norms.

The collective research presented here comprises three efforts that (1) demonstrate that
the military’s credibility gives it considerable latent influence on public policy attitudes,
(2) reveal how individual-level partisanship influences – objectively or not – perceptions of
that credibility, and (3) tests the limits of military credibility through that same lens of
partisan polarization. Though much empirical study has been devoted to understanding the
influence and credibility of elite communities on public opinion, particularly political and
social institutions, comparatively little has focused on the role of military elites in the same
process. This gap in understanding with regards to the military is particularly noteworthy
given its increasingly public role in policy formulation, advocacy, and execution. As such,
this research effort contributes not only to our understanding of elite-driven politics, public
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confidence in institutions, and civil-military norms, but to how these processes operate in
the context of partisan politics.

In this dissertation, I argue that military elite voices are indeed potentially influential
ones, particularly on matters of armed intervention and foreign policy. The influence of
these elite signals is tied considerably to individual-level impressions of credibility for the
military institution. However, these attitudes about credibility are themselves susceptible
to partisan predispositions. In exploring levels of public trust for the military in a partisan context, I further argue that a consideration of both media exposure patterns and
cognitive biases is necessary in order to understand a partisan divide in attitudes about
the military as an institution. While institutionalists argue that a rational evaluation takes
places when deciding to trust specific organizations or communities, there is little support
for the argument that partisans view the military either similarly or objectively. Variation among partisans in tolerance for normatively-negative behavior or activity is evidence
for not only different sensibilities about institutional performance, but different access to
information and reflexive biases about the military based on in-group partisan attitudes.
Adopting trust for the military into a partisan identity can prevent individuals from accurately learning the lessons of past policies (K. A. Schultz 2018) or to objectively characterize
institutional success and failure (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012).

Finally, I argue that this partisan bias has contributed to an environment where a
long-standing norm against political activism by military elites may be much weaker than
previously theorized. The credibility of military elites is conditional not on avoiding a partisan identity, but on assuming the “correct” partisan identity. These findings suggest that
the same force which contributes to individual attitudes about military credibility – partisanship – may also be the mechanism by which that credibility is eroded. Such a weakened
state of civil-military norms poses significant challenges to the preservation of an apolitical
military with a credible voice in civic society. This trend is more problematic to democratic
regime quality given the concurrent rise in public tolerance for authoritarian political solutions, illiberal rule, and calls for the military to perform functions for which it was not
3
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normatively or structurally intended.

Dissertation Outline
This dissertation analyzes the magnitude of military political influence through the public, the role of source credibility in that process, and the limits of that credibility in a
partisan context. As mentioned above, this research effort comprises three papers that incorporate various theoretical frameworks and empirical techniques in order to substantively
contribute to our understanding of these concepts. The first chapter explores the latent
influence of military elites on shaping public attitudes towards military intervention; using
a competitive-signal experimental survey design, it builds on previous empirical studies on
elite-driven politics and discusses the role that source credibility plays in public consumption of elite signals. The second paper addresses political heterogeneity in perceptions of
the military institution, seeking to explain how partisans arrive at such different conclusions
regarding military credibility. Analyzing the results of observational reporting data, original text data, and original survey experimentation, this chapter develops a fuller theory
of how information and partisan bias shapes attitudes about institutions like the military.
The third chapter takes this concept one step further, experimentally testing how partisan activity by military elites affects the public’s evaluation of elite- and institutional-level
credibility for the military as a source of information.

This introductory chapter provides a broad theoretical context for the study of elite
credibility and maps the structure of the project. In the following sections, I review the
relevant state of the art, theoretical and empirical gaps, central research questions, principal
findings, and contributions for each of the project’s component chapters. In the last section,
I offer how these findings pose unique challenges to political decision-makers, future military leaders, and scholars of public opinion and civil-military relations, providing several
avenues for further research.
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That Fair and Warlike Form: Military Voices in Elite-Driven Politics
In exploring these various dimensions of the public-military relationship, this dissertation
contributes to several robust fields of political science. The first is the study of elite-driven
politics and public opinion. This literature speaks to the role played by political and social
elites in shaping the public’s preferences on policy, with the foundational assumption that individuals frequently seek the heuristic provided by such “elite cues” as a cognitively-efficient
means for achieving an informed opinion (Downs 1957; McGuire 1969; Sniderman, Brody,
and Tetlock 1993; Zaller 1992). The influence of various elite communities – such as partisan leaders (Adam J. Berinsky 2009; Zaller 1992; Guardino and Hayes 2017), media outlets
(Feldman, Huddy, and Marcus 2015; Baum and Groeling 2010), policy experts (Guisinger
and E. N. Saunders 2017), and international institutions (Chapman 2011; Grieco et al. 2011;
Fang 2008) – have been revealed to be powerful shaping forces on public attitudes towards
political choices. Though limited, a burgeoning field of study has similarly explored the influence of military elites on preferences for political candidates (Golby, Dropp, and Feaver
2012) and military interventions abroad (Golby, Feaver, and Dropp 2017). However, this
project addresses a considerable gap in understanding the reach of these elites when their
voices are placed in a competitive environment, transmitted across different mechanisms,
and moderated through the lenses of individual partisanship and institutional confidence.

The influence of political or social elites on public attitudes has been well documented.
Both the political science and social psychological literatures argue that the heuristic offered
by such elite voices can offer the shortcut necessary for individuals to achieve reasoned opinions without expending the cognitive resources necessary for expert-level knowledge (Downs
1957; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1993). The effectiveness of these elite “cues” has been
attributed to various factors, such as the audience, the message itself, and characteristics of
the source (Hovland and Weiss 1951). First, individual-level features of those attending to
elite cues can determine the effect of such a message. Both Converse (1962) and McGuire
(1969) argue that the influence of an elite message is a product of its probability of (1) being
received by the individual and (2) the individual’s acceptance of its content. Zaller (1992)
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draws attention to the role of political awareness at the individual level in affecting both of
these dimensions, with politically-engaged citizens more likely to receive elite messages on
important issues. However, the explanatory power of individual-level political sophistication has varied across studies, with evidence to suggest that both high- and low-awareness
individuals can utilize elite cues effectively (Gilens and Murakawa 2002).

Second, attributes about the message content or information environment can influence
the effectiveness of elite signals. Specific issue domains can increase individual reliance on
elite cues, such as when the subject is complex or “low-involvement” from the perspective
of the individual (Lupia 1994; Petty and Cacioppo 1986). Message characteristics are also
particularly salient when the information environment is less confusing (Petty and Cacioppo
1986) or the surprising nature of their direction or substance lends them value (Baum and
Groeling 2010; Lupia and Mathew D. McCubbins 1998). However, while both audience
and message factors are important, I follow many previous studies in arguing that more
essential to this process are the attributes of the source itself when assessing the influence
of elite messaging.

In line with much of this existing research in elite-driven politics, this dissertation focuses on the importance of elite credibility. Individuals posed with a variety of political
information sources invest finite cognitive resources in choosing the ones they deem credible; heuristic cues offer the most effective guideposts to reasoned choice if they come from
trusted elites. In their Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM), Petty and Cacioppo (1986)
argue that when issues are simple or personally-important, the individual centrally processes the substance of the message; however, as issues become more complex or distant,
individuals peripherally attend more to attributes of the source itself when rendering a
judgment about the signal’s quality. In this sense, elite credibility has played a significant
role in many theoretical models governing the effectiveness of elite signals. It is this peripheral consideration of elite credibility with regards to the military institution that I consider
through this dissertation.
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What attributes about an elite source dictate its credibility? One consistent dimension
of credibility is knowledgeability or expertise on the issue under debate (Downs 1957; Lupia
1994; McGuire 1969). Sources that have highly-localized subject matter expertise should
speak more authoritatively on issues regarding that knowledge base. Another dimension
of credibility established by the existing literature is trustworthiness. Elites who share ideological or partisan inclinations with a “like-minded” audience are more likely to be seen
as credible by that same audience. However, individual-level partisanship can complicate
both of these characteristics. Though political alignment may create a perception of trustworthiness, it can similarly result in a biased rejection of contrary information, even if that
information is credible (Zaller 1992; Taber and Lodge 2006). Though expertise in a specialized area of policy may imbue non-partisan elites with a degree of influence, this effect is
conditional on the underlying level of partisan polarization about the issue itself (Guisinger
and E. N. Saunders 2017).

However, sources that are not politically “like-minded” or explicitly trustworthy can still
appear credible to a broad audience if they can “be trusted to reveal what they know” or
have very clear incentives to provide accurate information (Lupia and Mathew D. McCubbins 1998). Elites can incur costs in sending political signals, such as criticizing a co-partisan
or praising a political opponent, providing the public with valuable and informative signals
on elite consensus or discord on complex issues (Baum and Groeling 2009). While expertise and trustworthiness are two principal components of establishing elite credibility, these
attributes are highly susceptible to features of the political information environment, including partisan polarization, selective information exposure, and cognitive biases.

When testing the effects of elite cues empirically, the importance of credibility is often
implicit. Numerous experimental studies have explored the influence of partisan leaders in
driving public preferences. These have included persuasion effects on a range of issues from
support for war (Adam J. Berinsky 2009; Zaller 1992; Guardino and Hayes 2017) to domestic policy choices (Druckman 2001; Bullock 2011). Perceptions of elite credibility need
not be measured in any fashion beyond partisan identity, as these studies can make the
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reasonable assumption that individuals are likely to see co-partisans as more credible than
members of the opposite party. However, this assumption becomes more difficult when considering institutions or elites for whom perceived credibility is not so easily proxied. The
role of the media (Baum and Groeling 2010), international institutions (Chapman 2011;
Fang 2008), and policy experts (Guisinger and E. N. Saunders 2017) have also been explored, with these actors often providing a “second opinion” to elite voices from across the
partisan aisle (Grieco et al. 2011). However, few empirical efforts incorporate measurement
of the reliability of these sources into their analysis, even those dealing explicitly with the
influence of military elite (Golby, Feaver, and Dropp 2017).

These considerations in hand, it is clear that though elite cues have been the subject of
wide academic study, focus on the military has been comparably low; though elite credibility is theoretically important in this process, it has not been explicitly incorporated into
empirical design strategies. The first chapter in this dissertation seeks to address these gaps
through analyzing the influence of military elite actors on public attitudes towards military
intervention. Similar to earlier empirical efforts regarding the ability of military actors to
shape these preferences through “cues”, I argue that military elites have considerable latent
influence among the public, particularly on security-related issues. However, I build on this
existing body of knowledge by analyzing this process across different sources and different
partisan alignments, while considering individual levels of institutional confidence for the
military.

Using a competitive-signal experimental survey design, respondents were exposed to a
variety of informational cues from both the president and various military elites regarding proposed conventional and unconventional military interventions abroad. I find that
not only do military elites wield considerable influence in the policy debate, but that this
effect is rooted in individual-level perceptions of the military’s credibility. The effects of
the military elite cue-giver are robust across different sources – including retired officers –
and different transmission mechanisms, including both public statements and media leaks.
The influence of these figures remains significant even when conditioning on the views of
8
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the president and individual-level partisan identity. Unlike many previously-studied elite
communities, advocacy from military officials has the potential to cultivate support for the
president’s policies even from members of the out-party, while opposition can have a suppressive effect on support even among the president’s co-partisans.

This chapter substantively contributes to existing work on elite-driven politics, public
opinion, and civil-military relations. First, military elites have latent political influence
with a public that considers the military institution one of the most trusted in society.
Particularly on matters of conflict, the potential for military elites to shape the public’s
attitudes about a proposed intervention suggests that civilian leaders benefit from limiting
military opposition and cultivating support. While this can be achieved with active-duty
officers through bargaining or co-optation, retired officers may be more difficult to constrain,
though there are just as influential as their serving counterparts.

Second, these results contribute to a larger debate in the civil-military relations literature regarding the use of such influence in a democratic society where civilian control of the
military is a governing principle. As I discuss in the chapter’s case studies, both the 2006
“revolt of the generals” and the 2010 Afghanistan troop estimate leak reveal that while
these tactics can be effective, they can have damaging second-order effects on the quality of
civil-military relations, strategic harmony, and elite consensus, particularly during wartime.
While these findings predict that military elites can have an influential role in shaping public opinion, long-standing normative standards in the civil-military literature proscribe such
behavior outright. This is a conflict I discuss further in the third chapter of this analysis.

Finally, the role of source credibility is central to the influence of the military elite.
Despite varying source types and transmission mechanisms, the source’s military identity
lent these signals influence on public opinion despite contrary rhetoric from the president.
Individual-level measurement of institutional confidence in the military is revealed to be a
key moderator in the effectiveness of military source cues. These findings reveal the potential magnitude of the military voice in elite-driven politics; but, given the role that source
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credibility plays in this process, what is the nature of public confidence in the military, and
what are its limits? I explore this question further in the next chapter, assessing partisan
polarization in attitudes towards the military institution.

Who Follows the Generals?: Polarization in Institutional Confidence in the
Military
If the first chapter demonstrates the moderating role of elite credibility on the effect of
military signals, the latter two chapters of this project analyze this concept as a dependent
variable in itself. If the perceived credibility of the military institution is what lends elite
signals their influence, it is of considerable importance to understand the dimensions and
limits of that credibility. I first examine the nature of perceived military credibility among
political partisans, seeking to provide a more robust explanation for the widening confidence “gap” between the parties regarding the institutional quality of the military. More
pointedly, I explore why partisans seem to reach different conclusions about the military’s
credibility, despite the foreign-facing and non-partisan mandate of the institution. Analyzing public trust in the military is particularly important amidst declining confidence across
nearly all political and social institutions in US society and a broader rejection of traditional
“experts” as credible sources of information. The military institution has remained largely
unaffected by these trends, maintaining high public confidence despite unsuccessful wars
abroad.

However, this notable status that the military enjoys in society is in actuality far more
nuanced. While aggregate confidence in the military remains high, this masks a wide gap
between partisan subgroups. As of this writing, this gap between the percentage of Republicans and Democrats who expressed high confidence in the military institution was more
than 20 percentage-points across multiple survey instruments, with Republican support consistently higher.1 This puts the military in the same class of polarization as highly-partisan
1

According the Gallup June Wave annual surveys for confidence in US institutions, the only other institutions with comparable partisan gaps as of 2017 were the police (28% pts), the presidency (50% pts),
and the print media (29% pts). Frank Newport, “Americans’ Confidence in Institutions Edges Up”, Gallup,
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institutions such as the presidency, the news media, and the major party establishments.
Further analysis of expressed confidence in other institutions and “feeling thermometer”
ratings between partisans reveals that not only do partisans differ in their estimations of
military credibility, but display different sensibilities with regards to how they evaluate the
institution. It is from this basic observation that the second chapter in this dissertation
begins, attempting to explain why partisans seem to arrive at different estimations of an
institution with no partisan functions or domestic roles in governance.

In order to understand the micro-foundations of these observations, it is first necessary
to detail the extant literature regarding public confidence in institutions, to which this dissertation substantively contributes. When evaluating institutions on their performance and
credibility, the theoretical literature has adopted two contrary narratives: a socio-cultural
explanation, where institutional confidence is the natural aggregation of inter-personal cohesion and collective societies (Almond and Verba 1963; Putnam 1993; Fukuyama 1995)
and the institutionalist explanation, in which individuals rationally evaluate an organization’s quality based on observed performance (Rothstein and Stolle 2007; Hetherington
1998; Mishler and Rose 2001). This analysis follows in the tradition of the latter; individuals in this framework render opinions about the quality and credibility of institutions in
society through an evaluation of their performance. However, as Mishler and Rose (2001)
argue, “although institutional theories agree that political trust is endogenous, they disagree about which aspects of performance are important or how performance is assessed.”
As such, there is not only little empirical basis for understanding how individuals evaluate
and imbue confidence in civic institutions writ large, but even less on how this process
functions with regards to specific institutions like the military.

This is not to suggest that the causes of military confidence have not been previously theorized; on the contrary, numerous civil-military scholars have attributed public perception
of military credibility to battlefield successes (Gronke and Feaver 2001; King and Karabell
June 26, 2017.
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2002a), organizational professionalism (Burbach 2017), or its image as non-partisan and objective (Owens 2015; Golby, Feaver, and Dropp 2017; Hill, Wong, and Gerras 2013). While
not mutually exclusive, these broad classes of military behavior capture the majority of the
proposed explanations for how the military has improved and preserved its high standing
with the public since the nadir of public trust following the Vietnam War. However, these
theoretical images of how the public evaluates the military institution also lack an empirical
base of support, as well as little understanding or theorization as to how these evaluations
might differ across partisan subsets.

Allowing for different preferences among partisans with respect to evaluation of the
same institution is significant when considering the nature of the partisan confidence gap.
Bartels (2002) argues that partisans failing to converge on a common understanding of a
policy or institution confirms that some bias is at work; however, Gerber and D. Green
(1999) argue that partisans can simply have different preferences for performance and evaluate accordingly. The latter requires consideration of the argument that partisans are not
split over military credibility due to some partisan bias, but rather due to fundamentally
different preferences in terms of expected behavior. In this chapter, I allow for this alternate
explanation through empirical testing of these different classes of military activity, namely,
battlefield performance, professionalism, and non-partisanship.

However, just as important to this analysis are the predictions of the former argument,
that the partisan gap can be explained more thoroughly through understanding of the cognitive biases that can result from individual-level partisanship. Partisan polarization and
its resulting effects on individual-level perceptions of the military institution is therefore
another literature that this dissertation addresses. Though positive support for the military along partisan lines has been traditionally ascribed to elite-level similarities on the
use of force (Golby 2011; Feaver and Kohn 2001) or the demography of the military itself
(J. K. Dempsey 2009; Urben 2010; O. R. Holsti 1998), there is little accounting for the
dynamic effects of partisanship in solidifying these attitudes. If institutionalist theories of
public confidence rely on objective valuations of an institution’s performance, partisans may
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not only vary on which type of performance they value, but their exposure to information
that challenges their impressions of the institution (Iyengar and Hahn 2009; Stroud 2008;
Jamieson and Cappella 2008) and their objectivity given social proximity to the institution
itself (Mason 2015; Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; Iyengar and Westwood 2015).

With this state of the art in hand, I address the question of the partisan confidence
gap, proposing a dynamic process where partisan polarization drives both (1) the volume
and slant of political information received about the military and (2) the cognitive biases
that shape how that information is used in evaluating the military institution. This chapter utilizes a variety of observational and experimental data analysis methods in order to
demonstrate the salience of partisan identity on attitude-formation regarding the armed
forces. First, using observational data on media reporting habits, I find that during a key
phase of the Iraq War, partisans were subject to widely different levels of information on
military performance. Analyzing trends over cable news, network news, print media, and
radio, I find that conservative media outlets consistently reported on combat casualties,
material losses, strategic frustration, and military difficulties of the Iraq War at lower rates
than left-leaning or centrist outlets. Information on military scandals or organizational failures more broadly were also under-reported by conservative outlets, such as the Abu Ghraib
prison scandal, the Haditha massacre, and the Walter Reed Medical Facility scandal.

Using original text-as-data on cable news broadcast transcripts during the 2007 reporting window, I further find that not only were partisans exposed to widely different rates of
reporting on military activity in Iraq, but that these stories were likely to be framed is vastly
different ways depending on one’s source of information. Using nearly 2,000 transcripts of
news segments from MSNBC, CNN, and FOX News, I utilized the structural topic model
and unsupervised machine learning techniques to gain visibility on the topics with which
these news sources spent Iraq War reporting air time. Left-leaning media outlets (MSNBC,
CNN) were more likely to discuss the war’s material cost, plans for withdrawal, casualties,
and strategic re-direction when spending on-air time discussing the military’s performance.
Conservative outlets (FOX News), conversely, spent more time discussing domestic fights
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with Democrats over the budget, allowing the military itself to justify its strategy, and criticizing other media sources for their reporting on the war. Collectively, the data support
the argument that during a key phase of the Iraq War, strong partisans were subject to
receiving vastly different levels of information regarding military performance and institutional quality. While conservatives were likely to experience a positive image, or at least an
insulated one, liberals and centrists were more likely to observe military complications and
the costs of the conflict.

In order to explore the second part of this process, I utilized survey experimentation
designed to explore how different types of military activity affect public confidence in the
institution. In order to allow for the alternate explanation offered by Gerber and D. Green
(1999), I allowed respondents to be primed with news stories regarding military failures
in each of the theorized classes of military performance: battlefield performance, professionalism, and objective non-partisanship. I first find that Democrats and Independents
express clearer preferences for military behavior, losing substantively and statistically significant levels of confidence in the military over professional or battlefield performance
failures. However, not only do Republicans never degrade their evaluation of the military
in response to negative information, they even increase their expressed confidence in each
treatment condition. This “backfire” of positive support for the military even becomes statistically significant among strong or “sorted” partisans. In line with the analysis of media
reporting habits, Republicans and strong conservatives preserved their confidence in the
military even in the face of contrary information.

More pointedly, these results conform to expectations from the literature on affective
political polarization. While Democrats apparently view the military in a manner similar to
the way non-partisans view the institution, Republicans display an in-group defensiveness
that resembles attitudes about a co-partisan. Analysis of the 2012 ANES feeling thermometer data provided some initial evidence of this trend, where the military was more strongly
correlated in the Republican mind with political allies like the Tea Party or “conservatives”, rather than instruments of government such as their Democratic counterparts. But
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the results of both the media reporting data, broadcast text data, and the survey experiment depict a broader picture of the different images partisans have of the same institution.
Partisans are likely to be exposed to different information environments that subsequently
inform different evaluations of institutional quality; however, even conditional on being provided negative information, conservatives are more likely to dismiss the information rather
than incorporate it into their cognitive processing. The result is a political subset of society
that has merged trust in the military into a component of their partisan identity.

Given the apolitical mandate of the military, I argue that such biased processing and
partisan imaging of the military is potentially damaging to effective governance for a variety
of factors. First, the results indicate a highly partisan environment in which the military is
unlikely to be objectively evaluated on its performance by a subset of the population. The
solidifying effect of selective media “echo-chambers” in shaping the partisan bias we observe
in this study makes it unlikely that such polarization over military credibility will wane in
the near future. Second, political leaders may be increasingly tempted to draw military
elites into the political fray as advocates or allies, if they believe that such endorsements
are likely to be successful among individuals who have immovably high levels of confidence
in the military. This is already apparent in the increasingly public role played by these figures – particularly retired elites – in media commentary, policy advocacy, and the top ranks
of civilian government. Finally, partisan bias with regards to institutional performance can
prevent partisans from acknowledging when allies do poorly or opponents do well (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012). Applied to the military, this could contribute to an already
growing concern that polarization can prevent individuals from learning the proper lessons
of foreign policy efforts (K. A. Schultz 2018). In-group defensiveness or political tribalism
designed to insulate the military from criticism complicates this type of objective reasoning.

What Discord Follows: Partisan Polarization and Civil-Military Norms
The previous chapters in this dissertation empirically demonstrate how credibility drives
the influence of the military voice and the importance of individual-level partisanship on
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perceptions of that elite credibility. The last chapter addresses the logical extension of
these findings: what are the limits of this credibility? In order to address this question, I
examine the role of partisanship by military elites on their own credibility and that of the
broader military institution. A cornerstone of traditional civil-military relations theory, the
“apolitical norm” against partisan activity requires a military outside the realm of politics,
structurally subordinate to civilian control, and objectively non-partisan in the public space
(Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1960; Kohn 1994). Despite this, military elites – particularly
retired officers with the imprimatur of the institution – are ubiquitous figures in politics
as appointed officials, media commentators, and political activists, despite norms against
such behavior. Civil-military scholars have warned that the credibility of the institution is
conditional on its appearance as non-partisan; to compromise this image would erode the
veracity of military counsel and the reliability of information it provides (J. K. Dempsey
2009; Owens 2015; Urben 2017; Hill, Wong, and Gerras 2013). However, this theory relies
on an objective image of the public as a principled whole that broadly embraces a norm
against political activity, with little empirical validation to defend such an assumption.

As in the previous chapter, this requires conceptualizing credibility as a dependent
variable. As such, the first challenge this chapter addresses is a methodological one. Operationalizing elite or institutional credibility has taken a variety of forms in past empirical efforts. These have included a four-point measure of institutional trust used in cross-national
studies based on the World Values Survey (WVS) (Newton and Norris 2000; Rothstein
and Stolle 2007), a 100-point ‘feeling thermometer’ (Ladd 2010), the five-point measure
of institutional confidence used by Gallup (Golby, Dropp, and Feaver 2012), or analogous
three-item scales from the General Social Survey (GSS) and Harris polls (Burbach 2017).
In this chapter, I adopt more granular instruments for measuring this concept. These include modified additive scales adapted from the business research literature, exploring not
only the credibility of individual elites, but the “corporate” credibility of the institution
they represent (Goldsmith, Lafferty, and Newell 2000). Furthermore, these metrics allow
for more precise measurement of elite credibility’s principal components: expertise and
trustworthiness (Lafferty and Goldsmith 1999; Newell and Goldsmith 2001). While there is
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wide variation in how political scientists have captured public perceptions of institutional
credibility quantitatively, these measures collectively provide a host of methods by which
to assess credibility as a dependent variable.

However, the second and more pressing challenge this work poses is to an established
theoretical image of civil-military norms. While the supposed causes of high military credibility have been discussed at length in the civil-military relations literature, there has been
little empirical validation of them. In operationalizing elite credibility, we gain an opportunity to test the strength and salience of civil-military norms that have long been credited
as the foundation of high public trust in the military. The professionalization of the modern officer corps has relied on formalizing the functional and societal “imperatives” of an
apolitical and subordinate military, constraining the institution’s inherently martial ethos
amidst a society of liberal norms (Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1960; Finer 1962). Recent
scholarly work on military influence has more pointedly warned against political activity
by military elites – including those no longer in service – asserting that it is the appearance of non-partisanship that preserves military credibility (Golby 2011; Golby, Feaver,
and Dropp 2017; J. K. Dempsey 2009; Owens 2015; Urben 2010; Hill, Wong, and Gerras
2013; Feaver and Kohn 2001; Kohn 2002). While this is a near-consensus opinion in much
of the civil-military relations literature, it has endured neither broad empirical validation
nor consideration in a climate of increasing partisan polarization. The final chapter in this
dissertation substantively contributes to study of this question, testing the durability of
military credibility against knowledge of partisan activity by military elites.

As I discuss in this chapter, there are several reasons to believe that traditional norms
regarding military activity in politics may be weaker than previously theorized. The first
of these is a broader shift in the public’s acceptance for standards of governance, institutions, and civil-military norms that are decidedly undemocratic or illiberal. These include
notable increases in public support for military rule (Foa and Mounk 2016), resistance to
“unwise” orders (Schake and Mattis 2016), and active-duty military figures playing a role
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in politics.2 A second reason to suspect a weakening of the apolitical norm is the acute
effect of partisan polarization on evaluations of credibility. Existing study in this vein has
already revealed that strong affective polarization can distort these cognitive processes by
affecting perceptual bias (Mason 2015), in-group pride (Mason 2016), out-group animus
(Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012), and impressions regarding the expertise of co-partisans
over contra-partisans (Iyengar and Westwood 2015).

In order to test the salience of these norms in such an environment, I propose three
potential images of the public, in which the apolitical norm is objectively strong (the principled public), objectively weak (the indifferent public), or selectively weak (the partisan
public). The first captures the near-consensus assertions of civil-military relations scholarship: military credibility is conditional on the appearance of non-partisanship. The second
reflects the findings of the limited empirical work conducted by Golby, Dropp, and Feaver
(2012), that the public is indifferent to such behavior. To these I add my own theory, a
third image of the public in which partisan activity can substantively affect elite credibility,
but wherein civil-military norms are much weaker than previously theorized. In addition
to examining the effects that such partisan activity can have on individual elites, I also
look at the second-order effects of this behavior on the perceived credibility of the military
institution.

Using an original experimental survey instrument, this analysis captured individual impressions of elite credibility in response to different profiles of a retired senior military official
that differed only in the nature of their post-retirement levels of political activism. While
the “non-partisan” engaged in politically-neutral research or board membership, “activists”
participated in political campaigns, appeared regularly on cable news networks with strong
partisan audiences, and engaged in policy advocacy. Partisan activity by these figures
elicited sizable changes to their perceived credibility by all partisan subgroups, offering little support for the indifferent public hypothesis. However, instead of a principled rejection
of partisan activity by the public, partisans only expressed lower levels of credibility for
2

Peter Moore, “Could a coup really happen in the United States?”, YouGov, September 9, 2015.
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military elites on the opposite side of the political aisle. The effect was replicated when
measuring attitudes about the larger military establishment, with partisan alignment driving the direction of these effects.

The findings instead present strong evidence for the partisan public hypothesis. Individuals compartmentalized their disdain over partisan activity by military elites only when
such activity did not align with their own views. While the principled public hypothesis argues that military credibility is conditional on remaining non-partisan, these results
demonstrate that it is fact conditional on being the “correct” partisan. In some cases, individuals actually expressed higher levels of confidence in the elite source for having engaged
in such behavior on their side. Additionally, this one-sided trend effectively aggregated to
the individual’s impression of the military as an institution. While the process predicted
by the principled public is not evident, the pooled effects to military credibility are likely
similar to the predictions feared by many civil-military scholars: ad infinitum, it is not
unreasonable to propose that continued partisan activity would damage the credibility of
the military institution.

However, the key difference is that the micro-foundational incentives of the partisan
public are much different than the principled public. In the latter, military elites can expect broad opposition to their partisan activity, making such behavior decreasingly valuable.
Elites seeking to shape policy by cultivating a broad public audience face decreasing returns
for repeated forays into political debates. However, the partisan public compartmentalizes
this disapproval to individuals with whom the military elite actor already disagrees. This
environment creates incentives for those elites who do not value a broad audience. Additionally, it can create an opportunity to build credibility with co-partisans, curry favor with
a partisan establishment, or set the conditions for a political “afterlife” to their careers.
In order to demonstrate this, I utilize the experimental findings and information on media
outlet demography to show that, even if broad approval is unlikely, the tailored audiences
offered by cable news or talk radio outlets can be a tempting alternative.
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Similarly, this chapter explores the different political listeners that military elites cultivate at varying levels of partisan activism, building on previous studies mapping the
ideological distribution of social media networks (Barbera 2015). Using information from
the Twitter follower networks of several prominent military figures, I find that social media
can provide the type of audiences amenable to partisan activity. Military elites with records
of partisan activism speak with far less authority and credibility to the broader public. Instead, as the experimental results suggests, partisan military actors succeed in cultivating a
much narrower – if ideologically coherent – audience. The incentives for military elites seeking to shape public attitudes through activism are therefore less threatening: these figures
can attract a dedicated partisan audience in which such activism is not only acceptable,
but potentially beneficial.

Moving Forward
Individuals in society are faced with a multitude of choices in their information environment; yet, while “the volume of data is exploding [...] credible information is harder to
find”.3 The voices that citizens choose to attend to – and the limits of that influence –
are of considerable importance to our understanding of political preference formation. This
dissertation places the military – among the most trusted institutions in US society – in a
central role, exposing its political influence to a new depth of academic scrutiny. Military
elites continue to function as prominent actors in not only the execution of policy, but the
marketing of strategy and policy choices. This research effort explores not only the credibility of the military voice in that information environment, but what the susceptibility of
that credibility to partisan forces says about the public itself.

Among several others, the principal findings of this dissertation are that military elites,
due to high levels of public credibility, have considerable latent influence in shaping public attitudes. Despite the military’s non-partisan institutional functions, this credibility is
3

Amy Zegart, “The Three Paradoxes Disrupting American Politics”, The Atlantic, August 5, 2017.
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highly sensitive to individual-level partisan biases, selective exposure to information, and
social polarization. Political conservatives, in particular, view the military as the extension
of a co-partisan in-group, downweighting the influence of negative information even when it
is presented to them. However, this same force of polarization poses significant threats to
continued military credibility into the future; to a certain extent, the credibility of military
elites does not rest reliably on its appearance as non-partisan, but tenuously on its adoption
of “correct” partisan attitudes. This process presents considerable challenges to effective
elite signaling by potentially eroding military influence and cultivating increasingly narrow
audiences among the public. I conclude by proposing some of the ramifications of this effect
on the quality of civil-military relations, democratic governance, and security policy.

The first byproduct of military politicization is the potential loss of a credible voice
in the political information space. While the findings of this analysis are that the logic
of military partisanship may not be ostensibly self-defeating, it is nonetheless harmful to
military credibility as the frequency of partisan activity by military elites increases. The
military’s singular position as trustworthy among nearly all political and social institutions
in US society would not only be jeopardized, but could contribute to a wholesale loss of
confidence in government. The perception that military leaders were espousing inaccurate,
misleading, or partisan-driven operational information or priorities was part of a general
loss in governmental confidence following the war in Vietnam.4 It is not unreasonable to
believe that the placement of military elites in increasingly political or partisan positions
of responsibility could lead to a general shift in perceptions of the institution’s reliability.
Casting the veracity of military information into doubt jeopardizes not only its esteem with
the public, but the level of trust it enjoys from civilian leaders during wartime, where such
military counsel is essential to informed decision-making.

Second, the encapsulation of military support as part of a political identity is problematic for an effective process of public learning with regards to foreign policy outcomes.
4

Julian E. Zelizer, “How the Tet Offensive Undermined American Faith in Government”, The Atlantic,
January 15, 2018.
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Another finding of this dissertation is that Republican confidence in the military is tied to
a social and partisan identification with that party, defending the military institution in a
fashion similar to a political co-partisan. This has manifested in steady and high Republican confidence for the military despite changes in presidential partisan identity, moral and
ethical scandals, and consistent frustrations in foreign conflicts. However, it also is evident
in the clear insulation the military enjoys from foreign policy failures. Recent polling on
this subject suggests that civilian leaders carry more responsibility than the military for a
lack of decisive victory in foreign wars.5 Allowing support for the military to override an
objective evaluation of the merits of foreign policy could contribute to broader polarization effects that “impede the country’s collective ability to learn and adapt from foreign
policy” (K. A. Schultz 2018). Objective scrutiny by military elites on such policies risks
being attributed to partisan agenda-setting rather than concern for the maintenance of
national security. If public support for war is shaped by military input and significant to
political decision-making, military politicization could exacerbate existing polarization on
foreign policy attitudes and limit the public’s exposure to non-partisan critiques and lessons
learned.

Third, military politicization exploits a level of esteem for the military institution that
is itself problematic. While public trust in institutions is indeed a positive outcome in
democratic society, the military’s singular status as both most-trusted and least-democratic
institution is potentially troublesome. Former Army officer and Obama administration official Andrew Exum contends this issue has become so acute that veterans themselves should
campaign for public office and make a concerted effort to ensure that the military is “brought
down a peg or two” in the public’s esteem by challenging active-duty officers from the chairs
of committee hearings.6 Yet, as this study suggests, partisan military actors can instead
5
Respondents were asked which statements were closer to their own beliefs: “Modern wars are unwinnable”, “Modern wars are winnable, but our military hasn’t figured out how to win them”, “Modern
wars are winnable, but civilian policy decisions prevent the military from winning”, and “Modern wars are
winnable, and our military is winning them”. After those responding “Don’t Know” (28%), the next largest
bloc of respondents believed that modern wars were “unwinnable” (19%) (Schake and Mattis 2016).
6
Andrew Exum, “The Dangerous Politicization of the Military”, The Atlantic, July 24, 2017.
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expect to lose the broader appeal and credibility of their apolitical counterparts, marginalizing their ability to effect such a change. Furthermore, this does little to correct the broader
problem of low public confidence in the representative institutions that characterize US
democracy, such as the legislature.7 Military officials would seemingly benefit most from a
concerted campaign to distance the institution from partisan co-optation or rhetoric and to
strongly encourage its retired representatives to more closely embrace the apolitical norm
after their service.

Fourth, politicization of the military risks compromising its capacity to effectively perform its assigned functions in national security. The military institution and its representative elites are increasingly being called upon to perform political functions not previously
conceived by civil-military scholars. Republican partisans have more recently sought out
military elite involvement in government as a way to ‘borrow’ national security credentials
from a credible source or to publicly advocate for budgetary or strategic interests.8 Civilmilitary scholars have pointed to highly-partisan speeches and appeals to the military as
a conservative constituency as evidence that military politicization can occur to the institution just as well as by the institution. Conversely, Democratic activists have begun to
view the military and its retired elites as a power-checking institution with an opportunity
to constrain executive power or as a repository for the ideals of liberal democracy that
could resist an “authoritarian model” of governance.9 The politicization of this institution
may very well result in the same loss of public esteem that politicization of the intelligence
services has created among some of those organizations.10 Discrediting the military as an
7

Matthew Fay, “Persistently Politicizing the Military”, Niskanen Center, Jul 28, 2017.
Joe Gould, “Handful of hawkish US lawmakers urge military leaders to fight new CR”, Military Times,
December 1, 2017; Philip Bump, “The White House is increasingly – and worryingly – using the military
as a shield against criticism”, The Washington Post, October 20, 2017; H.R. McMaster and Gary D, Cohn,
“America First Doesn’t Mean America Alone”, The Wall Street Journal, May 30, 2017.
9
Jonathan Stevenson, “The Generals Can’t Save Us From Trump”, The New York Times, July 28, 2017;
David A. Graham, “Are Trump’s Generals Mounting a Defense of Democratic Institutions?”, The Atlantic,
January 31, 2017.
10
Of 13 government agencies polled by Gallup, Republicans espoused between a 3% and 33% increase in
those rating their performance as “excellent” or “good” between 2014 and 2017 (switching presidential party
identity) in 12 of those agencies. The only organization Republican partisans felt worse about was the FBI,
which lost 13% of its approval with the same subgroup. The partisan gap in approval for the FBI was 20
percentage-points, the second-highest in the survey. Megan Brenan and Steve Ander, “Republicans Push
Government Agency Ratings Up, but Not FBI”, Gallup, January 2, 2018.
8
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objective voice through these competing partisan demands risks compromising the quality
of military advice given by serving elites to civilian leaders.
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Chapter 2
That Fair and Warlike Form:
Military Voices in Elite-Driven Politics

Introduction
The role of public support for foreign military intervention is a prominent feature of international relations and security theory. Political elites and key decision-makers, particularly
in costly arenas such as military intervention or foreign affairs, must consider not only the
material costs of military action, but the public and political costs as well. Public approval
for these types of policies can often shape the realm of feasible options for political leaders
and underpins much of our understanding about how democratic systems of government
decide to launch, sustain, and conclude conflicts abroad (K. A. Schultz 2001; Reiter and
Stam 2002; Howell and Pevehouse 2007). As the modern information environment allows
broad access to elite opinions and preferences, the shaping influences of public opinion on
complex issues such as foreign policy are of considerable interest to both policy-makers and
academics.

A sizable literature in political science has been devoted to understanding how elites
in society can shape public support for foreign policy or war initiation. These efforts have
studied the ability of the media (Baum and Groeling 2010), partisan political leaders (Adam
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J. Berinsky 2007; Feldman, Huddy, and Marcus 2015), policy experts (Guisinger and E. N.
Saunders 2017), and international institutions (Chapman 2004; Grieco et al. 2011; Guardino
and Hayes 2017; Fang 2008) to influence public opinion on these complex issue domains.
The potency of these ‘cues’ are understood to vary considerably depending on the credibility of the source (Lupia and Mathew D. McCubbins 1998), the political awareness of the
recipient (Zaller 1992), or the substance of the message (Baum and Groeling 2009; Bullock
2011). However, the relative influence of traditional social and political elite groups such
as partisan leaders and the media has become increasingly uncertain, particularly as public
distrust in these organizations increases in democracies like the United States.1 Over the
past two decades, this trend has been coupled with a increasingly public focus on the opinions and policy-making relevance of one of the few institutions with high levels of public
trust: the military. Given the central role that elite members of the military play in both
the development and execution of these policies, it is notable that little empirical study has
focused on this community in assessing the influence of elite-driven politics. How effective
are military elite cues in influencing public opinion on complex issues?

This analysis focuses on the influence of the military institution in shaping public attitudes on intervention abroad, contributing to both the elite cue theory literature and the
broader study of public support for war in several ways. First, I propose a general theory
of military elite cue effects on public opinion formation. Given the high degree of source
credibility that military elites have enjoyed over the past several decades, otherwise professionally taboo public appeals issued by these figures will have a substantive effect on public
approval, even when issued in contradiction to the public preferences of the president. The
central role of source credibility will make these effects robust to different military actors,
including retired elites. I further argue that such cues are useful as valuable or surprising
1
Gallup polls in 2017 find that only 27% of the American public expresses high confidence in newspapers, 24% in television news, and just 12% in Congress. Public esteem in the mass media is particularly low among political conservatives, who display broad skepticism or active distrust across the
majority of major media outlets in print, television, or radio stations. Frank Newport, “Americans’
Confidence in Institutions Edges Up”, Gallup, June 26, 2017. http://news.gallup.com/poll/212840/
americans-confidence-institutions-edges.aspx; “Political Polarization and Media Habits: From Fox
News to Facebook, How Liberals and Conservatives Keep Up with Politics”, Pew Research Center, October
21, 2014.
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information for individuals to form preferences on policy, in some cases even confounding
partisan expectations by challenging the input of a trusted co-partisan president or making
a contra-partisan president’s policy seem more acceptable.

Second, I utilize survey experimentation to measure the effect of military elite cues on
public support for military intervention. Existing study on military cues have revealed
a baseline level of influence with the public on different types of security issues (Golby,
Feaver, and Dropp 2017). I expand the empirical study of elite cuing and military influence
by placing these statements in a competitive framework. Competitive designs are particularly useful in probing the susceptibility of individuals in society to elite influences in a
high-information environment that is more ecologically representative of the media exposure cue recipients would experience (Paul R. Brewer and Kimberly Gross 2005). However,
this design strategy has yet to be widely incorporated into the study of cuing effects. The
competitive design allows for studying the impact of military cues within the larger information environment wherein the military voice is not the only one the individual hears.
The credibility of the military elite makes such cues likely to remain significant, even when
contrary to the stated preferences of their civilian leadership.

Third, I incorporate the level of public trust in a variety of governmental and social
institutions in order to better understand the moderating influence of this individual-level
characteristic on the potency of elite cues. Source credibility to the individual is a principal theme in the study of elite cue persuasiveness, whether in the form of ideological
“like-mindedness” (Downs 1957), elite position (Zaller 1992), or having sufficient incentives
to be truthful (Lupia and Mathew D. McCubbins 1998). The high and durable levels of
public confidence enjoyed by the military should make source-specific credibility a key consideration in understanding their potential effect. As such, I measure public confidence in
media, political institutions, and the military in order to further explore whether trust in
the institution indeed moderates the effect of military cuing.
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This analysis will proceed in the following manner: first, I will discuss the state of relevant empirical efforts in the elite cue literature in order to identify relevant gaps in understanding, deriving testable hypotheses for empirical validation where appropriate. Second, I
will introduce the design features and discuss the results of survey experimentation analyzing the influence of military elites on public opinion over proposed military interventions by
presidents of both parties. Finally, I will conclude with two structured case study examples
of military cuing in practice and propose the next steps in studying military elite influence.

Elite Cues and the Military
Before discussing the potential effects of military elite cues, it is worth noting why these
signals might happen at all. The foundational theories in civil-military relations prescribe
different philosophies for the role of military elites in democratic systems of government,
ranging from a clear division of labor between political and military elites (Huntington
1957) to more synergistic models based on shared values and oversight (Janowitz 1960;
Feaver 1998). However, these works find common ground in the assertion that the military
owes not just subject matter expertise to political leaders, but institutionalized subordination. Senior military officers are both formally and normatively discouraged from actions
or statements that could be construed as subversive of sitting civilian leaders, especially the
president as commander-in-chief. Despite being professionally discouraged, military cues
on policy may still be issued for a variety of reasons. One explanation comes from understanding the formulation of policy as a bargaining process between civilian decision-makers
and the elite advisors they enlist for counsel on complicated issues. E. N. Saunders and
Wolford (2016) argue that intra-elite bargaining is essential in foreign-policy formulation,
both as a means for developing robust and successful strategies and for co-opting key elites
in order to prevent them from publicly signaling against the policy later.

Sufficiently co-opting these elites gives them a vested interest in the policy’s success and
less ability to publicly appeal on flaws in the policy. Applied to the military context, these
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concessions may involve civilian commitments to specific strategies desired by the military
elite (Feaver 2011), bureaucratic advancement or promotion (Woodward 2009), or providing increasing resources to the military commensurate with the task. However, a failure to
bring these key leaders into the decision-making process in a way that sufficiently mollifies
their misgivings or incorporates their preferences can create incentives to seek end-around
strategies in order to shape the decision space of the civilian leadership through the public.

Another potential reason for military cuing comes from fundamentally divergent preferences between military and civilian leaders that is exacerbated by bureaucratic factors.
Golby (2011) argues that military elites appointed under a different administration or not
appointed by the president are likely to have far different foreign policy attitudes than the
executive across a range of possible issue domains. Similarly, executives who have inherited
the military appointees of a previous administration may be less likely to lend weight to
their advice. As a result, civilian leaders may more forcefully push foreign policy or security agendas in spite of contrary military advice in the private sphere, incentivizing military
defection in the public sphere in an effort to shape the process.

This focus on divergent preferences, unrestrained by a sense of accountability to a political patron, is particularly important given another source of military elite cues: an
increasingly vocal retired military community. These elite figures have generated intense
debate on the normative implications of military dissent and the political consequences of
former military leaders offering conflicting opinions to sitting political elites (J. K. Dempsey
2009; Owens 2015; Liebert and Golby 2017a). Regardless of the normative propriety of their
presence in the political sphere by traditional civil-military relations standards, they present
an unstudied and potentially significant empirical puzzle. As I will discuss, this community
is worthy of consideration as part of the larger military elite community, as they draw on
the same shared pool of institutional credibility as their active duty counterparts.

Bureaucratic patronage or intra-elite bargaining failure present some explanatory insight
into why the military elite may issue these public signals at all, despite the proscriptions
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against them. Though many civil-military scholars have argued that such political interventions by military elites could degrade the credibility of the larger institution (J. K. Dempsey
2009; Owens 2015; Golby, Feaver, and Dropp 2017), this does not remove incentives for individual cue-givers to exploit a common pool of clout with the public for short-term gain.
Despite strong reason to believe that these types of signals will be influential, the elite cue
literature exhibits only a limited empirical accounting of their impact. This is particularly
curious given the increasingly public and political role being played by active and retired
military elites in government and warrants a more tailored analysis.

Public Opinion and Elite Cues
A considerable effort in political science has sought to understand the dynamic by which
the public develops opinions about complex issues. The formative models of public opinionshaping subscribe to the notion that individuals are unable to efficiently form expert opinions on every issue in the political sphere, resorting instead to the heuristic offered by
cues from trusted elites (Zaller 1992; O. Holsti 2004; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1993;
Druckman 2001). Empirical efforts testing the potency of these cues have explored the
influence of partisan leaders (Adam J. Berinsky 2007; Adam J. Berinsky 2009; Baum and
Groeling 2009), policy experts (Guisinger and E. N. Saunders 2017), and international institutions (Grieco et al. 2011; Fang 2008; Chapman 2011). This body of work has generally
ascribed considerable influence to elite figures in their ability to shape public attitudes on
policies or candidate choice through cuing.

In measuring these effects, a principal consideration has been the relative importance of
the cue’s substance (“the message”) against characteristics of the source (“the messenger”).
Petty and Cacioppo (1986) identify these two channels as central (where the message’s substance is analyzed) and peripheral (where the cue source’s credibility is assessed) modes of
thinking. This Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) argues that peripheral processing is
more likely when the information environment is distracting, the issue under debate complex, and the stakes of the decision impersonal. Given the distant and complex nature of
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foreign policy to the individual, we should expect increased reliance on source characteristics when measuring signal persuasiveness. The military’s unique position as executor of
foreign policy and as an ostensibly trustworthy institution in the public’s esteem should
posture military elites for considerable influence on such issues.

One of the primary empirical efforts in this vein was conducted by Golby, Feaver, and
Dropp (2017) in their analysis of scenario-specific military cuing effects. Across different
types of proposed intervention scenarios, they find that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff declaring a public preference can influence opinion by shaping impressions about
the operation’s legitimacy or probability of success. While they find initial evidence for the
potential influence of military elites, this design and its resulting conclusions are limited by
several factors. First, the importance of other voices in the policy debate is not sufficiently
addressed. Though members of Congress and national security experts are used in parallel
experimental conditions, these signals are not put into competition with the military signal;
furthermore, the relative influence of the military source is only revealed as significant in
one of the proposed scenarios. Second, the design lacks perhaps the most important voice
in the discourse regarding military intervention: the president. This is complicated further
by the fact that all surveys take place under the Obama administration, which prevents
broader conclusions about the influence of military signals in a partisan context. Third,
military sources are limited to serving senior military officers making public statements; this
precludes the effect of a host of other signaling mechanisms available to military elites –
both active and retired – for influencing policy (Risa Brooks 2009). Finally, elite credibility
among military sources is not explicitly measured, instead relying on Republican partisan
identity as a proxy for ideological like-mindedness with the military.

As I will discuss, I build on this work by including a number of design features that
more precisely measure influence patterns among partisans, incorporate a competitive-cue
environment more representative of the respondent’s information space, factor in the partisan identity of the president, use a broader array of military cue-givers (including retired
elites), allow for different transmission mechanisms, and measure individual-level confidence
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in the military institution as a potential moderator. However, their research design and initial findings are a critical first step and provide a useful baseline for this analysis, both in
attempting to recover the original effects and in allowing for expansion to a more robust
experimental design. The state of the art in elite cue theory therefore helps me to structure
some guiding hypotheses.

I categorize these hypotheses into three broad groups. The first addresses the influence of military elite cues as they relate to characteristics of the source itself, namely, its
credibility. These peripheral mechanisms include the existence of influence effects in the
aggregate, the role played by perceived trustworthiness and reliability, and the robustness of
cue effects across different types of military sources. These are intended to gauge both the
latent political influence of military elites and the importance of source credibility in that
process. Second, I propose a set of hypotheses relating the substance of the message to the
effectiveness of the elite cue. This test serves to measure the significance of signal direction
relative to other voices in the respondent’s information space, in this case the president.
Finally, I propose a third set of hypotheses designed to analyze the effect of multiple signals
on the strength of the military cue. These leverage the competitive cue framework of the
design to assess the influence of military elites in a partisan context and demonstrate how
military signals may be able to assuage polarization in support for policy across partisan
lines.

Source Credibility

The first hypothesis I propose regards the ability of the military source to move public
opinion in absolute terms. As previously discussed, cues that originate from credible elites
may influence public opinion formation across a range of issues. Given highly-specific subject matter expertise, perceived objectivity, and broad confidence from the public, military
elites should be a potentially influential voice in the information space. One should therefore expect military cuing to be persuasive on matters specific to that base of knowledge,
such as military intervention. Additionally, military cues may be normatively costly to
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transmit given professional imperatives against political activity by representatives of the
military institution. For these reasons, policy cues from military elites should be influential
to individual-level attitude formation.

• H1A (Military Influence): All else equal, public approval for a proposed military intervention will be higher [lower] with supportive [opposing] military cues than without them.

Second, I propose a hypothesis for understanding the role of source credibility by directly considering the perceived reliability of the military elite. Credible sources may serve
as a useful gauge for finding one’s ideal point policy on issues with which the respondent is
unfamiliar, particularly as the issue becomes more complex or distant (Petty and Cacioppo
1986). This credibility is largely understood to be the product of the source’s perceived
trustworthiness (Lupia and Mathew D. McCubbins 1998), expertise (McGuire 1969; Downs
1957; Hovland and Weiss 1951), and ideological or political like-mindedness (Downs 1957;
Zaller 1992). Ideological alignment with partisan elites is more easily measured through
individual-level partisan identity or political ideology. Though it is harder to measure likemindedness between the individual and the military than it is with political leaders, I proxy
for this connection by measuring the level of institutional trust the respondent expresses in
the military establishment.

• H1B (Confidence in the Military): The effect of military elite cuing will increase positively
with the level of institutional trust the respondent expresses for the military establishment.

Third, in order to further establish the role of source credibility in this process, I test
the robustness of source cues across different types of military elites. Military elites operating in this framework have a variety of options to influence the possible decision space of
civilian leaders and the mass public (Risa Brooks 2009). In recent decades, one of the most
prevalent strategies employed by these figures has been to utilize a high level of public trust
in an attempt to “end-around” political decision-makers. Appeals of this sort provide a
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potentially potent tactic for military elites to influence policy through the public. However,
due to the normative proscriptions against military leaders engaging in such behavior, the
larger literature on elite cuing and the mass public has suffered from an incomplete body
of research on the effectiveness of these tactics. Testing the relative effect of these different
sources serves both to broaden the existing body of knowledge on military cues and to test
the robustness of military source cues across different strategies. I briefly discuss the nature of these strategies and propose a third hypothesis regarding the importance of source
credibility by different military sources.

Deliberate Statements
Most directly, serving military elites can influence the public discourse by making speaking or writing through conventional media outlets. Risa Brooks (2009) captures this option
in her typology of domestic political strategies for the military elite, distinguishing public
appeals from the normal disclosure of military counsel by (1) its public nature and (2) its
outright endorsement or admonishment of a proposed policy alternative. This tactic has
seen wider use in the form of speeches, op-eds, and interviews to the media that place the
imprimatur of military elite support or opposition on particular policies. General Colin
Powell’s letter to the editor of the New York Times and article in Foreign Policy in 1992
opposing the contemplated intervention in Bosnia placed the enterprise in serious doubt in
the final month of a contentious presidential campaign.2 Though Brooks does not consider
Congressional testimony a true example of a public appeal, General Eric Shinseki’s testimony in the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq War that subverted the White House’s war plans for
the invasion was both a public signal and one of decided policy opposition.

Public appeals are easiest to employ, as senior military officers interact with conventional media outlets on a regular basis. However, the visibility of these cues can present
trade-offs to their effectiveness. The first is that concurrence may be indistinguishable from
2
Colin H. Powell, “Why generals get nervous”, The New York Times, October 8, 1992; Colin Powell,
“U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead”, Foreign Affairs 71, No. 5, (Winter 1992-93), pgs. 32-45.
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independent judgment when public cues are in accord with civilian-led policy, such as General David Petraeus’ 2004 Washington Post editorial supporting the ongoing strategy in
Iraq or Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster’s 2017 Wall Street Journal editorial advocating
the Trump administration’s “America First” foreign policy.3 When civilian and military
cues are in alignment, individuals may simply surmise that this is the public reflection of
some private sphere bargaining process or coordination. Political leaders are likely to have
co-opted the military into the decision-making process outside the public eye and little “surprising information” is disclosed by both elite groups espousing the same position. More
simply, because of the professional expectation of military support to the civilian leadership,
concurrent military cues may simply reflect a fulfillment of this supportive role. However,
they can also present an implicit statement about cost, likelihood of success, and feasibility;
supportive comments by senior military officials can provide comfort to those with interventionist preferences but uncertain opinions about a specific case.

Prepared statements, interviews, or articles have a high probability of being received
by the public and enjoying wide media circulation. As a result, there is a higher probability that the signal will be received by a broader audience among the public. However,
the second potential effect of this openness is that the signal’s influence may be limited,
particularly among active duty officers, if the public perceives that any statements made
by such figures are screened beforehand. Powell’s public remarks on the 1992 Bosnia debate were highly publicized and ignited considerable debate about the limits of appropriate
military influence, although he has since remarked that these comments were permitted by
the Department of Defense before their release (C. Powell 2003). This is not always the
case, however, and public statements can also trigger a wider dialogue over the merits of
civilian-led policy. During the air campaign in Kosovo in 1999, outspoken ground invasion
proponent General Wesley Clark was asked by the press to gauge the success of the air
war on Serbian forces. Clark, who had been marginalized by other senior defense officials
for his views on the necessity of a ground operation, offered that “without being there on
3

David H. Petraeus, “Battling for Iraq”, The Washington Post, September 26, 2004; H.R. McMaster and
Gary D, Cohn, “America First Doesn’t Mean America Alone”, The Wall Street Journal, May 30, 2017.
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the ground, it’s very difficult to give reliable information”, a subtle attempt to ‘box in’ the
Clinton administration’s policy space.4

Media Leaks
Communicating cues to the public need not utilize traditional transmission channels.
As noted previously, prepared statements and conventional media use may theoretically
limit the effectiveness of the cue in certain circumstances. A potentially potent tactic also
available to military elites, specifically active-duty officers, is to allow private information
to be acquired by or leaked to the press in an effort to circumvent normal decision-making
channels. There are several reasons to believe media leaking or private information ‘spillage’
can be effective. First, public opposition to such tactics on normative grounds has weakened over time. While Golby, L. Cohn, and Feaver (2016) find that leaking information
in response to “unwise orders” is considered the least legitimate response by the public,
approval of this tactic has increased four-fold since 1998 across both veteran and civilian
elements of the mass public.

Second, the release of classified or private information should be an inherently useful
elite signal to the public in their attitude formation regarding policy. Given the newsworthiness of unauthorized information seizures, third-party “doxing” activities, and staff-level
leaking of private information, it is reasonable to argue that this type of signal can be highly
influential because it lacks the impression of pre-approval that deliberate statements might
carry. The private nature of the message instead heightens the “surprising” nature of the
information and increase its perceived credibility. Through this mechanism, the public can
be exposed to information about misgivings held by military elites over the feasibility, cost,
and likely duration of a conflict.

Targeted leaks of private information can be a potent tool for military leaders seeking
4
Clark’s comments were reported in the press as an indication that the air campaign was not succeeding.
He was privately reprimanded by Secretary of Defense William Cohen and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff Hugh Shelton for knowingly using the public as a way to advance the ground invasion agenda. The
service chiefs and key Clinton administration officials were “starkly unsupportive” of Clark’s subsequent
attempts to push the issue. Peter Boyer, ”General Clark’s Battles”, The New Yorker, November 17, 2003.
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to shape policy. An example of this tactic in practice was the release of internal documentation detailing General Stanley McChrystal’s troop level recommendations to the Obama
administration in 2009. The headquarters staff in Afghanistan, concerned with a potentially
unfunded mandate to achieve rapid success there, sought to shape the decision space of the
newly-elected Obama administration by pushing for a “surge” influx of additional forces.
Finding themselves “boxed in” by the leak, the White House approved the Afghan “surge”
in accordance with a proposed military course of action (Rosa Brooks 2016). Signals of this
type similarly carry the imprimatur of military source credibility while providing “surprising” or private information that the public would not see otherwise.5

Retired Community Influence
One aspect of analyzing the influence of the larger military establishment that has been
largely unstudied is that of the retired community. Though some theoretical frameworks for
military signals include consideration of retired senior military officers in the endorsement
of major political candidates (Risa Brooks 2009), there has been little empirical analysis of
their potential influence in shaping policy through signaling and public appeals. In order
to account for this gap in the elite cue literature and to provide a more complete theory of
this specific elite community, I incorporate the influence of retired military elites into the
empirical strategy of this analysis. There are several reasons to believe that this community
warrants inclusion in the study of elite cuing.

First, retired officers are increasingly present in the public sphere as cue givers, whether
as security analysts for major media outlets or as independent subject matter experts. Over
several administrations, retired military officers have engaged in public criticism, advocacy,
5

Controlled leaks have a long history that pre-dates modern technology for distribution. In January
1950, General Douglas MacArthur allowed the release of classified State Department briefing materials
predicting an urgent threat to the island of Taiwan in response to the “appeasement” policy adopted by
President Truman and Dean Acheson. While this was seen by many as an attempt by MacArthur to
support Republican allies in Congress and facilitate a future presidential run, the incident contributed to
the increasingly confrontational relationship between Truman and MacArthur that would result in one of
the most notable civil-military clashes in US history during the Korean War and MacArthur’s relief from
duty. Callum A. MacDonald, Korea: The War before Vietnam, MacMillan Press Ltd.; London, UK, (1986),
21.
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or activism on issues such as security strategy in Iraq, Syria, and North Korea,6 the allocation of the federal budget,7 and policies governing the open service of homosexual or
transgender individuals, torture, and relations with the media.8 The increased popularity
of such figures as media commentators or analysts has made retired military influence an
increasingly ubiquitous feature of the information landscape, especially given the additional
platforms afforded to military elites by social media (Urben 2017).

Second, retired officers draw on the same shared pool of institutional credibility as the
active officer corps. In this way, retired military officers issue cues from the same position
as the active military, but with a less pressing normative proscription against speaking publicly. Recent study into the impact of retired officials drawing on this credibility pool has
concerned scholars and policy-makers alike, for fear that such repeated interference may
actually degrade the integrity of the wider military institution (Kohn 2002; J. K. Dempsey
2009; Owens 2015).9 Appearances by retired officers in major party conventions during the
2016 presidential campaign earned admonishments from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff General Martin Dempsey that “generals and admirals are generals and admirals for
life”.10 The importance of high source credibility among retired officers even after they have
left the military has become more salient in light of increasingly numerous and high-profile
appointments of retired military officers to key bureaucratic positions in government (P.
Carter et al. 2016).
6
On Syria: Robert H. Scales, “U.S. military planners don’t support war with Syria”, The Washington
Post, September 5, 2013. On Iraq: David Cloud and Eric Schmitt, “More Retired Generals Call for Rumsfeld’s Resignation”, The New York Times, April 14, 2004. On North Korea: Anna Fifield, “Retired military
leaders urge Trump to choose words, not action, to deal with North Korea”, The Washington Post, December
13, 2017.
7
On the federal budget: Dan Lamothe, “Retired generals cite past comments from Mattis while opposing
Trump’s proposed foreign aid cuts”, The Washington Post, February 27, 2017.
8
On media relations: Kristine Phillips, “‘Greatest threat to democracy’: Commander of bin Laden raid
slams Trump’s anti-media sentiment”, The Washington Post, February 24, 2017. On torture: Michael D.
Shear, Nicholas Fandos, and Jennifer Steinhauer, “Trump Asks Critic of Vaccines to Lead Vaccine Safety
Panel”, The New York Times, January 10, 2017. On LGBT service policy: Chris Kenning, “Retired military
officers slam Trump’s proposed transgender ban’, Reuters, August 1, 2017 and John M. Shalikashvili, “Second
Thoughts on Gays in the Military”, The New York Times, January 2, 2007.
9
Admiral Michael Mullen, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, directly authored a warning to
military servicemembers in the publication Joint Force Quarterly not to “wear our politics on our sleeves”.
Michael G. Mullen, “From the Chairman: Military Must Stay Apolitical”, Joint Forces Quarterly, Iss. 50,
3rd Quarter, 2008.
10
National Public Radio, “Gen. Dempsey To Fellow Officers: Stay Off the Political Battlefield”, August
3, 2016.
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These different signal mechanisms – deliberate statements, undisclosed leaks, and retired elites – reflect the wide variation in military elite sources to which the individual may
be exposed when acquiring information and forming policy attitudes. Whereas the previous
hypotheses explore the magnitude of military elite influence and the role of institutional
confidence on that same influence, I also argue that this effect is largely consistent across
different types of military sources. Given that a military identity is the constant feature
across these different sources, this third hypothesis provides an opportunity for further evidence of source credibility’s central role in military elite influence.

• H1C (Consistency of Military Influence): The effect of the military cue will be robust
across different types of military sources, including active duty, undisclosed, or retired elites.

Collectively, this first set of hypotheses speaks directly to the importance of source credibility on individual-level receptiveness to military elite cues. It first tests whether such elites
can have an effect on support levels for a given policy (H1A); this effort reflects past empirical designs measuring military elite influence in the context of the elite-cue literature.
However, I also explore the role of peripheral processing and the importance of sourcespecific characteristics in this process by measuring the moderating effect of institutional
confidence (H1B) and the robustness of the military cue across different strategies (H1C).

Signal Direction

The second set of hypotheses regards how the cue’s substantive direction might influence
the public on its own. Much of elite cue theory includes the assertion that individuals in
society may lend special weight to cues that are deemed surprising information or counter
to the perceived preferences of the cue source. Elite communities with stated preferences
on particular issues provide little new information by supporting those positions. However,
when partisan leaders or other elites issue cues that are counter-to-type or costly, these cues
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can be particularly informative to individuals, even if the individual does not share ideological alignment with the source (Lupia and Mathew D. McCubbins 1998). This dynamic is
identified by Baum and Groeling (2009), who find that costly and “credible communication”
– such as criticism of the president from a co-partisan – is far more influential to the public
than unsurprising, expected, or “cheap talk”.11

Applied to the case of military elites, such surprising information may be the military advocating for a policy believed to be counter to its core preferences or interests. Considerable
study in understanding military elite policy preferences argues that senior military officials
are often politically realist and conservative in the use of force, preferring those efforts
which allow for the overwhelming use of force within clearly defined objectives (Huntington
1957; Petraeus 1989; Vertzberger 1998). This comes in contrast to humanitarian interventions, asymmetric conflict, or “military operations other than war” (MOOTW), to which
the military has been ascribed a pathological avoidance in light of past experiences with
such operations (Wittkopf 1990; Golby, Feaver, and Dropp 2017). This perceived preference for conventional conflicts is likely not lost on the mass public. Indeed, survey polling
on attitudes towards limited or asymmetric operations has found that only a small minority of Americans believe that these interventions align with the military’s structure and
capacity.12 As such, military cues in support of such policies may be substantively more
influential compared to those advocating for traditional armed interventions:

11

Kriner and Howell (2008) similarly demonstrate that the trustworthiness of the cue is a product of the
source’s ideological alignment with the receiver, while its costliness comes from the source issuing a cue that
is seemingly against its predicted direction. Kriner and Howell (2008) study this dynamic within the context
of support for the Iraq War. “Trusted” cues, for example, were those issued by Republican politicians
to Republican receivers. ”Costly” cues were those that ran counter to expectation, such as a Republican
politician issuing a cue against the war. Cues that are both “trusted” and “costly” would exhibit both
qualities, such as a Democrat offering support for the war to a Democratic individual.
12
Schake and Mattis (2016) found in their 2013 YouGov poll measuring civil-military attitudes that only
8% of respondents believed that “modern wars are winnable and our military is winning them”. This is in
contrast to the 34% who believed that “modern wars are winnable, but civilian policy decisions prevent the
military from winning”, the 19% who agreed that such wars are generally “unwinnable”, and the 11% who
believed that the wars are “winnable, but our military hasn’t figured out how to win them”
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• H2A (Counter-to-Type Preferences): Military cues that are counter-to-type – advocating
a surprising policy preference – will be more effective than those advocating for traditional
military preferences.

Insofar as the message’s substance is concerned, H2A asserts that it is this direction of
the policy prescription relative to the organization’s preferences that largely determines the
cue’s influence. However, the military’s “type” need not be defined solely as a product of
policy preferences, but also from the organizational standards that govern its professional
conduct. More specifically, I argue that an aspect of the military type is also restraint
against oppositional cues that contradict the commander-in-chief’s preferences. As a result, statements or actions that violate this long-held norm should be considered costly and
informative. Whereas the counter-to-type preferences hypothesis looks to the policy itself
for surprising information, this argument focuses on the cue’s direction relative to the stated
preferences of the executive. I propose H2B to address this potential explanation:

• H2B (Costly Signaling): Military cues that are professionally costly – issued in contradiction to public executive preferences – will be more effective than those issued in concurrence
with the executive.

This set of hypotheses speaks to the substance of the message itself and generates several testable implications. If military elite influence is high conditional on the intervention
type under debate, there is stronger evidence for counter-to-type calculations (H2A) among
the public. Military advocacy for a seemingly difficult or undesired policy (or opposition to
a more traditional intervention) would therefore present a substantively more informative
signal. However, if cue direction relative to the president’s preferences (H2B) is more significant, its strength depends instead on whether they are supportive or oppositional in nature.

Effect of Multiple Signals

The third set of hypotheses I propose addresses the effect of multiple signals on the influence
of the military elite cue. As I will discuss, another advantage of my empirical design is the
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competitive structure, allowing for the incorporation of individual-level characteristics like
partisanship in understanding the influence of military elites. While both partisan and military cues have been shown to have an independent effect on attitude formation, the strength
of that influence in a partisan environment with competing voices has yet to be explored.
This dynamic is of considerable interest in situations where the information is expected to
have the least effect: does military opposition degrade support among co-partisans? Does
military concurrence increase support among contra-partisans?

Analysis of these competitive cues again speaks to the importance of source-specific
characteristics of the military elite. With exposure to multiple cues, the individual is forced
to weigh the relative credibility of the sources when rendering an expressed opinion. Recent
polling on the prospect of military intervention reveals the potentially wide disparity in
public confidence between different voices in the debate, most notably the president and
the military.13 Whether partisan political cues or military elite cues maintain a residual
effect after considering the other is unclear, though there are theoretical reasons to support
either case. Across the elite-driven politics literature, the effect of partisan resistance or
“motivated reasoning” plays a significant role; partisans may attend to co-partisan preferences while downplaying contradictory information (Zaller 1992; Taber and Lodge 2006).
However, military elites may present an objectively credible source of information, potentially tempering partisan biases or providing substantive policy cues. Accordingly, I propose
the following hypotheses testing the effect of military cues in this partisan context:

• H3A (Oppositional Effect Among Co-Partisans): Military elite cues that are oppositional will decrease support for a policy advocated by a co-partisan president.
13

A September 18-21, 2017 Washington Post/ABC News Poll probed public attitudes on a potential preemptive strike on North Korea by US military forces in response to escalating rhetoric over the North Korean
nuclear program. When asked who they “trust to handle North Korea responsibly”, 72% of respondents
answered “US military leaders”, compared to only 37% who answered President Donald Trump. Confidence
in the president was highly divided along partisan lines; in addition, expressed confidence between the two
entities was highly polarized, with 42% of respondents expressing no trust at all in the president and 43%
trusting the military “a great deal”. Scott Clement and Philip Rucker, “Poll: Far more trust generals than
Trump on N. Korea, while two-thirds oppose preemptive strike”, The Washington Post, September 24, 2017.
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• H3B (Supportive Effect Among Contra-Partisans): Military elite cues that are supportive will increase support for a policy advocated by a contra-partisan president.

There are several testable implications of these hypotheses. If military cues in support
of a policy advocated by a president who does not share a partisan identity with the respondent, this would indeed present evidence for the strength of the military signal. Rather
than ignore the information, this would indicate that individuals instead expended more
cognitive resources in addressing the dissonance it presents and updated their impressions of
the policy. Similarly, the preservation of oppositional cue effects in co-partisan respondentpresident dyads suggests that not only do military elites have an independent political
influence, but one that remains relevant even after considering strong co-partisan voices.
Individuals presented with oppositional military signals can also choose to either ignore the
information or allow it to update their support for the policy. While the former suggests
that partisan bias or resistance takes precedence, the latter is evidence for the robustness
of military influence amidst competing voices from a trusted political source.

Collectively, these three groups of hypotheses approach the latent political influence
of military elites from several different perspectives. The first analyzes the role of source
credibility on the effectiveness of military cues: whether this influence exists at all, its conditionality on perceived reliability, and its robustness to different types of military sources.
The second assesses which aspects of the message’s substance are most significant, its direction relative to the preferences of civilian leaders or its content relative to the military’s
own preferences. The last set of hypotheses tests the durability of these cues in a partisan context, specifically evaluating whether such signals can influence individual attitudes
against the expected direction.

Research Design
In order to test these various sets of hypotheses regarding persuasiveness and military cuing, I employ a survey experiment with unique design features. The survey was fielded to
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a nationally-representative opt-in panel and was designed to measure the effect of military
elite cuing on proposed armed intervention policies.14 The design incorporates competitive cue environments and explicit assignment of presidential partisan identity, including
variation in the transmission mechanism of military elite cues, building on initial empirical
findings from Golby, Feaver, and Dropp (2017). After the standard demographic battery
and randomized assignment, respondents were asked to read and offer an opinion on a short
news story detailing a proposed military intervention being considered by the United States,
the substance of which varied along two dimensions.

The first dimension varied the president’s partisan identity as either a Democrat or
Republican.15 In all conditions, the president advocates support for the proposed policy.
The second dimension varied the nature of military influence as either silence (control ), a
supportive signal (support), or an oppositional signal. Supportive signals came in the form
of a statement to the press by an active-duty senior military commander in the region. Oppositional signals came in one of three possible forms: a statement by an active-duty officer
similar to the support condition (oppositional statement), a leaked internal memorandum
from the regional military headquarters (oppositional leak ), or cable news commentary from
a retired senior military commander (oppositional retired ). Military signals differed only in
transmission mechanisms and direction, offering no governing logic for support or opposition.

The resulting structure yields a 2x5 factorial design with 10 possible experimental conditions. Respondents were assigned to one of these conditions, asked to read the corresponding
vignette, and subsequently provided their level of agreement with pursuing the proposed
policy, which was randomly presented as either a humanitarian or conventional military
intervention.16 After measurement of their support for this policy, respondents receiving
14

The survey was conducted with the firm YouGov in December 2016 using online survey questionnaires
to a opt-in survey panel of 1,000 respondents. Specific wording of the questionnaire and format of news
articles can be found in the Appendix.
15
The timing of the survey occurred during the post-election period in 2016, providing a rare window
where both partisan identities could be realistically projected onto the presidency, given the party switch
that would occur the following month.
16
Respondents offered support on a five-point scale (“strongly disagree”, “disagree”, “neither agree nor
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either vignette were re-randomized into a new treatment condition and asked to read and
provide their level of support for the other scenario. Each respondent therefore went through
random assignment, news story exposure, and approval measurement twice, with the order
of the scenario’s presentation randomized.

The design is structured to provide information in a competitive environment. In all
conditions, the president was on record as being in support of a potential intervention,
with the partisan identity of the president randomized between the two major parties. A
completely symmetrical design would include a dimension in which the president publicly
opposed the intervention; however, in order to preserve both statistical power and ecological
realism, this dimension is not included, as it is less likely that the president would actively
campaign against an intervention. The format of the vignette and the randomization of
partisan identity were chosen for several reasons. First, the information was formatted in
order to best replicate the manner in which many Americans actually consume news media,
in short news summaries rather than in long substantive articles. Second, the president was
assigned a randomized party identity in order to allow for analysis of partisan alignment
between individuals and the president on cue effectiveness. The resulting design provides
numerous avenues to test the hypotheses of this analysis and investigate the influence of
military elites in a political context.

disagree”, “agree”, “strongly agree”). In the conventional scenario, the news story depicts a small former
Soviet state as the victim of increased aggression from Russia as border skirmishes and mobilization threaten
the country. The country has positive relations with the United States, but no formal alliance; such comparable cases include Russian interventions in Georgia (2008) and the Ukraine (2014), where US military
intervention was at least contemplated if not pursued. In the humanitarian condition, the news story reflects
an authoritarian regime clashing with protesters as domestic resistance to the regime breaks into violence.
Analogous cases where such events occurred and US military intervention was contemplated or executed
include Syria (2013), Libya (2011), Bosnia (1996), and Kosovo (1999). Additionally, respondents were asked
as part of the demographic battery to rate their level of confidence in a random-ordered display of social
and political institutions, including Congress, television news, the Presidency, newspapers, and the military.
This question utilized Gallup’s formulation of their “Confidence in Institutions” poll conducted annually.
The question asked is “I am going to read you a list of institutions in American society. Please tell me
how much confidence you, yourself, have in each one – a great deal, quite a lot, some, very little, or none
at all?” The most recent national response for confidence in the military institution in June 2016 was 73%
in the top two blocks. The sample for this experiment was substantially lower at 55%, making this sample
a ‘hard case’ for recovering effects given the lower overall confidence in the military establishment Gallup,
“Confidence in Institutions”, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1597/confidence-institutions.aspx
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Data Analysis and Findings
Aggregate Cue Effects

The initial results of the experiment confirm that military signals do influence public opinion in the aggregate. Figure 2.1 displays the change in aggregate levels of public approval
compared to the control condition, given respondent treatment conditions and pooling over
both scenarios. Most notable is the suppressive effects of military opposition to public support. The mean support level among the public drops considerably between the support
(+2%) and opposition (-8%) conditions. Conditional on the military weighing in on the
debate, the direction of military influence creates a 10 percentage-point swing in support
among the public. These initial findings resemble the response patterns observed by Golby,
Feaver, and Dropp (2017) and bear out the central claim of H1A, with effects being recovered while pooling across both partisan assignments of the president, the different treatment
conditions of military cues, and any respondent characteristics

17

The effect of military cues observed in Figure 2.1 is in line with one of the central arguments of this analysis; namely, that information provided by military elites is useful to
individual attitude formation in a political context. While this does not yet allow for inference about the role of source credibility, it is noteworthy that such effects were achieved
through mere endorsement/opposition to the policy. The structure of the experiment and
the design of the news vignettes and military cues isolates the effect to characteristics of
the source; because the wording of the cue is held constant, we have reason to believe that
any resulting variation in effect size is the result of the source’s perceived reliability or expertise. While this suggests that source credibility is a potentially important function in
determining the effect of military cues, analysis of the following two hypotheses will more
directly measure this argument.
17

The significance of the treatment condition is reflected in Table 2.5 and 2.6 in the Appendix, which
captures the results of a logistic regression model using a binary indicator variable for approval of the
policy. The treatment condition for oppositional cuing remains substantively and statistically significant
across base and fully-specified models, which include controlling for respondent gender, education, partisan
identification, political ideology, and the partisan identity of the president. The results are robust to an
alternative model using ordered logistics regression and similar covariates.
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Figure 2.1: Public Support for Interventions by Treatment Condition

Note: This figure reports the change in support for proposed military intervention, pooling across
both intervention scenarios. Individual responses were recoded as a binary variable for support for
the intervention if they answered “strongly agree” or “agree” to the policy, and 0 if otherwise. The
“Support” treatment condition reflects those respondents assigned to military cues in support of the
policy, where “Oppose” reflects those respondents assigned to any of the conditions where military
cues were issued in opposition. Reported figures display p-values for two-tailed t-test for difference
in means between treatment and control conditions. NSU P P ORT + NOP P OSE = 1579.

Confidence in Military Institution

How is this effect moderated by expressed trust in the source? In order to allow for further
investigation of the effect of source credibility on how these military cues are being internalized, respondents were asked a part of the demographic battery to provide their level of
confidence in several political and social institutions, using the same question format as the
annual Gallup survey for trust in government. Respondents were asked for this measure of
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Figure 2.2: Effect of Oppositional Cues by Institutional Confidence

Note: This figure reports the effects of military cues based on respondent-level confidence in the
military institution across both scenarios. Respondents were characterized as “high” trust if they
responded “quite a lot” or “a great deal” to the confidence measurement question and “low” trust if
otherwise. Reported p-values denote significance in two-sided t-test for difference in means between
treatment condition and control condition. N=1564. Among high confidence individuals, NDem =414,
NRep =498 ; among low confidence individuals, NDem =468, NRep =184.

confidence for print newspapers, television news sources, the presidency, Congress, and the
military. I use this measure to assess the validity of H1B, that public trust and confidence
in the institution relates positively to cue persuasiveness.

I collapse the five-point confidence scale into a binary categorization for high and low
confidence in the military as an institution, with the former including those who responded
with “a great deal” or “quite a lot” to the confidence question. Using this respondent attribute, I re-assess the magnitude of military elite cues based on this characteristic among
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individuals. Figure 2.2 displays the relative influence of both signal types in both lowconfidence and high-confidence subsets. Individuals exhibiting greater skepticism or distance from the military institution were, across both scenario types, far less influenced by
the military signal when forming intervention attitudes. However, high-confidence individuals in the sample were more susceptible to military cuing on average; this is particularly
true for oppositional cues for which the magnitude of the effect is nearly three times that
in the low-confidence group.

This finding seems to lend increased support for the argument that source credibility
matters when considering military elite cues (H1B). Trust in the institution visibly moderates the effect size of the signal, though the substantive information provided by the
oppositional cue remains more powerful. A principal finding of Golby, Feaver, and Dropp
(2017) is that military elite cues are generally more influential among Republicans. These
results suggest a more precise characterization is that cues are most persuasive among those
with pronounced confidence in the institution. However, the basic assertion that Republicans are more likely to be in the high-trust condition was also validated. Republicans in
the survey largely expressed high confidence in the institution (73%), compared to a comparably lower rate among Democrats (46%). Across the entire sample, 55% of respondents
expressed high confidence in the military; within this group, 46% identified as Republicans and 37% as Democrats.18 While confidence in this regard is more tightly correlated
with Republican identification, the broader inclusion of the trust metric reveals that even
Democrats can be moved by such cues if they trust the source.

18

Compared to the actual Gallup polls conducted in the previous year (2016), this 55% figure is low
compared to the nationally-recorded level of 73%. Newport, 2017. Given the role of expressed confidence in
cue persuasion established here, this has the effect of biasing my treatment effect downwards. As such, it
is reasonable to believe that a more representative sample with higher levels of expressed confidence in the
military would have exhibited even larger treatment effects in response to military cuing.
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Robustness of Effects to Different Forms

The third test of the role of source-specific characteristics in this process is the robustness
of this effect across different types of military sources. Another unique feature of the survey design was the random assignment of different cue transmission mechanisms; while the
different oppositional cue strategies have been quantitatively collapsed thus far, exploring
the impact of each in turn provides more insight into how source credibility plays a central
role in military influence. Respondents in the oppositional cue condition received either a
prepared op-ed from an active senior military commander, a leaked internal memorandum
obtained by the press, or a television interview with a retired senior military commander.
The predictions of H1C suggest that the effect size should remain statistically and substantively significant across mechanisms, the relevant constant among them being the military
identity of the source.

Figure 2.3 depicts these changes in support for intervention in response to different
military source cues. Across both scenarios, we observe that all oppositional cues are substantively able to suppress public approval for the policy on their own. Active-duty op-ed
statements seem to be the least dramatic in terms of negative influence, depressing public
support by roughly 5 percentage points from the control condition. The reduced effect
is potentially the product of the more deliberate cue transmission process discussed earlier, in which the assumption of pre-approval by government officials may render them less
“surprising”. The media leak strategy was more effective, suppressing public approval by
nearly 10 percentage points across both scenarios. These results seem to support the notion
that military source credibility combined with private information makes for a potent signal.

Finally, the retired military community displays similar influence among the public in
shaping attitudes. The receipt of an oppositional cue from a retired senior military commander suppressed public approval by nearly 11 percentage points across both scenarios.
Consistently, retired military elites were able to shape public support for the policy as much
or more substantively than their active duty counterparts in both scenarios, indicating that
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Figure 2.3: Public Support by Opposition Strategy

Note: This figure reports the effects of oppositional military cue conditions across both conventional
and humanitarian scenarios. “Statement”, “Retired”, and “Leak” labels indicate approval levels for
those respondents assigned to the deliberate statement, retired commentary, or media leak experimental conditions, respectively. Reported figures display p-values for two-tailed t-test for difference
in means between treatment and control conditions. Total oppositional cue sample N=1191.

this community is indeed drawing on a shared credibility pool, while less constrained by
norms of public silence on policy. Though they have not been incorporated into past empirical design strategies, these results not only validate the importance of military credibility,
but also the increasingly ubiquitous role of retired elites in public attitude formation.

The results indicate strong support for the predictions of H1C. While the different military source results are statistically indistinguishable from each other, they individually
maintain statistical significance, indicating the strength of military oppositional cues to different types of sources. Allowing for variation in the specific military cue-giver’s status and
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transmission mechanism more broadly demonstrates the robustness of military elite cues;
the most crucial characteristic held constant across all conditions is the military identification of the messenger. Future study should consider the relative influence of potential
strategies not tested here, such as compelled governmental testimony or collective action
by blocs of retired officers. More specific to our purposes, the positive support for H1A-C
demonstrates the critical function that source credibility provides in the effectiveness of
military elite cues on public opinion.

Signal Direction and Influence

The importance of source credibility does not necessarily negate the substance of the message itself and the information such signals provide. While the cue in my experimental
design contains no substantive argumentation, its direction relative to organizational preferences (H2A) or presidential preferences (H2B) may be inherently informative given their
respective costs. Figure 2.4 displays the approval patterns among all respondents by intervention scenario. Immediately observable is the congruent distribution of attitudes across
treatment conditions between component scenarios and the general trend depicted in Figure
2.1. This conveys a consistency between both conventional and humanitarian interventions;
despite vastly different dimensions of cost, probability of success, and baseline approval, the
influence of supportive and oppositional cues across both is remarkably similar. The fact
that the oppositional cues were effective in both scenarios bears out H2B, as the constant
condition across both is open military disagreement with stated presidential preferences.
Military support to a humanitarian intervention should have constituted “surprising” preferences by the military establishment according to H2A; as such, it would have predicted
that the supportive cue condition of the humanitarian scenario should have elicited much
more support. Instead, we observe that contradicting the executive in this competitive
framework has more value to the respondent in either scenario.

The substantive value of oppositional cues, revealed by this part of the results, is significant. Military elites offering contrary signals to the commander-in-chief may be providing
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Figure 2.4: Public Support for Interventions by Scenario

Note: This figure reports the scenario-specific changes in support for proposed military interventions. Individual responses were recoded as a binary variable for support for the intervention if they
answered “strongly agree” or “agree” to the policy, and 0 if otherwise. The “Support” treatment
condition reflects those respondents assigned to military cues in support of the policy, where “Oppose” reflects those respondents assigned to any of the conditions where military cues were issued
in opposition. Reported figures display p-values for two-tailed t-test for difference in means between
treatment and control conditions. Control (N=208, N=213), Support (N=198, N=190), Opposition
(N=594, N=597).

updated information about cost or probability of success to the public, degrading confidence in the policy’s potential outcome. These signals may indicate to the public that the
elite community charged with policy formulation and policy execution – the president and
military, respectively – have divergent attitudes about the same scenario. This uncertainty
could influence individual level calculations about whether to support the policy. The substantive value of the oppositional cue is likely heightened due to the costliness of conveying
it; as stated previously, perceived professional or institutional costs to the military in issuing
such a contrary signal could imbue the signal with greater informational value.
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Though the precise pathway is not identified in this design, one observation worth noting is that oppositional cues are likely given influence because of the unique position of
the military institution in society. Whether as a statement about elite discord and the
potential prospects of the intervention, or as the result of normative costliness for issuing
the statement at all, both mechanisms include attributes of the military elite as critical
considerations. Military elites, particularly active-duty figures, are therefore powerfully positioned to influence public support through dissent with policy due to their position in the
national security structure and in the public’s esteem. These findings suggest that civilian
decision-makers risk potential damage to a public base of support for intervention by not
suitably co-opting military preferences.

Military Cues in a Partisan Context

Generally, we find that cues offered by the military prove influential in shaping public approval for military intervention. Additionally, there is strong evidence to suggest that it is
the credibility of the military source that facilitates this level of influence with the public.
A final contribution of this original empirical design is analysis of how this influence is
affected by competing voices in the information space, most importantly those of partisan
elites. There has been considerable attention paid to partisan leaders in the elite-driven
politics literature and on the effects that partisanship have on perceived credibility (Iyengar and Westwood 2015) or on resistance to new information (Taber and Lodge 2006).
However, such analysis has not been conducted when elite signals are in opposition with
others, particularly over the subject of armed intervention and when the military elite voice
is heard. As a result, measuring military cues in a competitive environment increases our
understanding of their effect in a realistic setting.

In order to test the third set of hypotheses, I examine the shift in public approval for an
intervention advocated by presidents of either party with respondents of different partisan
identities. Figure 2.5 depicts this change in support by partisan identity of the individual
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and the president, across both treatment conditions and pooling across both intervention
scenarios. Again, these hypotheses analyze the most interesting potential cases, in which
military cues may actually be able to create support among contra-partisan dyads (H3A) or
erode that support among co-partisan ones (H3B). Faced with information contrary to their
individual partisan pre-dispositions, partisan respondents might be expected to marginalize
or ignore the military cue in favor of reducing the dissonance that such opposing information presents.

Among co-partisan dyads, however, this expected rejection of the oppositional military
signal is not reflected in the results of the experiment. Democratic respondents exposed
to an oppositional signal reduced their support for the proposed intervention by roughly
7 percentage-points compared to Democrats in the the control condition, even when the
operation was proposed by a Democratic president in both cases. Similarly, Republican respondents exhibited a nearly 11 percentage-point reduction in support for the intervention
when exposed to an oppositional signal despite its proposal by a co-partisan Republican
president. Collectively, these results offer evidence in favor of H3A: despite a contradictory
position from a co-partisan political elite, the military elite cue retains a residual effect
when the two are placed in competition.

There are several potential explanations for such a pattern. First, the competitive
framework of the design forces individuals to weigh the credibility of the two sources when
rendering an opinion about their support for the policy. Given the results of H1A-C, it is
likely that the credibility of the military source – given the subject under debate – outweighs that of the co-partisan. As a source with highly-localized expertise and perceived
trustworthiness, the military source offers an influential voice even amidst partisan ones.
However, this does not suggest the effect is necessarily transferable to other issue domains
in which the co-partisan voice is a more helpful heuristic. Second, as previously discussed,
it is possible that oppositional cues are more generally indicative of elite discord or a signal
about the viability of the policy, which is a pathway discovered in some existing empirical
efforts (Golby, Feaver, and Dropp 2017). These mechanisms are not mutually exclusive,
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Figure 2.5: Interaction of Partisan Identity and Military Cuing Effects

Note: This figure reports the effects of military cue conditions in each of the four combinations
between respondent and presidential partisan identity. The horizontal axis varies the president’s
partisan identity while the vertical axis varies the partisan identity of the respondent. Results are
pooled across both conventional and humanitarian intervention scenarios. Baseline is control condition for the relevant cell. Respondents identified as Democrats and Republicans includes “leaners”
on seven-point scale of partisan identity. Blue and red-bordered cells indicate partisan alignment,
gray-bordered cells indicate contra-partisan alignment. N=1564.

however, and these results are likely a product of both considerations. Nonetheless, these
findings offer a rebuttal to previous assertions that individuals will instinctively side with
co-partisans when elites express division over an issue (Adam J. Berinsky 2009); instead,
military cues may act as an objective source of information that can confound even partisan
predictions.

The pattern of response in contra-partisan dyads offers more mixed support for the
hypothesis that military cues can elicit support from outside the president’s party. Republican respondents offered a supportive cue by the military elite increase their approval for a
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Democrat-proposed military intervention by nearly 11 percentage-points. This constitutes
a substantive and surprising challenge to partisan expectations for the Republican audience.
However, not only did Democratic respondents exposed to a supportive signal not increase
their support for a Republican-proposed intervention, their support actually decreased by
roughly 9 percentage-points compared to the control condition. These results offer partial
support for H3B in that supportive cues, at least for Republicans, can positively influence
support for a contra-partisan policy.

Again, there are several explanations for either pattern among partisans. Given the
null effects of the oppositional cue among Republicans for a Democratic president’s proposal, it is clear that these indicate “floor effects”; military opposition presents no new
or surprising information for Republicans that influence their opinion regarding the policy.
However, military support is highly informative given the change in approval patterns. As
contra-partisans are likely skeptical of the president’s proposal, military elite support may
offer a useful “second-opinion” that can calm these uncertainties and offer a useful policy
cue (Grieco et al. 2011; Golby, Feaver, and Dropp 2017). It is also possible that military
support for a Democratic president offers a substantively surprising endorsement given the
conservative image of the military and party stereotypes regarding national security (Petrocik, Benoit, and Hansen 2003a).19 Democratic respondents, however, seem more rigidly
skeptical of Republican proposals, using the military cue not as a “second-opinion” but
rather as further reason to doubt the policy’s soundness. While we find mixed support for
H3B, the potential influence of military cues to elicit support among some contra-partisans
is nonetheless significant.

Though not explicitly hypothesized, there are several patterns that warrant consideration. First, controlling for the partisan identity of the president, it appears that Democratic
19

Schake and Mattis (2016) asked respondents “Do you think people serving in the military are more
likely to vote Democratic or Republican?”, to which 42% replied “somewhat” or “much more” likely to vote
Republican, compared to only 11% who replied the same for Democrat. This is unsurprising given both
historical and recent works on the partisan identity of military service members (J. K. Dempsey 2009), but
confirms for our purposes that public perception often views the military not only as more conservative, but
more Republican.
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presidents only have support to gain from military elite signals, while Republican presidents
only have support to lose through opposition. Second, military support for a Republican
offers little substantive information to co-partisan individuals. Insofar as military signals
confound traditional stereotypes about the party’s management of national security, these
results are significant in the prescriptions they create for political leaders courting military
support for armed intervention. Democratic presidents potentially benefit from incorporating military leaders into the policy process and earning subsequent public endorsements;
these actions can win support even from across the political aisle. However, Republican
presidents must be careful not to lose a baseline of support through public military elite
defections. While co-opting military leaders into the planning process may mitigate this
risk, it is also noteworthy that one of the principal drivers of oppositional cue strength
comes from retired officers, over whom the presidency has no direct control.

Taken together, these findings offer additional support to my central argument that
military elites possess considerable latent political influence with regards to shaping public
opinion on military action, even in a partisan context. The competitive framework forces
respondents to sift through multiple voices when rendering an opinion; while the mechanisms may be different, the source credibility of the military cue clearly drives effects on
both sides of the partisan aisle. This argument is further supported by the fact that the
experiment does not provide respondents with any substantive information about policy
preferences by the military cue-giver. Instead, individuals in all treatment conditions are
reacting to a simple endorsement or opposition to the policy. This “peripheral” attention
to the message makes the source’s unique attributes more significant in its persuasiveness.

Collectively, the results of this design have provided a suitable test for the central argument of this analysis. In accordance with H1A, military elites can influence public opinion
on military intervention, despite this decision being the purview of civilian political leaders.
The importance of source credibility in this process is revealed in the positive moderating
effect of institutional confidence in the military (H1B) and the robustness of military elite
cuing effects across different types of information sources and elite figures (H1C). Signal
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Table 2.1: Summary of Principal Findings and Support for Testable Hypotheses

Hypothesis
Source Credibility (H1)
A Military elite cues influence public support.
B Influence increases with expressed confidence.
C Effect robust to different military sources.

Support
3
3
3

Signal Direction (H2)
A Substance of policy type matters.

7

B Direction of policy cue matters.

3

Effect of Multiple Signals (H3)
A Oppositional cues can dissuade copartisans.
B Supportive cues can attract contrapartisans.

3(D) 3(R)
7(D) 3(R)

Findings
Military cues create 10 %-pt swing across all conditions compared to control.
Oppositional cues three times more effective with
high-confidence individuals.
Effect statistically and substantively significant
across military sources.

Effect size comparable between conventional and
humanitarian scenarios.
Oppositional cues nearly four times more influential than supportive cues.

Democrats and Republicans reduce support by 7
and 11 %-pts, respectively.
Republicans increase support by nearly 11 %-pts;
Democrats actually decrease support.

NOTE: Table 2.1 depicts the level of support for each testable hypothesis and a brief description of the
empirical findings for each; hypotheses are grouped by point of analysis (source credibility, signal direction,
and the effect of multiple signals). Results for H3A and H3B allow for mixed support based on partisan
identity of the respondent; (D) indicates the hypothesis’ validity for Democrats, (R) for Republicans.

direction is significant insofar as it relates to the stated preferences of the president; the
substantive or normative cost of oppositional signals are more significant relative to supportive cues (H2B), despite variation in the type of policy being considered (H2A). Finally,
military cues are able to achieve effects even when considering the competing voice of the
president. While these signals can generate a mixed amount of support among members of
the presidential out-party (H3B), there is strong evidence that they can erode support even
among co-partisans (H3A).
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Military Elite Cues in Practice
Given the significance of these results, there remains the question of what these events look
like in the actual political-military environment. In order to illustrate the nature of military elite cues and their capacity for shaping public opinion and decision-making, I briefly
discuss two recent examples of military dissent in the elite cue context. These brief case
studies will seek to demonstrate the observable influence of military cues in the context of
military intervention policy and the varying dimensions of costliness that characterize their
transmission. This section covers the 2006 retired military community’s public appeals over
the Iraq war and the 2009 troop estimate leak in the Afghanistan war.

The Generals and the Bush Administration; Iraq, 2006

The US military effort in Iraq following the defeat of conventional Iraqi armed forces in
2003 had stalled considerably by the second term of the Bush administration. Increasing
sectarian violence across the country cast doubt in public and elite circles that the administration could effectively resource and manage both the Afghanistan and Iraq theaters with
its limited military force structure. Initial misgivings about the need for a much larger
force in the run-up to the Iraq invasion, most publicly voiced by former Army Chief of Staff
General Eric Shinseki, re-emerged in a new debate about the prospects for the mission’s
success and the embattled leadership of Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who had marginalized
Shinseki in subsequent policy-shaping following the general’s remarks to Congress.

Even before the considerable strategic shift that followed the 9/11 attacks and the ‘global
war on terror’, senior military officials in the Pentagon and abroad experienced a major bureaucratic shake-up with the appointment of Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense.
Rumsfeld’s interpersonal style and managerial philosophy struck many senior military leaders as abrasive and uncompromising, coupled with a desire to ‘streamline’ the organization
and assert more direct control over military leaders. The negative reversal of fortune in
the Iraq war seemed to vindicate Shinseki’s original warnings and increased criticism of
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Rumsfeld’s management of the Pentagon, which many military leaders felt perpetuated
poor strategic choices by stifling debate (Risa Brooks 2009).

The debate on Rumsfeld’s bureaucratic management of the Defense Department evolved
into a broader referendum by the retired military community on the wisdom of the Iraq war
and its governing strategy. Marine Lieutenant General Greg Newbold, who served under
Rumsfeld in a key staff position during the initial phases of the Iraq war planning,20 was
the first of several recently-retired senior military officers to voice public disapproval for
Rumsfeld’s management of the military and the larger Iraq war’s strategic direction. In an
article written for Time in mid-2006, Newbold openly rebuked the secretary’s handling of
Shinseki’s warning in 2003 and characterized the administration’s commitment to the Iraq
fight as having been “done with a casualness and swagger that are the special province of
those who have never had to execute these missions – or bury the results.”21

Newbold was not alone in this open criticism of the war and its civilian leadership. Retired Army generals Paul Eaton, Charles Swannack, John Riggs, and John Batiste, along
with retired Marine general Paul van Riper, all issued public statements or articles calling
for Rumsfeld’s removal from leadership of the Defense Department. Most of the officers
involved had, like Newbold, observed first hand the flaws in the Pentagon’s management
of the Iraq war and had suffered directly from Rumsfeld’s leadership style. Eaton, who
had been saddled with the task of rebuilding the Iraqi army in 2004, was marginalized into
early retirement following his statements that such an effort would take several years to
be completed effectively. Like the rest of the officers involved, Eaton wrestled with professional norms of restraint in his disapproval of the Iraq strategy. However, after viewing the
2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, a Defense Department articulation of strategic priorities
and budgetary forecasts, Eaton found its “appalling” focus on conventional threats during
20

LtGen Newbold served as director of operations, J-3, for the Joint Staff at the Pentagon from 20002002. A key figure in the war-planning effort, Newbold shared similar misgivings about the wisdom of an Iraq
invasion and the acceptable level of resource commitment for it to succeed. Finding Rumsfeld resistant to
information that called the Iraq mission’s feasibility into doubt, Newbold offered his premature resignation
in 2002. Thomas Donnelly, “Testing the ‘Fluornoy Hypothesis’: Civil Military Relations in the post-9/11
Era”, in Warriors and Citizens: American Views of Our Military, eds. Kori Schake and Jim Mattis, 2016.
21
Greg Newbold, ”Why Iraq Was A Mistake”, TIME Magazine, April 6, 2006.
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a counter-insurgency war unacceptable, voicing his discontent in a New York Times op-ed.22

The collective furor caused by these elite military figures reinvigorated a debate over the
strategic direction of the Iraq war, Rumsfeld’s future in the Pentagon, and the political will
to see the mission through to completion. The ‘revolt of the generals’ was all the more difficult to ignore with figures like Swannack and Batiste – recent division commanders in the
Iraq war – immediately following their retirement with a foray into the political discourse
of the war’s conduct. Though Rumsfeld’s ouster would not follow for several months after
the initial wave of public dissent from this elite group, the outcry among the generals had
the desired effect. The generals’ discontent ensured public opinion turned sharply against
the embattled Secretary of Defense, despite President George W. Bush’s statements of support to stand by Rumsfeld through the length of his second term. By the time Rumsfeld
offered his resignation in November, the 2006 midterm elections had swung against the Republican party. Congressional Republicans were “infuriated” that Bush had not facilitated
the secretary’s ouster earlier, convinced that Republican candidates suffered at the polls
from carrying the weight of Rumsfeld’s public image, irreparably damaged by the generals’
‘revolt’.23

If this public appeal by the retired military elite was influential in achieving its objective,
it was also costly for the military institution. A renewed conversation over Iraq strategy
was also met with heated debate over the appropriateness of the ‘revolt’ in the context of
the norms of civil-military professionalism. Critics denounced the generals as subversive to
the principle of civilian control and setting a dangerous precedent for active-duty officers
to more forcefully resist policies with which they did not agree (Owens 2006). While many
applauded the ‘revolt’ as a display of patriotism and professional integrity, many saw the
action as potentially damaging to the credibility of the active-duty officer corps. Kohn
22

Quoted in David Margolick, “The Night of the Generals”, Vanity Fair, April 2007.
Though Rumsfeld has officially tendered his resignation before the election, President Bush did not
announce this fact until the day after the election, which further heightened partisan in-fighting among
Republicans who believed control of the Senate could have been preserved had candidates been relieved of
public scrutiny targeted at Rumsfeld. Kristin Roberts, ”Rumsfeld resigned before election, letter shows”,
Reuters, August 15, 2007.
23
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(2002) contends that the opinions and misgivings of retired military elites may very well
be indistinguishable from those of active officers in the eyes of the public; this community
is therefore legitimized by the same credibility of the larger military institution, but less
constrained by norms of the civil-military relationship. Many have since used the incident
as a cautionary tale of the dangers of the ‘paradox of prestige’ and the potentially costly
ramifications of frequent military elite cue-giving (J. K. Dempsey 2009).

This case captures the dynamic of military elite cues in the context of intervention strategy well for several reasons. First, it is a clear example of how ‘surprising’ and credible
informational cues from military elites can shape the decision space of political leaders. The
source figures, all senior military officers with experience in either planning or fighting the
war, carried considerable weight in their efforts to criticize the governing strategy behind its
initiation and conduct. Second, it highlights the parity between retired and active military
elites in public opinion shaping. As the results of the previous experimental design bear
out, this community of military elites warrants inclusion in future analyses about the limits
of military influence. Despite being out of uniform, these elites were able to influence the
political environment considerably given their position.

Finally, this case highlights the different types of cost that accompany cue-giving by the
military. One dimension of cue costliness is the risk to the source in conflicting with powerful political elites, even after retirement; two generals in the ‘revolt’ admitted to having
lost subsequent job prospects due to their participation.24 Another dimension of cost is
the professional price of having defied the long-held norms of civil-military relations. These
norms of restraint have governed the relationship between military and civilian leaders for
decades, making public appeals like the ‘revolt’ infrequent. As a result, the historical rarity
of military dissent makes cuing costly for the same reason it is credible. Lastly, events such
as the ‘revolt’ display the institutional cost of cue-giving from military elites. While successful in its aims, the actions of the generals called the long-term independent credibility of
the military into doubt. The fact that the individual cue-giver does not directly internalize
24

Margolick, 2007.
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this cost creates a potentially damaging ‘tragedy of the commons’ as retired officers try to
leverage the institution’s credibility for personal gain.

McChrystal and the Obama Administration; Afghanistan, 2009

Just as a the 2006 ’revolt’ had created political problems for the Bush White House on
the direction of the Iraq war, a series of military public statements and targeted information leaks regarding the future of the Afghan war had a similar effect on the Obama
administration. In an effort to re-assess the broader strategy for American military efforts in the country, key advisors in the newly-elected Obama White House advocated for
the replacement of serving theater commander General David McKiernan with General
Stanley McChrystal. Largely reliant on recommendations from Defense Secretary Robert
Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, Obama approved
the change, with the added responsibility of conducting a review of the state of US efforts
in Afghanistan and a recommendation for future strategic decision-making (Rosa Brooks
2016). The recommendation would inform potential troop increases required to support the
fledgling Afghan security forces and protect the population from insurgent groups that had
gained momentum with the diversion of key resources to support the Iraq conflict.

By early 2009, the new president had already expressed trepidation to increasing US
presence in Afghanistan; during the preceding campaign, Obama had stressed a re-prioritization
away from the “war of choice” in Iraq and affecting a responsible stabilization and withdrawal from Afghanistan. A troop increase that further entangled the US with the Afghanistan
war was largely undesirable among key administration officials, many of whom harbored
distrust for the military establishment. Vice President Joe Biden would concurrently push
for a competing strategy dubbed ‘counter-terrorism plus’, a smaller-footprint military approach that focused on developing human intelligence networks and decapitating insurgent
group leaders.25
25
Holly Bailey, “Joe Biden, White House Truth Teller”, Newsweek, October 9, 2009; Robert Haddick,
“This Week at War: The Biden Plan Returns”, Foreign Policy, October 22, 2010.
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McChrystal’s classified report, passed to the Pentagon by August, seemed to clash directly with any political aspirations of a timely withdrawal. The assessment highlighted a
lack of reliable intelligence, unwilling coalition allies, and a restrictive focus on the force
protection of US servicemembers as the drivers behind a security environment where the
Taliban held considerable advantage. The report offered three force structure alternatives:
a increase of 10,000 troops to focus on training Afghan soldiers, of 40,000 troops for a
concerted counter-insurgency campaign against the Taliban and al-Qaeda affiliates, and
of 85,000 troops for a more dedicated counter-insurgency campaign. Without a resource
commitment commensurate with the objectives the president had articulated, the larger
operation would result in “mission failure” (Woodward 2011).

The assessment’s gloomy forecast for US success and its advocation for such a potentially large influx of troops into the theater created political problems for the administration
officials, who wished to keep the finer details of troop requests out of the public discussion.
In mid-September, the assessment was leaked to the Washington Post, which promptly
published McChrystal’s misgivings to the American public. Though the assessment was
partially sanitized, the general theme of impending mission failure should the administration not comply with military recommendations had restricted the president’s strategic
choices. The environment was further destabilized shortly after, when in a speech to the
International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, McChrystal directly rebuked the
feasibility of a small-footprint strategy like the one being advocated by Biden.26

Obama conveyed his frustration over the leak and these remarks to Gates and other key
advisors, viewing the incident as a clear attempt by the military to ‘box in’ the president’s
options over the Afghanistan conflict and force a troop increase that would involve the US
in that war for much longer. With the 40,000-troop request public knowledge and projected
to cost in upwards of $1 trillion over ten years, Obama’s ability to explore smaller options
26

John F. Burns, “McChrystal Rejects Scaling Down Afghan Military Aims”, The New York Times,
October 1, 2009.
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in the face of the McChrystal report was considerably checked. Congressional Republicans
conditioned their support for any Afghan strategy on approval by senior military leaders like
McChrystal; Senator Lindsay Graham caveated Republican support “as long as the generals
are O.K. and there is a meaningful number” of at least 30,000 troops (Baker 2009). The
president approved a final compromise option with the National Security Council, promising an increase of 30,000 soldiers that would be ‘surged’ into the country between July 2010
and July 2011.

As with the 2006 ‘revolt of the generals’, the leak of McChrystal’s assessment at least
partially achieved the desired effect. While it did not result in the middle-ground option
of 40,000 soldiers requested by McChrystal directly, it had forced a more aggressive choice
from the Obama administration despite both publicly and privately-announced preferences
to the contrary. Obama had intended for the McChrystal review to serve as the basis for a
private discussion with the military about future strategy; the leak and London speech had
effectively shaped his available options to the American public. Key advisors also made
clear that with their advice public knowledge, Obama would likely have to relieve Mullen
and McChrystal should he make a decision that contradicted their advice (Woodward 2011).

However, the incident was exceedingly costly for both the key figures involved and for
the larger military institution. McChrystal’s leak of a classified mission assessment and his
subsequent remarks were interpreted by civilian officials as a clear attempt to circumscribe
the president’s decision-making autonomy. Peter Feaver (2009) characterized the incident
as “the defining moment in civil-military relations under Obama’s watch” as a new debate
on the stability of the political-military relationship emerged again. McChrystal personally
found himself on the outside of much of the subsequent strategic decision-making and his
open clash with the Obama administration had set the conditions for his removal months
later when a Rolling Stone article published disparaging remarks on administration officials
made by senior military staffers in McChrystals’s headquarters.

McChrystal’s removal did not assuage the fundamentally divergent preferences expressed
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by the military and political elite over the issue of wartime strategy. While civilian officials
felt manipulated by an indirect military appeal to the public, military elites felt the entire
ordeal was representative of a fundamental breakdown in understanding between the two
parties on the resourcing of political objectives in war. The feasibility of those objectives
for a speedy withdrawal and a stable Afghan government were never questioned by the
military elite, only the resources needed to achieve them; the divergence seemed to suggest
that “if the president wanted a different answer, he needed to ask a different question”
(Rosa Brooks 2016).

As with the ‘revolt’ under President Bush, the Afghanistan incident provides a useful
case for analyzing military elite cue-giving for several reasons. First, it again illustrates the
potential potency of military cues to the public on influencing policy choices from civilian
leadership. The disclosure of private military counsel placed the Obama administration in a
difficult position that made disregarding its substance more problematic. The result was a
compromise measure that arrived closer to the military’s proposed 40,000-troop figure than
to Biden’s 20,000-strong ‘counter-terrorism plus’ proposal. Second, it provides a contextual
example of the combined influence of military cues through specific mediums. As the results of the previous experiment confirm, media leaks or indirect attribution mechanisms for
military signals can be an influential force for a public trying to form individual preferences
for complicated policies.

Lastly, it again displays the different dimensions of costliness for cues of this type.
The individual-level costs to the cue-giver are observable with the tarnished relationship
between the Obama team and McChrystal’s headquarters after the incident. McChrystal
lost a potent voice in Washington as part of the strategic discussion and the general’s
removal in 2010 was easier to facilitate in the environment the leak incident had created.
The institutional costs of the ordeal are perhaps far more apparent. A reinvigorated debate
on the health of American civil-military relations again called into question the apolitical
and independent nature of military advice. An already distrustful relationship between the
new administration and the military was made worse, as all subsequent military counsel
67

Chapter 2: That Fair and Warlike Form: Military Voices in Elite-Driven Politics

had to be questioned for exaggeration or self-serving organizational biases. Though partially
effective, this type of military elite cue was again costly for the same reason it was credible;
the long-term effects of repeated incidents remain to be seen.

Conclusion
While there has been a considerable effort to understand the dimensions of elite-driven
influences on public opinion formation, there has been a dearth of knowledge in understanding this dynamic among military elites. One critique of top-down theories of elite
cuing is that it is difficult to disentangle the causal channel between elites shaping opinion
or being responsive to public attitudes. This is particularly a problem for partisan leaders
with electoral motivations for getting in line with popular opinion rather than influencing
it. However, military officials are a unique elite community that confounds this problem,
as the military has no incentive to bend its signals based on popular opinion. As primary
figures in the formation and execution of policy with a durably-high level of trust with the
American public, these figures continue to play a key role in political debates on policy both
in uniform and after departure from the service. The state of civil-military relations in the
US has strong foundations in objective control and a division of labor between political and
military leaders (Huntington 1957); yet, this dynamic is difficult to sustain in an era where
the line between the two areas is increasingly blurred. The norms of Huntington’s philosophy oblige an institutionally subordinate military whose elites do not engage in public
debate with their civilian superiors.

However, the military has become an increasingly vocal entity in the development of
foreign policy. Through targeted survey experimentation, I have demonstrated how individuals substantively attend to elite cues on military intervention, even when they are
issued in contradiction to the president, whether a co-partisan or political opponent. When
offered information about military attitudes on a proposed policy, some respondents used
oppositional cues as a useful “second opinion” or used substantively surprising information
on policies with which they have little information, even if the policy was recommended
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by a contra-partisan president. Perhaps most importantly, the results of this experimental design demonstrate that not only do these figures possess considerable latent political
influence, but that this influence is largely tied to the perception of the military elite as a
credible figure and reliable source. Subsequent analysis on the effectiveness of military cuing
must consider the different cost dimensions on their continued influence. If common-pool
issues over public military dissent in fact degrade its institutional credibility, can we expect
decreasing military influence in the future? This also raises the question of the limits of
elite influence: does military influence wane as the issue in debate becomes more polarized,
less security-related, or more partisan?

Using the Iraq war’s ‘revolt of the generals’ and the Afghanistan troop estimate leak
as contextual examples, I have shown that military cues can be effective, if highly costly
to the source’s credibility. As the retired military community plays a more direct role in
policy formation or a more vocal role as critic to those policies, the future stability of
US civil-military relations warrants continued study. The results of this analysis therefore
have wide-reaching implications for both policy and academic realms. If military officials
continue to wade into increasingly partisan political waters, will its institutional credibility
begin to suffer with the public? If not, will an emboldened military strain the principles of
civilian control that have characterized the stability of liberal democracies? If appeals to
the public can help shape civilian decision-making in a way favorable to the military, these
are significant inquiries.
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Appendix A: Covariate Balance and Regression Results
A.1 Randomization Checks and Covariate Balance
Table 2.2: Covariate Balance Across Treatment and Control Conditions
Respondent Demographic

Control

Support

Opposition

Party Identification
Democrat
Republican

44.7%
38.4%

40.9%
36.3%

44.9%
31.8%

Gender
Male
Female

48.0%
51.9%

46.9%
53.0%

44.9%
55.0%

Age
25th Percentile
50th Percentile
75th Percentile

35
51.5
63

31
49
62

33
45
61

Race
White
Non-white

71.1%
28.8%

76.2%
23.7%

71.3%
28.6%

NOTE: Percentages reflect segment of survey population assigned to
each experimental condition or class of conditions (Opposition collapses
all oppositional cue conditions into a single population) broken down by
key demographic values.
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Table 2.3: Randomization Check: Logit Regression with Treatment Assignment as DV
Dependent variable: Treatment Assignment
Opposition

Support

Opposition

Support

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Democrat

0.063
(0.132)

−0.137
(0.163)

−0.086
(0.132)

0.020
(0.164)

Male

−0.100
(0.129)

0.037
(0.159)

−0.167
(0.130)

0.098
(0.162)

Age

−0.003
(0.004)

−0.003
(0.005)

−0.001
(0.004)

−0.001
(0.005)

White

−0.077
(0.149)

0.255
(0.189)

0.086
(0.148)

−0.103
(0.182)

Constant

0.613∗∗∗
(0.232)

−1.388∗∗∗
(0.287)

0.472∗∗
(0.231)

−1.398∗∗∗
(0.287)

Observations
Log Likelihood
Akaike Inf. Crit.

1,000
−674.263
1,358.526

1,000
−496.029
1,002.058

1,000
−672.993
1,355.986

1,000
−485.841
981.681

NOTE: †p < 0.10,∗ p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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A.2 Regression-based Analysis of Treatment Effects
Table 2.4: Logistic Regression on Binary Support Variable
Dependent variable: Binary Support Indicator

Control1

OpposeCue1

DV1

DV2

DV1

DV2

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

−0.117
(0.218)

−0.192
(0.226)

−0.534∗∗∗
(0.184)

−0.644∗∗∗
(0.191)

Control2

OpposeCue2

−0.086
(0.210)

−0.119
(0.215)

−0.467∗∗∗
(0.179)

−0.494∗∗∗
(0.183)

Congress

0.248∗∗∗
(0.086)

0.332∗∗∗
(0.082)

Military

0.339∗∗∗
(0.082)

−0.010
(0.073)

Presidency

0.160∗∗
(0.075)

0.144∗∗
(0.071)

Constant

−0.809∗∗∗
(0.154)

−0.607∗∗∗
(0.152)

−3.049∗∗∗
(0.366)

−1.743∗∗∗
(0.325)

Observations
Log Likelihood
Akaike Inf. Crit.

1,000
−549.291
1,104.582

1,000
−597.601
1,201.201

997
−517.958
1,047.917

997
−577.920
1,167.839

NOTE: †p < 0.10,∗ p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table 2.5: Ordered Logistic Regression on 5-pt Support Variable
Dependent variable: 5-pt Ordered Support Variable
DV1

DV2

(1)

(2)

(3)

−0.152
(0.182)

−0.172
(0.183)

−0.181
(0.183)

−0.375∗∗
(0.149)

−0.444∗∗∗
(0.150)

−0.416∗∗∗
(0.150)

Military

0.232∗∗∗
(0.057)

0.312∗∗∗
(0.057)

Newspapers

0.212∗∗∗
(0.058)

0.186∗∗∗
(0.057)

Presidency

0.220∗∗∗
(0.056)

0.228∗∗∗
(0.056)

Control1

OpposeCue1

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.067
(0.057)

0.135∗∗
(0.057)

Democrat

0.125
(0.150)

0.242
(0.148)

Republican

−0.109
(0.160)

0.050
(0.158)

Control2

−0.020
(0.182)

−0.014
(0.183)

−0.012
(0.182)

OpposeCue2

−0.282∗
(0.152)

−0.259∗
(0.152)

−0.262∗
(0.152)

Male

Observations

0.037
(0.116)
1,000

997

997

NOTE: †p < 0.10,∗ p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table 2.6: Logistic Regression on Binary Support Variable
Dependent variable: Probability of Support for Policy
Conventional
Control1

OpposeCue1

(1)

(2)

−0.117
(0.218)

−0.214
(0.229)

−0.534∗∗∗
(0.184)

−0.680∗∗∗
(0.194)

Humanitarian
(3)

(4)

Male

−0.141
(0.157)

−0.103
(0.147)

Congress

0.245∗∗∗
(0.089)

0.344∗∗∗
(0.085)

Military

0.342∗∗∗
(0.087)

−0.020
(0.078)

Newspapers

0.153∗
(0.079)

0.104
(0.074)

Presidency

0.095
(0.078)

0.088
(0.074)

Ideology

−0.076
(0.068)

−0.068
(0.062)

News Interest

−0.128∗
(0.070)

−0.144∗∗
(0.063)

Control2

OpposeCue2

−0.086
(0.210)

−0.119
(0.217)

−0.467∗∗∗
(0.179)

−0.488∗∗∗
(0.184)

Constant

−0.809∗∗∗
(0.154)

−2.555∗∗∗
(0.517)

−0.607∗∗∗
(0.152)

−1.209∗∗∗
(0.462)

Observations
Log Likelihood
Akaike Inf. Crit.

1,000
−549.291
1,104.582

997
−510.768
1,041.536

1,000
−597.601
1,201.201

997
−571.028
1,162.056

NOTE: †p < 0.10,∗ p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Appendix B: Treatment Heterogeneity
B.1 Treatment Effects by Demographic Subgroups
Table 2.7: Conventional Scenario, Percentage of Respondents in Support, by Demographic Group

Support

Oppose

Military Elite Cues
Approval Gap

N

p-value

Respondent Party ID
Democrat
Republican

33.3%
36.1%

19.9%
22.8%

−13.5%∗
−13.4%∗

348
261

0.022
0.041

Ideology
Liberal
Conservative
Moderate

23.4%
35.4%
35.8%

21.7%
21.9%
20.0%

−1.7%
−13.5%∗
−15.8%∗

231
243
252

0.811
0.048
0.018

World View
Internationalist
Isolationist

47.3%
10.0%

30.7%
15.5%

−16.5%∗∗
5.5%

345
192

0.007
0.299

Military Confidence
High
Low

40.2%
16.7%

24.9%
8.1%

−15.3%∗∗
−8.6%

436
104

0.005
0.268

Political Interest
High
Low

34.1%
30.3%

23.8%
18.8%

−10.3%†
−11.5%∗

376
380

0.079
0.024

Total

30.8%

20.7%

−10.1%∗∗

792

.006

NOTE: Significance levels refer to two-way t-tests of the difference between concurrent cues
(support) and oppositional cues (oppose). †p < 0.10,∗ p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table 2.8: Humanitarian Scenario, Percentage of Respondents in Support, by Demographic Group

Support

Oppose

Military Elite Cues
Approval Gap

N

p-value

Respondent Party ID
Democrat
Republican

38.8%
32.3%

27.9%
25.6%

−10.9%†
−6.7%

343
272

0.071
0.311

Ideology
Liberal
Conservative
Moderate

37.7%
34.9%
38.5%

29.2%
24.3%
25.0%

−8.5%
−10.6%
−13.5%†

232
248
248

0.240
0.124
0.076

World View
Internationalist
Isolationist

43.8%
27.5%

32.1%
17.4%

−11.6%
−10.1%

351
189

0.065
0.160

Military Confidence
High
Low

39.5%
21.1%

26.9%
22.2%

−12.6%∗
1.2%

442
100

0.015
0.914

Political Interest
High
Low

37.9%
33.3%

27.0%
25.2%

−10.9%∗
−8.2%

373
377

0.056
0.154

Total

35.2%

25.4%

−9.8%∗

787

0.012

NOTE: Significance levels refer to two-way t-tests of the difference between concurrent cues
(support) and oppositional cues (oppose). †p < 0.10,∗ p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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B.2 Cross-Partisan Dyadic Relationships
Table 2.9: Interaction of POTUS and Respondent Party Identification on Approval Rating for
Proposed Conventional Intervention
Executive PID
Democrat

Republican

Respondent PID
Democrat

Support Cue
No Cue
Opposition Cue

32.4%
37.2%
20.9%

Support Cue
No Cue
Opposition Cue

34.1%
34.0%
18.5%

Republican

Support Cue
No Cue
Opposition Cue

39.0%
22.4%
25.0%

Support Cue
No Cue
Opposition Cue

32.3%
25.8%
20.6%

Table 2.10: Interaction of POTUS and Respondent Party Identification on Approval Rating for
Proposed Humanitarian Intervention
Executive PID
Democrat

Republican

Respondent PID
Democrat

Support Cue
No Cue
Opposition Cue

52.1%
31.4%
34.1%

Support Cue
No Cue
Opposition Cue

21.6%
42.6%
21.7%

Republican

Support Cue
No Cue
Opposition Cue

25.8%
20.6%
18.8%

Support Cue
No Cue
Opposition Cue

38.2%
48.6%
32.1%
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B.3 Respondent Partisan Identity

Figure 2.6: Public Support for Intervention, Respondent Partisan Identity
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B.4 POTUS Partisan Identity

Figure 2.7: Public Support for Intervention, POTUS Partisan Identity
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Appendix C: Divided Elites and Uncertainty
C.1 Effects on Uncertainty Levels
Table 2.11: Net Support % of Respondents who Agree/Strongly Agree - % of Respondents who
Disagree/Strongly Disagree

Conventional

Humanitarian

Pooled

-21
-9
-1

-12
+2
+4

-16
-4
+2

Opposition
No Cue
Support

Table 2.12: Net Support % of Respondents who Agree/Strongly Agree - % of Respondents who
Disagree/Strongly Disagree by Respondent Party ID (7-pt Scale)
Conventional

Humanitarian

Pooled

Democrat

Oppose
No Cue
Support

-21
+4
-1

-8
+10
+12

-14
+7
+5

Republican

Oppose
No Cue
Support

-23
-20
+7

-13
+3
-6

-18
-9
+1

NOTE: Mean approval and disapproval levels calculated using binary indicator agree for ‘strongly agree’ or ‘agree’ and disagree for
‘strongly disagree’ and ‘disagree’. Partisan identity coded using both
3-pt scale partisans and 7-pt scale ‘leaners’ towards one of the major
political parties.
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C.2 Agree-Disagree Separation

Figure 2.8: Difference in Mean Agree/Disagree Levels, Conventional and Humanitarian Scenario
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Appendix D: Questionnaire and Intervention Vignettes
D.1 Scenario-based Vignettes
Respondents were drawn from a nationally-representative opt-in panel organized by YouGov
in December 2016. Individuals were uniformly exposed to the following prompt outlining
the scope of the experiment:

“You are about to read two news stories depicting a potential US foreign policy decision.
These situations and the persons mentioned within do not pertain to any particular real-life
case, but reflect events that have happened in the past and may happen again. Please read
the articles carefully and imagine your feelings regarding the situation. Afterwards, you will
be asked a few questions about the stories.”
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Conventional Scenario

The respondent was then prompted with this baseline news story for the conventional
scenario:
“WASHINGTON (AP) - Tense relations between Russia and a former Soviet state have moved closer to
full-scale war. Russian military forces began small-scale bombings inside the country and increased its troop presence
along the border. Russia claims it is supporting ethnic Russians within the country.
Relations between the US and the small state have been historically positive, though no formal security agreement
exists between them. The American president, after meeting with fellow [POTUSID] policy advisors, stated to the
press that the US should strongly consider military intervention to deter further violence. [CUE]”

The value for POTUSID was randomized between “Democratic” and “Republican”.
The value for CUE was randomized between the following:
• NULL, for control respondents
• “A senior military commander for American forces stationed in the region, an Army general,
expressed support for the proposed intervention in an article for a highly respected newspaper,
stating that the policy would be wise.” , for supportive cue respondents
• “However, a senior military commander for American forces stationed in the region, an Army
general, expressed opposition to the proposed intervention in an article for a highly respected
newspaper, stating that the policy would be unwise.” , for opposition statement respondents.
• “However, national media outlets recently obtained a leaked, classified internal memorandum.
In the memo, a senior American military commander in the region, an Army general, expressed opposition to the proposed intervention, stating it would be an unwise decision.” , for
opposition leak respondents.
• “However, a retired Army general, who previously served as senior military commander for
American forces stationed in the region, expressed opposition to the proposed intervention in
an interview with television news, stating that the policy would be unwise.”, for opposition
retired respondents.
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Humanitarian Scenario

The respondent was then prompted with this baseline news story for the humanitarian
scenario:
“WASHINGTON (AP) - The people of a small foreign country have engaged in a recent campaign of protests
against a ruling dictator. This leader has committed major acts of violence against his citizens in the past and
government forces have now violently clashed with protesters. The conflict has brought on a major humanitarian
crisis, internally displacing many citizens and forcing many more to flee the country.
One proposed policy being considered by US security officials is a military intervention to prevent a further
humanitarian disaster. The US president, after speaking with fellow [POTUSID] advisers, stated to the press that
the US should strongly consider a military intervention. [CUE]”

The value for POTUSID was again randomized between “Democratic” and “Republican”. The value for CUE was randomized between the following:
• NULL, for control respondents
• “A senior military commander for American forces stationed in the region, an Army general,
expressed support for the proposed intervention in an article for a highly respected newspaper,
stating that the policy would be wise.” , for supportive cue respondents
• “However, a senior military commander for American forces stationed in the region, an Army
general, expressed opposition to the proposed intervention in an article for a highly respected
newspaper, stating that the policy would be unwise.” , for opposition statement respondents.
• “However, national media outlets recently obtained a leaked, classified internal memorandum.
In the memo, a senior American military commander in the region, an Army general, expressed opposition to the proposed intervention, stating it would be an unwise decision.” , for
opposition leak respondents.
• “However, a retired Army general, who previously served as senior military commander for
American forces stationed in the region, expressed opposition to the proposed intervention in
an interview with television news, stating that the policy would be unwise.”, for opposition
retired respondents.

84

Chapter 2: That Fair and Warlike Form: Military Voices in Elite-Driven Politics

Appendix E: Additional Remarks on Civil-Military Relations
E.1 Objective Control and Convergence
A central component of liberal democratic governance is the institutionalized control of the
military by civilian political leaders. This is both a political imperative and a pragmatic
policy, ensuring both a stable regime with the military as an apolitical actor and a unified
command structure that engenders more effective conduct in wartime. The formative works
in the field identified a fundamental conflict between the inherently martial values of the
military and the liberal normative architecture of the states they were designed to defend.
Huntington (1957) argues that the fear of the militarization of society could lead to either a
marginalization of the military establishment or an acculturation that renders it more in the
image of society at large. However, he contends that civilian leaders can maintain the liberal
values of society and a competent military establishment by compartmentalizing the latter
into a profession that is politically “sterile and neutral”. This theory of objective control
has underpinned the study of civil-military relations for decades and is the driving force
behind the military’s professionalization as an apolitical entity within the larger democratic
systems they support.
This concern regarding the seemingly conflictual domains between the military and civilian leaders has been addressed differently over time. Janowitz (1960) posits that military
and civilian responsibilities in security decision-making are not so easily subjected to such
a clean division of labor. This convergence theory assumes that “it is inevitable that the
military will come to resemble a political pressure group”, such that the only meaningful
insurance for the preservation of liberal values and civilian control is for the larger society to
more directly shape the character of the military institution (Nielsen 2002). Cohen (2003)
similarly argues that military and political leaders operate in a common, if “unequal” dialogue regarding security affairs given civilian control of the process; as such, political elites
are better served by involving themselves more directly in the formulation of policy rather
than engendering a blind reliance on military elites.
These explanations have driven much of our understanding of civil-military relations,
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particularly in the American context, offering seemingly complementary accounts of the
most favorable methods by which the civilian political elite can constrain the military in
society. Both objective control and convergence ideas constitute normative judgments on
the influence of the military in civilian affairs, deeming a politically active or independent
military elite as a threat to the integrity of democratic institutions designed to ensure the
primacy of civilian leaders. In either framework, the military undoubtedly plays a key role
as subject matter expert and advisor to civilian officials in the formulation of policy. Once
the decision has been made, however, the military establishment is obliged to execute the
policy, regardless of any continued misgivings about cost and feasibility.
This creates a structural problem, one more effectively captured by the agency model of
civil-military interaction (Feaver 2003). Appropriating the economic concept of principalagent relationships, civilian leaders find themselves in a structural dilemma with their military. The civilian ‘principals’, with whom decision-making authority resides, effectively
delegate the execution of security policy and warfighting to the military ‘agent’. Because
of conflicting interests, the military in this framework has a structural incentive to “shirk”,
failing to carry out the civilian principal’s directives as ordered or to the fullest possible
extent. Because the principal requires some level of assurance that policy will be executed
as ordered, they cannot afford to rely merely on the professional norms of the military elite
as Huntington or Janowitz would contend. Instead, political leaders structure defense and
oversight bodies in such a way as to monitor the military closely enough to ensure compliance, but loosely enough to avoid cost-prohibitive or obstructive levels of observation.
Collectively, these models of civil-military relationships highlight several essential characteristics that are important to this analysis. First, there exists a structural and normative
prohibition against military interference in domestic politics that has been formalized into
the professional education of the modern officer corps, labeling such behavior threatening to
the wider values of democratic society and to the internal values set of the military. Second,
prominent defections by the military elite in policy formulation or execution is envisioned as
so potentially damaging that considerable organizational effort is spent by civilian leaders
to mitigate them. While Feaver’s model assumes a single principal – the executive – modern
democracies could be construed to consist of multiple principals, including the legislature
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and civilian defense bureaucracy. Although unilateral military involvement in public policy
debates has been institutionally discouraged, we empirically observe appeals of these nature
in the political discourse.
The nature of this relationship produces interesting considerations when analyzing public cues issued from the military community. First, because of the proscriptions against
subversive or independent political activity, cues issued in contravention of civilian preferences are a highly risky prospect for cue-givers. Civilian punishment mechanisms are
readily available to the political leadership, including dismissal or punitive action. As a result, however, these cues should be construed as costly, as they are being issued in opposition
to civilian leaders in a public forum. Second, insofar as the objective control philosophy
has set the military apart as a community of specific subject matter expertise, military
cues in the security realm should be deemed especially trustworthy as well, given the high
and durable levels of institutional trust and confidence that the military enjoys with the
American public.
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Chapter 3
Who Follows the Generals?
Partisan Polarization and Military Credibility

Introduction
The credibility of expert communities in society is a central component in elite-driven politics and a critical consideration in theories regarding the receptiveness of the public to
new information through elite discourse. Considerable theoretical effort has been made in
articulating the ways in which attributes of information sources such as knowledge, trustworthiness, and like-mindedness (Downs 1957; Lupia and Mathew D. McCubbins 1998; Zaller
1992) can scale the persuasiveness of their messages. The credibility of elite communities
and institutions can most readily be measured by expressed public trust and confidence
in those same entities. Public trust in political and social institutions is an essential part
of a functioning democracy, not only as a reflection of popular approval of institutional
performance, but as an expression of the trustworthiness of information and policy signals
that come from these institutions. In an environment where the value and veracity of political information from traditional sources are contentious and increasingly characterized
by “echo-chamber” media exposure (Iyengar and Hahn 2009; Jamieson and Cappella 2008;
Stroud 2008), the process by which individuals seek credible elite voices and form policy
preferences is significant. This is especially true given the tendency for individuals to rely
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on these voices the more confusing or distracting the information space becomes (Petty and
Cacioppo 1986).

The broad trend of declining confidence in a variety of political and social institutions
has been met with renewed debate over the process by which individuals decide to express
trust in them and the implications this trend has for the long-term viability of democratic
values (Nye 1997; Pharr, Putnam, and Dalton 2000). However, while study of this dynamic
has traditionally focused on political institutions with low levels of public confidence and
uneven persuasiveness, I direct attention to an institution with unique functional imperatives and high public trust: the military. Given the increasingly central role that active
and retired military elites play in policy formation, governance, media commentary, and
business, scholars have devoted more attention to the potential influence of this elite bloc.
The capacity of military officials to shape public opinion on policy (Post and Sechser 2016),
influence public support for military intervention (Golby, Feaver, and Dropp 2017), inform
the public perception of success probability during war (Sidman and Norpoth 2012), or
grant credibility through endorsement relies on the military institution’s considerable clout
with the public. High levels of support for the military come during a time where decisive
military victories are elusive and a sizable portion of society admits mixed understanding
of the military (Schake and Mattis 2016); however, they also come during a period of increased dissatisfaction with representative institutions, political polarization, and growing
acceptance of authoritarian measures in government (Foa and Mounk 2016).

Despite the comparably high public confidence the institution enjoys relative to others
in society, pooled data of expressed public trust in the military can be misleading. The
institutional trust literature is largely devoid of dedicated study on public attitudes toward
the military, while those that approach the subject focus on high aggregate levels of confidence captured in most polls (Gronke and Feaver 2001; Burbach 2017; Hill, Wong, and
Gerras 2013). These studies overlook increasing polarization in assessing military credibility within the civilian public itself (Liebert and Golby 2017a), leaving a puzzling pattern
of partisan separation in evaluation of the institution’s credibility. While the civil-military
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relations literature prescribes an apolitical military outside the realm of partisan politics,
partisans in US society exhibit widely divergent attitudes in assessing the credibility of the
institution. Examination of the military in a partisan context yields the primary research
question of this analysis: what explains partisan polarization in perceived credibility of the
military?

This polarization in partisan attitudes toward the military requires study for several
reasons. First, an inability to objectively evaluate the credibility of select institutions in
society contributes to a broader devaluation of fact-driven political discourse. A military
institution that can maintain high levels of public confidence among certain partisans despite organizational scandals or frustrations on the battlefield could negatively influence the
ability of individuals to properly learn the lessons of foreign policy failures (K. A. Schultz
2018). Second, as partisan sorting deepens political and social polarization, the capture
of military confidence into a partisan identity has potentially damaging implications for
the preservation of civil-military norms. While democracy and civil-military scholars argue that a military institution removed from partisan political fights is necessary for the
preservation of democratic values, the perception of partisan “capture” of the military institution could be damaging to the integrity of the armed forces and of the very credibility
it carries with the public (Golby, Feaver, and Dropp 2017; J. K. Dempsey 2009; Kohn 2002).

While patterns of confidence in the military are unique for several reasons, one of its
more puzzling characteristics is a pronounced divergence in partisan attitudes despite the
military’s apolitical mandate and non-partisan professional norms. Seemingly out-sized
support among conservatives has been explained in the past as the result of partisan realignment (Huntington 1957; M. C. Desch 2001b), defense policy preferences (Kohn 1994),
and shifting post-conscription military demography (M. C. Desch 2001b). However, while
I believe that these help to explain the static existence of a baseline partisan “confidence
gap”, I argue that a complete accounting of this widening divide requires viewing expressed
trust as a dynamic process. Because of the necessity of new information in evaluative processing when judging the credibility of an institution like the military, I argue that the
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confidence gap between partisans is not simply the result of different preferences, but of
divergent pathologies in how partisans receive and employ updating information.

My analysis proceeds as follows: first, I briefly discuss the nature of this growing trend
of polarization in assessment of the military institution. The principal aim of this section
is to demonstrate the partisan separation on evaluation of the military institution and to
review existing explanations for this divide. Second, I propose a complementary theory for
the partisan confidence gap that contributes to the existing body of work by (1) considering
the impact of selective information exposure and (2) incorporating the influence of partisan
attitude polarization on impressions about military credibility. As such, I argue that both
selective exposure to information and biased updating can help to better explain polarization in military trust. Third, I assess the validity of these two explanations incorporating
original text data, observational data on media reporting habits, and original survey experimentation designed to test individual attitudes on trust for the military institution. I find
that during a critical phase of the Iraq War, conservative Republicans were far less likely to
be exposed to useful updating information about military struggles and misconduct based
on their media preferences. In keeping with much of the established literature on partisan bias and attitude polarization, I find that this same political subset is more likely to
marginalize new or newly-salient information on military misconduct than Democrats or
Independents. The result is a segment of society that views the military institution, in many
ways, as an extension of its own partisan political identity, with the cognitive biases this
entails. I conclude by discussing the potential implications of such patterns on the quality of civil-military relations and the objective evaluation of US foreign policy by the public.

The Partisan Gap in Military Credibility
Polarized attitudes on the credibility of elite voices has significant implications when considering how the public forms attitudes on important policy decisions. As previously noted,
the credibility of cue sources to the individual is an irreducible factor in the persuasiveness
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of that source and its message. In forming preferences on complex issues, the individual
makes cost-efficient choices in seeking out sources and allowing themselves to be persuaded
by information advanced by credible actors. Specific articulations of what “credibility”
entails vary; while usually requiring some baseline of knowledge about the subject under
debate, different theoretical accounts of credibility include consideration of costly signaling (Baum and Groeling 2009), ideological “like-mindedness” (Downs 1957), elite status or
unity (Zaller 1992), likability (Brady and Sniderman 1985), and “trustworthiness” in being
able to reveal accurate information (Lupia and Mathew D. McCubbins 1998). Reliance on
source attributes like credibility is more likely under circumstances where the respondent
has minimal understanding of the issue or exists in a high-distraction information environment (Petty and Cacioppo 1986). As a result, an understanding of which elite communities
carry the most weight in the public debate requires some measure of institutional credibility.

While operationalizing source credibility for political institutions like the legislature can
be more easily proxied for by partisan identity or regularly-surveyed job approval metrics,
it is difficult to measure the same value for apolitical institutions without public pressure
incentives or electoral demands. However, public trust and confidence in institutions is
a widely-collected survey device that affords the opportunity to overcome this problem
and operationalize perceived source credibility more directly. Though there is considerable
theoretical debate over whether expressed public trust is transactional and a reflection of
incumbent performance (Citrin 1974; Lipset and Schneider 1983) or a broader statement
about satisfaction with the system of government (Miller 1974a; Williams 1985), popular
trust in institutions provides a metric for the perceived reliability of these elite communities
in society.1 While individuals should theoretically converge on some common evaluation of
institutional performance – particularly for institutions without a partisan function – we
will observe that the military evokes increasingly divided attitudes.

Many analyses probing the broader trends of institutional credibility have been limited
1

While the wording of various survey questions phrases these concepts differently, I use the terms trust and
confidence interchangeably insofar as they speak to the individual’s chosen criterion for positive performance.
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by two constraints. First, these studies have focused on pooled, aggregate, or cross-national
statistics of public confidence, with incidental accounting of how the military institution
fits into the public consciousness. However, some efforts have been made to disaggregate
specific institutions from the whole in an effort to visualize underlying correlations between
individual organizations. Some scholars have found that the military escapes classification
as “the only public institution whose performance can be expected to operate and be evaluated according to standards different from those of civic life” (Newton and Norris 2000),
while others place the military into the category of “order institutions” valued for their
objective enforcement of the law (Rothstein and Stolle 2007). By what evaluative method
individuals judge the military remains undetermined even by these efforts. The second
limitation is that the public is often envisioned as a political whole. This tendency can be
misleading, projecting an image of broad consensus on a dynamic that exhibits many of the
same aspects of polarization we observe in other realms of public opinion.2 Whereas many
studies have focused on the high level of public confidence the military enjoys, failing to
examine this trend among political subgroups has prevented more nuanced study.

Challenging these prior limitations in the field of institutional confidence allows for observation of the primary empirical puzzle of this analysis: the partisan gap in military
credibility. Table 3.1 reports Democratic and Republican levels of confidence for a variety
of institutions in US society, including representative, power-checking, and order institutions. This figure captures not only the divide amongst partisans over the credibility of the
military institution, but contextualizes this gap across other institutions in society. Partisan separation regarding the military rivals the same gap among other institutions that
2
Regression analysis of the individual-level data from the primary institutional confidence surveys reveals
the partisan asymmetry at the core of our research question. Linear probability regression models with
year fixed-effects using the Gallup and GSS time-series datasets indicate that identification as a Republican emerges as the strongest predictor of high confidence in the military, even in fully-specified models
controlling for education, race, gender, age cohort, and an indicator for whether a political co-partisan was
the commander-in-chief at the time. Classification as ‘high confidence’ captures response to the confidence
question with “a great deal/quite a lot” rendered as a binary variable; similarly the dependent variable in
the GSS models was the top response of expressed confidence on that survey’s three-point scale. Using a
similar model with the most recent World Values Survey (WVS) data on US attitudes from 2011, I again
observe that Republican vote-intent is a statistically significant predictor; additionally, high military confidence was positively shaped by preference for authoritarian political solutions, national pride, and concerns
over terrorism, characteristics commonly associated with political conservatism (Hetherington and Suhay
2011).
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Table 3.1: Confidence Among Partisans for Select US Institutions (2017-18)

Gallup (2017)

NPR/PBS/Marist (2018)

Dem.

Rep.

Partisan Gap

Dem.

Rep.

Partisan Gap

10∗
−
−
45
31∗

60∗
−
−
66
14∗

50∗
−
−
21
17∗

7
26
2
44
23

37
3
23
65
4

30
23
21
21
19

30∗
67∗
43∗
4

36∗
73∗
40∗
5

6∗
6∗
3∗
1

16
−
22
7

17
−
27
9

1
−
5
2

High Polarization
Presidency
Democratic Party
Republican Party
Military
Media/TV News

Low Polarization
Banking System
Small Business
Supreme Court
Congress

NOTE: Reported figures depict levels of partisan confidence in select US institutions across
both the Gallup Institutional Confidence survey (2017) and the NPR/PBS/Marist Poll (2018).
Partisan Gap column indicates the magnitude (in percentage points) of difference between
partisan subgroups on each institution surveyed. Asterisk (*) indicates institutions where
figures were computed using both “a great deal” and “quite a lot” of confidence combined due
to data format. All other figures computed using highest (“a great deal”) confidence response.

are highly susceptible to partisan calculations, such as the presidency and the media. Surprisingly, while we might expect evaluations of the military to resemble low-polarization
institutions such as the courts or the banking system, this is not the case. Rather, partisans seem to be just as polarized about the military institution as they are about the major
party establishments.

The notion that partisan calculations should inform impressions about the performance
or institutional quality of the military is particularly curious given its apolitical mandate.
The military institution has a specific role in society, to fight and win the nation’s wars;
however, despite the organization having no explicit partisan role, partisans arrive at different evaluations of the institution’s credibility. What explains this divergence? Existing
scholarship would suggest that elite-level alignment on policy preferences or military demography could explain such an arrangement. However, these explanations cannot explain
a dynamic sustainment – and expansion – of the partisan gap across different administrations and states of military performance. In the following section, I propose a corollary
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theory, that separation in perceived institutional credibility – particularly during wartime
– between partisans is the product of the different processes by which these groups receive
new information about the institution and form resulting evaluations.

Theoretical Development
Extant Explanations
Many security scholars have studied the importance of partisan identity as a salient consideration in civil-military relations, whether in the context of how civilians and the military
divide on the use of force (Golby 2011; Feaver and Kohn 2001), the public’s knowledge
and perception of the military in society (Schake and Mattis 2016), or the political demography of the military itself (J. K. Dempsey 2009; Urben 2010; M. C. Desch 2001b).
However, while these analyses describe elite-level dynamics or the political identification of
the military, they speak less to the polarization that exists between subsets of that public in
evaluating the credibility of an institution they commonly observe. Indeed, a conservative
Republican preference for the military institution has been a persistent trend for several
decades and one addressed laterally in broader discussions of civil-military relations in the
United States. What explanations have been advanced that could explain, at least statically, the partisan “confidence gap” in the military institution?

At the elite level, closer proximity between the military and the Republican party has
been attributed to a host of factors. The party’s post-Vietnam role in loosening many
of bureaucratic restrictions that the Kennedy and Johnson administrations had placed on
the military led to a period of autonomy and expansive authorities in the Pentagon, developed further under the patronage of the Reagan-era buildup and the Goldwater-Nichols
bureaucratic re-organization (Kohn 1994). The party leadership also seized on a critical
opportunity to capture national security and patriotism as key aspects of the its post-war
identity, filling the political void left by a Democratic party that retreated from interventionist rhetoric and favored domestic programs over expanded military funding. Indeed,
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even the military’s image was better rehabilitated under Republican presidents, as William
Odom states, that though “the Democrats have treated the military as the source of bad
national strategy in Vietnam [...] the Republicans defended the military against the charge”
(Kohn et al. 1994). This connection was deepened by increasingly aligned preferences for
the use of force abroad (Golby 2011), militant internationalism (Wittkopf 1990), and increasing skepticism of more ideologically-distant Democratic leaders (Kohn 2002).

The rightward-changing demography of the military itself has also been a subject of
study among civil-military scholars. Huntington (1957) early identified the emerging southern identity of the post-conscription force, while the post-Vietnam all-volunteer military
took on a far less representative profile than society at large. With the adoption of the
“southern strategy” by Republicans in the 1960s and 1970s, Republicans leveraged their
position as the national security party and its geographical inheritance of the American
South to increase its electoral connections to servicemembers. Between 1976 and 1996,
military officers had become far more outspoken in their identification with the party, increasing from 33% to 70%, even though the larger society only increased identification with
the party from 25% to 33% over the same period (O. R. Holsti 1998; M. C. Desch 2001b).
Political attitudes among military officers have swung decisively in favor of the Republican
party, with those identifying as Democrats joining at lower rates and leaving at earlier times
than Republican counterparts (J. K. Dempsey 2009). Recent survey evidence suggests that
conservatives in the broader public find much more common political ground with the institutional values of the military as well.3

These efforts make a collectively compelling argument for explaining the existence of
3

Schake and Mattis (2016) find that 58% of Republicans believed military servicemembers to be “more
socially conservative” than the rest of society, compared with 9% of Democrats who believed servicemembers
were “less socially conservative” than the rest of society. Additionally, 72% of Republicans believed military
values to be “about the same” or “less progressive” than the rest of society, compared with 16% of Democrats
would believed military values were “more progressive”. This speaks to the perception that Republicans feel
military veterans are “more like us” than Democrats or Independents. The survey finds that Republicans
see the military as more meritocratic and that holding on to an “old-fashioned view of morality” is necessary
for the institution. Compared to Democrats, Republicans are also more likely to believe that the military
has “a great deal of respect for civilian society” and less likely to believe that civilian society possesses the
same respect for the military in turn.
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(1) a preference alignment on foreign policy between Republicans and the military at the
elite level and (2) an increasing cultivation of military servicemembers as an extension of
the party’s constituency at the mass public level. However, this does not directly address
why the conservative public would continue to imbue the military with high levels of seemingly unconditional trust as an elite source. As I will argue, the missing component is an
understanding of how institutional confidence can be less an objective valuation of an organization’s performance than it is itself an extension of partisan polarization and cognitive
bias. With limited first-hand understanding of an institution, individuals are largely dependent on other elites in society for information by which to form an opinion, such as the
organized media (Nye 1997). However, media environments trafficked by different partisans
may exhibit widely different sensibilities in their reporting patterns, making information
unevenly available for use by the audience.

In the following section, I argue that we currently lack a dynamic understanding of
partisan polarization in expressed trust for the military in a way that exceeds mere static
explanations of preferences. Individuals with limited exposure to the military institution
require third-party elite information to drive attitudes about its performance. Just as strong
partisans are more likely to be politically active (Abramowitz and K. L. Saunders 2008),
exhibit polarized attitudes (Iyengar and Hahn 2009), and downweight disconfirming information (Taber and Lodge 2006), they are also more likely to display increased in-group bias
(Mason 2015) and fail to objectively evaluate the quality of institutions (Iyengar, Sood,
and Lelkes 2012). As such, I propose a theory linking how strong partisans acquire and
use information about the military institution when making judgments about its credibility.

A Dynamic Theory and the “Confidence Gap”
The fundamental assertion of this analysis is that the confidence gap between partisans can
be more completely explained by considering the methods by which individuals acquire and
process new information about the military institution; if partisans on either side are more
or less likely to acquire new and useful information, or biased in their interpretations of that
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information, then even poor performance or unethical activity by the military could prevent individuals in society from converging on some common assessment of the institution.
Furthermore, any pattern of partisan polarization must include an account of the role of
strong or ideologically “sorted” partisans in the process, as these individuals are both more
relevant to the shaping of political discourse and are more likely to be driving polarization
writ large (Mason 2015). Because of the strictly non-partisan and apolitical nature of the
military, the existence of a bias-driven and partisan confidence gap could be symptomatic
of shifting public attitudes about the appropriateness of a political role for the military.

However, how would partisans in society arrive at different expressed opinions about a
non-partisan entity they both commonly observe? An incredibly rich literature in political
science has focused on the varying processes by which individuals update their impressions
of policies or institutions in response to new information. One theoretical school, advanced
more recently by Achen (1992) and Gerber and D. Green (1999) contends that even partisan individuals are capable of responsibly using information to update their own prior
beliefs in a credibly Bayesian fashion. This conceptualization of fundamentally unbiased
learning “holds that new information moves people with different partisan affinities (but
similar levels of prior information) in the same direction and to approximately the same
extent.” When approval for a policy or leader across different partisan subgroups seems to
track in a parallel fashion, they argue, this is clear evidence of unbiased learning.

However, Bartels (2002) argues against this interpretation; if a truly unbiased process
were at work, partisan subgroups should not be moving in parallel, but converge on some
common understanding as new information outweighs individual-level priors in the Bayesian
framework. Instead, the parallel trends observation used by Gerber and D. Green (1999) as
validation for their belief in unbiased learning is actually the most potent evidence against
it: there is some irreducible partisan bias that separates political subgroups despite observation of some common picture of factual information. Indeed, this perspective has been
more recently examined in analysis by Taber and Lodge (2006) that finds strong partisans,
particularly those with the political sophistication to mount an informed defense, will seek
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out confirmatory information, downweight disconfirming arguments, and lend more credibility to information that confirms their prior understanding. Applied to this case, the
failure of partisans to reach a common understanding of the performance of the military
institution should lead us to believe that a potentially partisan-motivated bias is at work.

Such thinking is at the core of this theory: an increasingly polarized and ideologicallysorted public, subjected to different information flows and exhibiting different levels of cognitive bias, contributes to widening polarization in what should be an objective evaluation
of institutional performance. As such, this theory envisions two complementary elements
of the same evaluative process with regards to assessment of the military institution. First,
the selective exposure hypothesis argues that partisans are predisposed to receive widely
different types of information pertaining to military performance, shaping the usable store
of data with which partisans issue judgments of credibility. Second, the partisans bias hypothesis argues that how partisans use new or newly-salient information in forming opinions
differs greatly between subgroups, with affective polarization biases driving uneven levels
of perceived military credibility. I incorporate competing arguments regarding the ability
of individuals to update rationally (Gerber and D. Green 1999) or in a biased fashion (Bartels 2002; Brian J. Gaines et al. 2007) when rendering a judgment on the reliability of the
military institution and utilize a multi-method approach to address this question.

Selective Information Exposure

The first portion of my theory regards bias in information acquisition, which I argue could
take on any combination of two non-mutually exclusive forms. The first is that partisans
are subject to different volumes of information regarding military performance or organizational conduct. Demand-based reporting biases and voluntary selective exposure to certain
outlets can result in the individual having far less probability of hearing new information.
An individual may discredit reporting that focuses on the story or traffic a limited diversity
of news outlets, allowing reporting biases to shape the information to which she is exposed.
If information availability is minimal compared to other individuals, contrary updates are
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easier to dismiss out of hand as unreliable or aberrant. Bartels (2002) argues that while
skepticism of new information that challenges one’s priors may be Bayesian, it is not rational; indeed this off-hand rejection of new information “in extreme cases [...] may approach
delusion” in its censoring of new updating information. In order to account for the possibility that media outlets with partisan audiences – particularly conservative ones – may
exhibit this reporting bias, I structure H1A:

• H1A (Asymmetric Reporting): News outlets with established partisans audiences will
report negative stories about the military at different rates. The reporting volume of these
stories will be lower among conservative-favored media outlets than centrist or liberal-favored
outlets.

The second form of information exposure bias I propose is that partisans are subject to
different frames when military information is reported; on issues regarding military competence and professionalism, these stories may be presented in a way that insulates the
institution from public criticism or highlights institutional failures. Even if H1A predicts
certain outlets would under-report these stories, periods of conflict would still likely oblige
reporting on war activities by biased media outlets to their audience. However, the nature
of that reporting may be heavily subject to “lead story” effects and issue framing by focusing on some aspects of the military’s performance and a war’s conduct while ignoring or
downplaying others (Iyengar and Kinder 1989). I capture this potential avenue of information selectivity in H1B:

• H1B (Asymmetric Framing): When negative military stories are reported, media outlets with established partisan audiences will exhibit different frames with respect to criticism/insulation of the military institution. Conservative-favored outlets will frame war stories
in a way that insulates the military from criticism or re-directs blame, while centrist or liberalfavored outlets will report more directly on military failures or scandals.

In both cases, the events of reality fail to effectively update factual beliefs due to filtering
by partisan-favored media sources. Given the direction of the partisan confidence gap, in
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which Republicans exhibit consistently higher levels of trust in the military, H1A predicts
that conservative media outlets reporting on political issues will significantly under-report
issues regarding military failures, strategic missteps, professional misconduct, and other stories critical of the military institution. This would logically result in a Republican audience
with less access to updating information by which to form new evaluations of the military.
Whether this is the result of supply-side news biases, demand-side audience preferences, or
a combination of both, is not the purview of this analysis, as all of them contribute to the
logic of H1A. In addition, H1B predicts that when these stories are reported, they will be
framed in such a way as to minimize direct damage to the prestige and credibility of the
institution. I will test both of these hypotheses in the following section by analyzing reporting habits and patterns among news outlets with defined partisan audiences during the
Iraq War. This period is particularly useful in testing the information exposure hypothesis
because (1) new information about military conduct and performance was readily available
and (2) this timeframe is characterized by some of the widest separation between partisans
on military attitudes.

Partisan Biases and Affective Polarization

The second portion of my theory asserts that partisans are using different evaluative processes to transfer information into judgments about the credibility of the military institution.
Conditional on new updating information reaching the audience, it still may be the case
that partisans differ in how they evaluate the performance or institutional quality of the
armed forces. However, difference in expressed opinion need not indicate the existence of
pronounced partisan bias. I therefore consider three potential explanations for how partisans might arrive at different conclusions about the military institution in response to new
or newly-salient information.

The first is that Republicans in society have a larger base of knowledge and working information about the military compared to others. According to this assertion, Republicans
are not updating in a biased fashion. Instead, the incorporation of new information does not
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influence prior attitudes because that prior is based on a very high number of observations
in their “running tally”, against which a new piece of data is relatively insignificant. If
Republican respondents are selectively predisposed to have much higher amounts of information about the military institution, have greater expressed interest in military issues, or
have more direct familiarity with the institution compared to Democrats and Independents,
it may follow that their prior attitudes are harder to reverse because of the relative size
between existing beliefs and new information. From this argument I form the following
hypothesis:

• H2A (Bayesian Updating): Republican partisans possess a larger store of information
regarding the military institution than Democrats or Independents ex ante, making updating
information relatively ineffectual compared to others.

The implications of this hypothesis would be that Republicans have greater interest in
military affairs, possess greater command of knowledge in issues regarding the institution,
or have higher levels of direct exposure to the military as an organization. As a result,
new information regarding military affairs would have a much larger prior to influence compared to centrists or liberals with comparatively less knowledge about the military. I will
test this hypothesis using both observational and experimental data regarding Republican
knowledge and interest in security issues and the military institution more broadly.

The second potential explanation for the partisan separation in expressed confidence I
consider comes from the counterarguments of Gerber and D. Green (1999); if individuals
simply have different perceptions of what is preferable, disparate attitudes need not be
indicative of biased processing. In order to understand how individuals might have different expectations of the same institution, it is necessary to understand some of the basic
arguments in the institutional trust literature. In its broadest form, the debate over the
causes of public trust is the product of two divergent attitudes over directionality. The
first advocates that cultural factors at lower social levels drive institutional trust at higher
ones. This tradition subscribes to an exogenous understanding of trust in government as
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the natural extension of a vibrant civic culture and socialization (Almond and Verba 1963;
Putnam 1993; Fukuyama 1995). The second argues a reverse process in which institutional
outcomes drive requisite public trust. In this tradition, expressed trust in institutions is
endogenous, a rational valuation of those institutions based on their perceived performance
(Hetherington 1998). This top-down process of creating confidence in institutions requires
that government produce positive outcomes that are, in turn, rewarded by the public with
expressions of trust in the institutions that are responsible for those outcomes. Mishler and
Rose (2001) seize on one of the main limitations of this field in that, “although institutional theories agree that political trust is endogenous, they disagree about which aspects
of performance are important or how performance is assessed.” In order to correct this gap
with regards to evaluation of the military, I establish several categories of potential conduct.

Most of the limited study dedicated to understanding institutional evaluations of the
military has relied on institutionalist theory, arguing that public trust is a rational valuation
of perceived performance. There have been numerous efforts to characterize what types of
behavior or performance individuals value most with regards to the military, ranging from
purely transactional evaluations of battlefield performance (Gronke and Feaver 2001; King
and Karabell 2002b) to organizational professionalism (Hill, Wong, and Gerras 2013; Burbach 2017). As some have noted, the specific challenge in explaining patterns of trust in
the military institution comes from the difficulty in capturing a meaningful metric of performance (Garb and Malesic 2016; Yang and Holzer 2006). However, none have considered
that these criteria might differ based on the political or ideological leanings of the individual.

I therefore organize the existing literature on military confidence to create three nonmutually exclusive categories of criteria for assessing the military institution. The first
potential driver of public esteem for the military is, as Gronke and Feaver remark, “the
most obvious” one, a purely transactional assessment of the institution based on its performance in warfare. I categorize this class of criteria as performance evaluations. As the
military’s singular function within society is to fight and win its nation’s wars, it follows
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that the institution’s performance under these conditions should provide the clearest signal to the public as to its competency and quality. Using results from a sweeping survey
of civilian and military elites in the late 1990s, Gronke and Feaver (2001) examine the
potential causes of high expressed confidence among the public as a product of process,
perception of the organization’s governing principles and ethics, and policy, an institutionalist account of performance-based evaluation (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995).4 A similar
case is made by King and Karabell (2002b), arguing that the military overcame depressed
public support after Vietnam by demonstrating consistent and decisive success in Grenada,
Panama, Iraq, and the Balkans. I therefore consider that some partisans may value performance in conflict more than others when rendering an opinion on institutional credibility.

A second theoretical approach takes into account the importance of organizational practices and “process”, that public regard for the military institution is driven by perceived
institutional integrity, ethical quality, and embodiment of cherished social norms. Following
the nomenclature of King and Karabell (2002b) and Burbach (2017), I categorize this class
of explanations as professionalism evaluations. While achieving some quantifiable link between institutional practices and public esteem has been difficult to ascertain, I nonetheless
consider this explanation potentially powerful given the concurrence of internal military
reforms and rising public esteem during the post-Vietnam era. This does not suggest that
concern over the military’s moral character supplants public desire for a capable military.
For our purposes, the professionalism class of evaluations asserts that individuals in society
expect the military to embody certain virtues or maintain organizational standards of integrity while preserving warfighting capacity. However, it also assumes that the more active
process in public valuation of the institution is not an overt display of battlefield prowess
so much as fair practices and accountability.

Third, I capture potential responses to the military’s development as an impartial and
4
The process class is significant to the “professionalism” treatment condition in this study, while the
policy class is analogous to the “performance” condition. While the latter focuses on direct observation
of outcomes from the battlefield, the former is a judgment on the institution’s ability to fairly regulate its
internal processes.
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unbiased elite community in society. Though civil-military relations scholars have debated
various models for the optimal distribution of political and military power, there is broad
consensus across most for the virtue and necessity of an apolitical military (Huntington
1957; Feaver and Kohn 2001; Feaver 1999; J. K. Dempsey 2009; Golby, Feaver, and Dropp
2017). The typology of institutions laid out by Rothstein and Stolle (2007) includes the
armed forces as part of the class of “order institutions” valued for their impartiality and
ability to fairly administer policy. While military elites have become more prevalent in the
political discourse domestically, Hill, Wong, and Gerras (2013) argue that it is the continued
restraint of the institution from engaging in partisan activity and its deeply-ingrained deference to civilian leaders that has contributed to high public confidence. I characterize this
class of criteria as non-partisan evaluations, distinct from performance and professionalism
preferences in that the public is responding not to battlefield outcomes or organizational
ethics, but on the perception of the military as an apolitical source of information. In this
framework, overt acts of partisanship or political activism on the part of active or retired
military elites would be the most damaging behavior the institution could engage in, as
it compromises the image of the military as neutral executor of public security. Indeed,
the specter of a politicized military has led many to suggest that repeated forays into the
political sphere would damage trust in the military institution directly, and in government
more broadly (King and Karabell 2002b; J. K. Dempsey 2009; Liebert and Golby 2017a).
From these three preference sets I form the following hypothesis:

• H2B (Divergent Standards): Certain partisans will value different classes of military
behavior (performance, professionalism, non-partisanship) more in rendering their opinions
about institutional credibility. These differing preferences allow for partisans to evaluate the
institutions rationally, but on different evaluative criteria.

These different classes of evaluative criteria allow for the possibility that partisans across
society merely have divergent preferences with regards to the optimal behavior of their military. As a result, H2B argues that partisan divergence in expressed confidence is the result
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of different political subsets expecting certain types of behavior from the military and rewarding or punishing the institution in accordance with their perceived accomplishments
or failures in that class. This would be observable if partisans displayed clear and distinct
prioritization in which types of military behavior affected their perceptions of trust. I test
this hypothesis using experimental methods designed to measure partisan preferences for
military performance.

However, if partisan priors ex ante regarding knowledge of the military institution are
comparable and partisan individuals express no clear preference for military behavior relative to each other, we can no longer assume that unbiased learning is taking place. In this
case, a difference in expressed opinion at the conclusion of the updating process between
partisan groups is attributable to cognitive biases that prevent an updated evaluation of
the institution. Conditional on access to useful information on military failures, one would
expect a commensurate re-evaluation of the institution that took this information into account; if they did not, some biased process is affecting the nature of that evaluation:

• H2C (Partisan Bias): Republican partisans employ a biased process in evaluating the
credibility of the military institution in response to new information. Conditional on receiving
negative information on military institutional quality, Republicans will reject, downweight, or
“backfire” their estimations of military credibility.

Both H2A and H2B allow for an unbiased process of evaluation to take place: the former attributes rigid confidence in the military to the notion that new information is less
influential compared to a larger base of knowledge, while the latter contends that partisans
simply disagree on the most important criteria by which to evaluate the military’s credibility. However, H2C captures the possibility that, even without more ex ante information on
the military and with the ability to express preferences differently, a subset of individuals
will actively reject updating information or interpret the meaning of that information in a
way that insulates the military institution from damage.
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Why might this be the case? A substantial literature in political science has sought to
investigate the nature of partisan polarization in American society, particularly with regard
to the effect of partisan sorting on the extremity of issue positions and out-group animus
(Mason 2015; Abramowitz and K. L. Saunders 2008; Bafumi and Shapiro 2009). A critical
distinction is made between traditional issue polarization and social or affective polarization,
in which partisans – sorted into closer party-ideology alignment – increase both out-group
animus and in-group bias (Mason 2015; Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Iyengar, Sood, and
Lelkes 2012). In this framework, partisan identity carries with it a social dimension that
can distort objective thought processes regarding policy or governmental quality. Bafumi
and Shapiro (2009) argue more pointedly that the influence of solidified partisan attitudes
may have potentially damaging implications for rational opinion formation more broadly
(emphasis added by author):
Strong partisan attitudes may lead to rigidity of attitudes and opinions in the face
of new and credible discrepant information. Not only might such new information be
avoided through selective exposure, but its accuracy and validity might be denied as a
result of “motivated bias” or flawed reasoning or no reasoning at all.

Expressions of confidence in the military, within this framework, are not rational evaluations of institutional credibility, but emotional statements of partisan and social identity.
Strong partisans have been found to be particularly more likely to counter-argue contrary
information (Taber and Lodge 2006), to express anger or bias in response to threats to
party status or prestige (Huddy, Mason, and Aaroe 2015), or in the case of political conservatives, to express far more dogmatic thought processes or ideological intensity (Nyhan and
Reifler 2010; Lelkes and Sniderman 2016). While many of these patterns have been found
in attitudes about co-partisans, it would be particularly curious to find such a dynamic at
work in attitudes about an institution with a decidedly non-partisan structure and code
of ethics. Nonetheless, I propose through H2C that this process is at work, particularly
among strong conservative partisans, influencing how new information about the military
is received and processed.

In this section I have argued for the use of a dynamic theory in order to explain partisan
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polarization on perceived military credibility. While issued-based explanations are suitable
for explaining a static or baseline “confidence gap” between partisans, the persistence and
expansion of this gap over time requires a different theoretical approach. This theory argues that special attention must be paid to (1) how individuals receive new information
about the military institution and (2) the pathologies that partisans exhibit in how that
information is used. In the first part of the theory, I propose two hypotheses arguing that
partisan audiences are exposed to vastly different information environments with regards
to the volume and tone of military information. In the second part, while I account for
the possibility that divergent attitudes are the product of rational processes, I argue that
partisan bias – particularly among the strongest or “sorted” partisans – may be driving the
broader pattern of polarization we observe.

Partisan Exposure to Military Performance
In this section I evaluate the validity of information exposure explanations for partisan polarization in military confidence. The institutionalist school discussed above requires that
the public issue judgments of the performance of an institution based on its perceived quality. However, it is a central contention of this analysis that even if individuals have a variety
of options in how to evaluate the military institution given new information, they are still
largely reliant on third parties to provide that information. Barring personal experience or
direct exposure to the institution’s actions, many individuals instead rely on information
from other elite communities in society, such as political leaders and the news media when
forming attitudes on institutions (Nye 1997; Hanitzsch and Berganza 2012; Wiegand and
Paletz 2001). This assumption is particularly valid when considering the military institution, given its increasing distance from the mass public and the decreasing probability
of the average citizen having first-hand information on military performance (Liebert and
Golby 2017a). Due to the centrality of these additional sources on shaping the information
environment, I examine the importance of media reporting habits on the information environment to which partisans are exposed.
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Partisan political identity serves as the principal lens through which I envision individuals gaining information about institutional performance. For a structurally and normatively
apolitical institution as the military, partisan alignment should theoretically provide no additional information that is predictive of performance evaluation. However, as the previous
descriptive regressions and factor analysis have revealed, this is not the case. Instead, I
argue that polarization in expressed trust for the military is partially the result of such
expressions being subsumed into partisan identities, maintained by controlled information
exposure. As Achen and Bartels (2017) observe:
A party constructs a conceptual viewpoint by which its voters can make sense of the
political world. Sympathetic newspapers, magazines, websites, and television channels
convey the framework to partisans. This framework identifies friends and enemies, it
supplies talking points, and it tells people how to think and what to believe. (pg. 268)

Conservative Republicans are far more likely to consume news media from a single
source rather than a multitude of news outlets; as such, we should expect that the reliance
on third-party information about the military institution is more potent among these individuals, given the increased likelihood for more substantively coherent information.5 However, as previously discussed, the existence of media “echo-chambers”, particularly among
established partisans, serves to minimize exposure to contrary information (Jamieson and
Cappella 2008), “reinforce existing attitudes and beliefs” (Iyengar and Hahn 2009), and
increase alignment with pro-attitudinal information (Stroud 2008). Furthermore, the active
distrust among political conservatives for a much wider swath of media sources compounds
this effect: in addition to trafficking a limited plurality of information sources, this partisan
subgroup is also more likely to reject contrary information as non-credible depending on its
source. Polling on this phenomenon reveals that while 62% of Democrats believe that the
5
Pew reports that 47% of individuals identifying as “conservative” or “very conservative” obtain news on
government and politics from a single source: FOX News. This compares to smaller outlet followings among
political liberals, where MSNBC and CNN have followings of 12% and 15%, respectively. “Consistent”
conservatives are also far more likely to actively distrust other media outlets than liberals; of the 36 media
outlets surveyed, conservatives held more distrust than trust for 24 of them, compared to 8 out of 36
among liberals. “Political Polarization and Media Habits: From Fox News to Facebook, How Liberals and
Conservatives Keep Up with Politics”, Pew Research Center, October 21, 2014.
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news media “gets the facts straight”, only 14% of Republicans feel the same way; this distrust of the press permeates every medium, from television to print media to internet news.6

If stories that otherwise might update their opinion of the military’s performance or
professionalism are rejected or not widely reported by their preferred media outlets, strong
partisans may be more likely to dismiss singular disconfirming stories as either untrustworthy, biased, or unrepresentative of the institution writ large. The impact of partisanship
has been demonstrated to have a marked effect on perceptions of military operations; respondents identifying as Republican during the Bush administration were more likely to
underestimate the number of casualties the US had sustained in the Iraq conflict and more
likely to have a higher perceived probability of success for the war’s outcome (Adam J.
Berinsky 2007). Rather than support for a conflict specifically, I explore the feasibility
of H1A and H1B in that partisans update – or fail to update – their impressions of the
military institution in response to different patterns of reporting on war performance and
military professionalism. The role of individual level political identity, particularly among
ideologically “sorted” partisans, may help to explain the broader trend of polarization in
military confidence we observe.

Evaluating Asymmetric Reporting Hypothesis
In order to assess the plausibility of divergent information availability across news outlets
with established partisan audiences, I analyze reporting trends on the Iraq War in 2007
across major media sources in different forms. This period is remarkable in that it was
arguably the most politically contentious and empirically the most deadly year of the Iraq
War; I argue that this period of time exhibits the high watermark of war reporting and public accessibility to updating information about military capability and effectiveness, making
it a highly useful case for analysis. The first dimension I examine is the frequency with
which stories that might otherwise update partisan attitudes on the military are reported
6

Andrew Dugan and Zac Auter, “Republicans’, Democrats’ Views of Media Accuracy Diverge”, Gallup,
August 25, 2017.
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across different sources. In order to test the theory that conservative sources may under
report stories of war performance (H1A), I utilize the Pew Research Center News Content
Index (NCI) dataset, which records and codes the duration, substance, and frequency of
online, radio, television, and print media news segments based on a series of rotating sampling processes.7

I specifically examine the prominence and frequency of stories coded in the NCI dataset
as pertaining to combat events, casualties, reconstructions efforts, evaluations of the Iraq
troop surge, and other events relevant to the conduct of the war’s execution. These stories are coded distinctly from “homefront” stories involving memorialization or Iraq veteran
issues and “policy debate” stories regarding political ramifications, general strategy, or antiwar efforts. As a result, this category exclusively captures news stories that best reflect the
performance of the military during the critical “surge” period to a national audience. I
focus on cable news outlets with the highest ratings exposure in 2007 (CNN, MSNBC,
FOX) and print media outlets classified as “Tier 1” by Pew based on national distribution
and circulation (The New York Times, The Washington Post, and Wall Street Journal ). I
also include radio programs with headline feeds (ABC News Headlines), national audiences
(NPR), and the highest cumulative audience programs in 2007 (Sean Hannity, Rush Limbaugh).8 From this I am able to capture a fairly adequate picture of the media environment
partisans would have experienced regarding information on the military’s performance in
Iraq.

Figure 3.1 displays the results of this analysis for the major cable news channels. As
previously stated, a preponderance of self-identified conservatives consume most of their
news from FOX, while liberals and centrists are more likely to sample from a variety of
7

See Appendix C for expanded description of NCI sampling processes and procedures.
For television and radio programs, I generate “% of Newshole” by calculating a daily total of duration
(in on-air seconds) spent on the Iraq Combat Events topic by each source, divided by the total number of
on-air seconds sampled by the NCI database. This yields a daily percentage of the on-air time devoted to
Iraq Combat Event stories per day, per source. For print media, I reverse-coded the “prominence” variable
from the NCI dataset that rates all newspaper stories on a five-point scale based on location in the paper’s
print edition (most prominent, second most prominent, other-above the fold, etc...), taking the daily average
of these to create a “Prominence Proportion” per day, per source.
8
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Figure 3.1: Media Coverage of Iraq Combat Events by Source, 2007

NOTE: This figure depicts media coverage of Iraq Combat Events (ICE) and related news stories as
coded by Pew Research News Content Index (NCI) Dataset. Points represent day totals for percent
of newshole for cable news sources with largest audience reach. LOESS smoothers are added to
depict broader trend of moving averages over time (span = 0.10). Shaded periods indicate several
Iraq-related events of interest during the course of the 2007 news year, including announcement of
the “surge” strategy (State of the Union), the Congressional report on its progress (Petraeus Report),
and sharp increases in coalition casualties.

sources including CNN, MSNBC, and PBS. For this reason, I focus on the contrast between
these groups of media outlets when reporting on the Combat Events category. Evident from
these results is that FOX devotes low levels of average air time to such stories in 2007, with
segments of far shorter collective duration compared to the other news channels. The most
notable gaps in relative coverage between outlets are concurrent with increased concern of
the refugee crisis (March), the deadliest months of the year (April-July), and the period
following General David Petraeus’ report to Congress (September). During these periods,
conservative media is out-reported by as much as two- to three-times by other networks on
these stories. As reported in Table 3.2, over the entire measured period of 2007, the average
percentage of daily coverage time spent on ICE stories on FOX amounted to roughly half
of that spent by CNN and MSNBC, and close to a third of that spent by PBS. Coverage of
Iraq stories more generally, including homefront and policy stories, exhibit and even starker
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contrast between outlets.

I replicate this analysis to include other forms of news transmission. Incorporation of
print newspapers with national distribution yields a similar pattern of reporting asymmetry.
Figure 3.2(a) captures the prominence given to ICE stories over time by each of the three
Tier 1 print sources sampled; while the Wall Street Journal is not a conservative media
“chamber” as FOX is for television, recent study has revealed it is the only newspaper that
self-identified conservatives trust more than they distrust.9 Even at minimum span, the
LOESS smoother cannot capture a yearly trend of reporting for WSJ because there are too
few data points of reporting on these stories. This should not be surprising; compared to
The New York Times and The Washington Post, the Journal is far more business-focused
and devotes less column inches to foreign affairs on the whole. However, it remains that
among preferred print media sources, an even wider disparity in access to updating information about the military’s war performance exists in this medium than in cable news.

I include consideration of radio sources as an additional medium; of the top five media
sources utilized by consistent conservatives, FOX News (88%) and local news (50%) are
followed closely by radio programs from Sean Hannity (45%) and Rush Limbaugh (43%).10
However, Figure 3.2(b) reveals that these do not constitute an unaccounted channel by
which information about war events might be communicated. Again, the LOESS smoother
has too few reporting points to calculate a yearly trend from the conservative outlets. This
is in comparison to National Public Radio and ABC News Headlines which regularly spend
in excess of 10% of their sampled air-time on ground events and actions coming from the
Iraq War. As a well-trafficked news medium by self-identified political conservatives, these
findings contribute to the pattern developed in Figures 3.1 and 3.2(a), in which network
9

While actually quite centrist based on the ideological distribution of its audience, WSJ is in fact the only
news sources out of 36 in the Pew study in which individuals from the entire ideological spectrum express
trust over distrust; for this reason, I incorporate this paper as the conservative source for print media as it
is the most likely to be consumed by right partisans.
10
Percentages of conservative viewership captured by Pew Research, 2014. Pew Research Center, October
2014, “Political Polarization and Media Habits”
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics, Iraq War Reporting: Cable News (2007)
Mean Percentage of Sampled Newshole
PBS

CNN

MSNBC

FOX News

News Source

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Combat Events

9.18
(< 0.001)

6.12
(< 0.001)

6.85
(< 0.001)

3.62

Domestic/Homefront

27.12
(< 0.001)

6.57
(0.07)

10.75
(0.01)

4.62

Policy Debate

26.38
(< 0.001)

13.03
(0.01)

25.28
(< 0.001)

9.97

Observations

431

468

243

394

NOTE: Reported figures depict average percent of daily newshole dedicated
to segments on Iraq War stories across the entire 2007 news year. Values in
parentheses () indicate p-values for two-tailed t-test for difference in means
between reported news source and FOX News as reference category.

news entities were far more likely to report on ICE during this period of high military activity.

In addition to stories regarding military performance, I extended analysis of the same
cable news sources to reporting on specific “sub-story lines” coded by the NCI dataset outside the Iraq Combat Events category.11 Noticeably less airtime was committed by FOX
News to stories such as the troop increase, the Pat Tillman friendly-fire cover-up scandal,
and stories comparing the conflict in Iraq to the Vietnam War. I conducted a similar extension of reporting habits across print media sources on military scandals including some
outside the 2007 timeframe, which shows that Wall Street Journal readers were far less
likely to be exposed to any stories regarding the Abu Ghraib prison scandal (2004), the
Haditha massacre (2006), the Walter Reed Medical Facility scandal (2007), or stories regarding sexual assault in the military (2013) than readers of The New York Times or The
11

The Pew NCI dataset codes component sub-story lines that collectively compose broader or “big stories”.
For example, Iraq combat events are broadly coded together (storyid=100), but include more specific categorizations based on their nature as ”Combat/violence/casualties” (substoryline=100001), ”Iraqi refugees”
(substoryline=100010), or ”Evaluations of US troop surge” (substoryline=100014). Graphical depictions of
outlet variation in reporting times is available in Appendix B.
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Figure 3.2: Media Coverage of Iraq Combat Events by Source, 2007

(a) Print Media Coverage

(b) Radio Source Coverage
NOTE: This figure depicts media coverage of Iraq Combat Events (ICE) and related news stories as
coded by Pew Research News Content Index (NCI) Dataset. Points represent day totals for percent of
newshole or prominence proportion. LOESS smoothers are added to depict broader trend of moving
averages over time (span = 0.15).
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Washington Post over the same periods.12

The media environment depicted in this analysis reveals a consistent asymmetry in reporting across conservative and left-center news sources on the subject of Iraq war events,
more specifically the stories about casualties, reconstruction frustrations, and regular assessments of the “surge” strategy that might otherwise have informed a new assessment of
the military’s execution of the campaign. As a critical story topic for informing the public
on military performance, the difference in information between partisan subgroups comes
into closer focus. Media outlets such as FOX News, more heavily trafficked by conservative
Republicans, were less likely to report on military scandals or poor wartime outcomes. As
a result, I find strong support for the assertions of H1A, in that partisans on both sides
of the political spectrum would have had different levels of availability to updating information on military performance and institutional quality. In the next section, I examine
how this asymmetry in reporting is potentially compounded by uneven framing of military
information across news sources.

Evaluating Asymmetric Framing Hypothesis
Examining high-volume news periods like the 2007 phase of the Iraq War provides a unique
picture of the reporting patterns of the various news sources frequented by partisans during
an important opportunity of evaluation for the military. One potential critique of these
patterns is that they speak to descriptive patterns of story frequency, rather than the substance of certain stories – such as Iraq War events – when they are reported. It is reasonable
to assert that certain sub-storylines, such as the “Comparisons to Vietnam” or “Pat Tillman Scandal” stories, are damaging enough to military prestige in themselves that a gap
in reporting frequency likely results in a commensurate gap in substantive portrayal of the
institution. The difficulty US forces encountered during this critical period, with mounting
casualties, the “surge” of several brigades into the Baghdad area, and high-level leadership
turnover, made even objective reporting on battlefield events potentially damaging news
12

Graphical depiction of print media reporting on these stories is available in Appendix B.
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about military performance. Collectively, we observe strong evidence for H1A in the reporting patterns depicted during this period for individuals to update their judgments on
military performance; across different media and sources, conservative outlets consistently
reported less on war events and combat costs than centrist or left-leaning media outlets.

However, testing the validity of H1B required analysis of substantive data on reporting
content. Selecting on the same three primary television news outlets from earlier (CNN,
MSNBC, and FOX), I utilized the LexisNexis database to collect all broadcast transcripts
between January 1, 2007 and December 31, 2007 which contained the term or root iraq/iraqi
and were sub-coded as pertaining to the Iraq War. After removing missing data and detectable duplicates, the final dataset of 1,951 broadcast transcripts captured the substantive
discussion of news segments dealing primarily with the Iraq War during the same timeframe
analyzed previously. This dataset served as the textual corpus for content analysis on the
topic distribution across news sources within the Iraq War subject.

Unsupervised machine learning and text-as-data analysis have become an increasingly
effective tool for allowing a textual corpus to inform the researcher about the variety of
substantive topics being addressed in a body of text. Here I use an extension of the Latent
Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) multilevel architecture, the Structural Topic Model (STM), in
order to utilize the text of the transcripts themselves to inform what subjects are being
discussed across news sources. The STM pre-supposes a set of k potential topics being
discussed in the text, across which a probabilistic distribution of words exists, and that
documents are similarly a mixed distribution across topics (Blei, Ng, and Jordan 2003;
M. E. Roberts, Stewart, and Tingley 2014).13 This allows the text to characterize its own
topic distribution based on those words that occur most frequently.

After collection, I then pre-process the transcripts to produce a functional version of
13
For more technical description of the quantitative methods behind STM, reference (M. E. Roberts,
Stewart, and Tingley 2014).
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Figure 3.3: Expected Topic Proportion by Source (STM), Cable Broadcast Transcripts, 2007

(a) FOX News Topics

(b) MSNBC/CNN Topics

NOTE: This figure depicts the expected topic proportion for each of these seven topics estimated by
the topic model by source. Topics are grouped by the media outlet that led reporting on those topics.
Labels indicate substantive impact of frequently occurring words and the content of top ten broadcast transcripts captured by topic prevalence. Uncertainty bands represent 95% confidence intervals
following 100 simulations. With K=35, the average expected mean topic proportion ≈ .028.

the dataset as a textual corpus (stemmed, lemmatized, and stripped of punctuation, numbers, and capitalization), I ran several topic models on the constituent broadcast segments.
Several iterations allowed for me to remove proper nouns with high frequency, such as the
names of reporters and commentators referenced directly. Once a sufficient number of these
“stop words” had been removed, the I implemented a 35-topic structural model to ascertain
the thematic threads of the transcripts. Using these words and the substantive material
in the top ten articles best captured by each topic, I labeled the topics according to the
content of reporting and the tone of the discussion.

Using the news source as a covariate, I am able to plot the predicted topic proportion
over the entire text corpus for each news source with uncertainty bands at the 95% level.
Figure 3.3 depicts some of the more coherent and clearly identifiable topics based on word
probability and the substance of the broadcasts themselves. Each graphical depiction shows
how different topics composed various levels of the content share across the media outlets
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– expressed as the mean topic proportion – given the substance of the transcripts. Topics
depicted in Figure 3.3(a) indicate those with notably higher frequency in the FOX subset
of the corpus, while those topics in Figure 3(b) were more prevalent in the MSNBC and
CNN transcripts.14

Indeed, many of the patterns identified during analysis of the Pew dataset seem to
re-emerge. The MSNBC and CNN-favored topics in Figure 3.3(b) included direct commentary of material losses, strategic frustration, and mounting coalition military casualties. The
“New Course in Iraq” and “Iraq Withdrawal” topics, most heavily reported by MSNBC,
were temporally frequent around the announcement of the “surge” strategy in early 2007
and later in the year when the “surge” strategy was coming under increasing scrutiny. The
stories drew increased attention to the debate over the viability of the new strategy and
discussion of a timetable for removing US forces. Media focus shifting to how the 2008
presidential candidates planned to handle the war came with a commensurate increase in
commentary on the complications with the “surge”. The “Costs of War” and “Coalition
Death Toll” topics favored by CNN coincided with periods of high-casualties for the coalition, including the 3,000-killed milestone and specific stories on war dead and missing.
Again, these topics were more concerned with the personnel and material losses of the war
and the military’s difficulty in navigating the Iraq conflict.

However, topics more heavily reported in FOX transcripts, shows in Figure 3.3(a), represented a different tone and thematic focus on military information. Unlike the previous topics that spent considerable airtime discussing the military’s complications in Iraq,
FOX reporting focused on political battles with Democrats over war-funding, defense of
the “surge”, and lateral admonishment of how other media sources were covering the war.
The “Petraeus” and “Selling the Surge” topics were characterized by direct interviews with
commanding general David Petraeus or Republican political elites and supportive commentary of President Bush’s “surge” strategy. In addition to allowing the commanding general
to directly advocate for the troop increase and his upcoming report to Congress, these
14

Brief metadata summary of top-ten news articles depicted in Appendix B.
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broadcasts often led with such remarks as “in Iraq, the surge is working” or critiques of
Democratic opposition to the war’s continuation.15

Framing of the war as a political battle with Democrats and left-wing media were generally more popular topics in the FOX transcripts as well. Broadcasts in the “Selling
the Surge” and “Funding/Dem. Congress” topics often led with comments such as “can
Democrats force the president to accept a timetable for pulling out?” and “Democrats
want to shell out $21 billion, in all, on non-military programs. And this is part of their war
bill?”.16 FOX most heavily outpaced other networks in its reporting of the political battle
between President Bush and Congressional Democrats and the manner in which the war
was being reported in other outlets. The “Anti-Media Coverage” topic was characterized
by admonishments of a PBS war documentary “leaving many conservatives up in arms”,
critical stories about “how the far left is handling the U.S. military”, and negative reports
on how The Washington Post, NBC News, and “the left wing press” were reporting on the
military.17 When newly-retired Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez issued openly critical
statements about the war’s governing strategy, the FOX story reported that “lost in the
outrage was another statement from Sanchez, condemning media outlets for having political
agendas and blasting news agencies for putting soldiers in harm’s way”.18

Across these topics, we observe support for an asymmetric framing pattern (H1B) during this critical reporting period. As individuals sought out and received various types of
information regarding the conduct of the war, they were subject to different distributions
of framing or “lead story” effects based on which outlet they were likely to traffic. Whereas
centrist and liberal media sources were more likely to frame discussion of the Iraq war as a
dialogue on military frustrations, personnel and material loss, rising sectarian violence, or
discussion of a rapid withdrawal, conservative outlets were more likely to discuss the conflict
15

“Interview with David Petraeus”, FOX News, Chris Wallace, December 23, 2007.
“Interview with Senators Graham/Levin”, FOX News, Chris Wallace, April 15, 2007;“Interview with
House Minority Leader John Boehner”, FOX News, Neil Cavuto, March 21, 2007
17
“New Documentary on War Has Some Up in Arms”, FOX News, Alan Colmes, April 24, 2007; “Talking
Points Memo and Impact: Who Respects the Troops”, FOX News, Bill O’Reilly, February 8, 2007; “Talking
Points Memo and Top Story”, FOX News, Bill O’Reilly, April 24, 2007
18
“Retired General Blasts Iraq War Effort, Media Coverage”, FOX News, Alan Colmes, October 15, 2007.
16
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in terms of homefront political fights over funding and the “surge”, the Democratic opposition in Congress, or criticism of how other media outlets were reporting on the military. In
addition to spending less time discussing the military’s performance on the ground, these
topics often came to the defense of the military institution by insisting that other media
outlets were subverting the armed forces or that Congressional Democrats were harming
the war effort.

Given the patterns of reporting measured in the preceding section, these results indicate
a strongly skewed information environment between partisans with regards to the volume
and content of information they received about the military. The result, particularly among
conservative Republicans, is a decidedly “one-sided information flow” whose substance is
far more partisan (Zaller 1992; Feldman, Huddy, and Marcus 2015). Given the increased
reliance of this partisan subset for fewer news sources, these individuals are less likely to
encounter contrary information outside a unified narrative. As I will discuss in the next section, strong partisans who are reliant on a select few media outlets may also be particularly
susceptible to biased updating when presented with new and contradictory information.

Partisan Bias and Military Credibility
I now turn to the second part of my dynamic theory, focusing on the way partisans use
new or newly-salient information to update their evaluations of the military institution. As
discussed previously, I argue that the partisan confidence gap is also the result of biased
processing of information critical of the military and its conduct; however, I also consider
potential explanations that might otherwise allow for divergent opinions without biased
updating. In order to test this suite of hypotheses regarding interpretation of information, I
structure an experimental analysis that tests how partisans respond to priming information
about the institutional quality of the armed forces, allowing them to express disfavor for
different types of military misconduct or failures.
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Research Design
Using a design similar to that used by Ladd (2010) in a study of public attitudes on media
behavior, the following experiment leverages a broad literature in social psychological studies of public attitude measurement through survey collections.19 Zaller and Feldman (1992)
develop a model for expressed public opinion as a probabilistic draw from a running count
of impressions and experiences. Based on accessibility to information, individuals average
across all memorable information when forming answers to public opinion queries, with the
effect of “ideas recently made salient” being the most influential. The introduction of new
or newly-salient information shaping expressed attitudes falls in line with established “top
of the head” models of public opinion measurement, as well as experimental “framing” designs bringing specific information to the forefront of the individual’s consideration (Taylor
and Fiske 1978; Chong and Druckman 2007). Collectively, these theoretical concepts offer
an empirical strategy for measuring expressed attitudes on subjects such as institutional
confidence. Experimental framing can raise the short-term salience of specific information
in line with the institutionalist hypotheses already developed, providing an opportunity to
measure the effect of specific actions by the military on public confidence in that institution.

I construct a experimental environment wherein individuals are subjected to updating
information that increases the salience of institutional quality in the military. Respondents
were drawn from a nationally-representative opt-in panel through YouGov in March 2017,
resulting in a final sample of 1,000 individuals randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions. The control condition was asked two questions regarding their level
of interest in news stories regarding US foreign policy and military operations, but unlike
the treatment groups read no news stories or priming vignettes. This group served as the
19

Ladd (2010) himself uses a similar formulation of Gilens (2001), where even though the question asks
about awareness of the story, this is not the measurable variable of interest; because the experiment is
probing negative attitudes, the intent is to merely bring the information to the top of the respondent’s head
without drawing attention to the treatment. My own design differs from Ladd’s in several ways. First, the
use of a more compact scale for measurement of trust (rather than the feeling thermometer employed by
Ladd for measuring attitudes on the media). Second, the news stories are meant as priming information in
themselves, whereas the Ladd study uses elite criticism of the media institution as priming information. I
adopt a similar strategy for measuring the control condition, where the only measurable variable is whether
the respondent heard the story.
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statistical baseline for confidence levels in three measured institutions – the military, the
presidency, and the Congress – which were measured on an 11-point scale following the two
news interest questions.

All respondents were prompted that the study was measuring the extent to which stories
about security issues and the military were reaching the public. In the control condition,
respondents were asked (1) if they actively followed news stories about US foreign policy
and (2) about US military operations. Each of the other three treatment groups was respectively prompted with two news snippets describing stories related to the military that
had occurred in the last several years and asked if they had heard these stories. All groups
were then asked at the end to measure their level of confidence in the military, the presidency, and Congress as well. The news stories given to each group were structured to vary
the content of new information according to three classes of divergent preference criteria
discussed previously. The first treatment group (non-partisan) was prompted with news
stories that detailed partisan activity by retired military officers during the 2012 and 2016
presidential campaigns. The stories discussed large blocs of retired generals and admirals
who had openly endorsed candidates Barack Obama, Mitt Romney, Donald Trump, and
Hillary Clinton. This was designed to allow respondents to express preferences of military
behavior in terms of non-partisanship and objectivity.

The second treatment group (performance) was exposed to two stories that detailed
battlefield ineffectiveness or incompetence in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, including a
botched hostage rescue attempt by the Navy’s SEAL Team Six in 2010 and the accidental
bombing of a Medecins Sans Frontieres clinic in Kunduz, Afghanistan in 2015.20 These
were designed to allow respondents to express preferences in terms of battlefield outcomes
and strict performance criteria. Finally, the third treatment group (professionalism) was
20

New snippets reflected substantive information from actual news stories. Anthony Faiola, “British
aid worker Norgrove killed accidentally by U.S. soldier, inquiry finds”, Washington Post Foreign Service,
December 3, 2010; Barbara P. Usher, “Kunduz bombing: US attacked MSF clinic ’in error”’, BBC News,
November 25, 2015.
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prompted by news stories that described ethical failures by the military institution, including a 2012 Defense Department report describing the firing of nearly 30 generals and
admirals due to offenses ranging from sexual assault to misuse of government funds, and a
story discussing the 2009 conviction of several US soldiers accused of the rape and murder
of an Iraqi family in 2006.21 This thread was designed to allow respondents to express
preferences in terms of professional or ethical standards of conduct.

Evaluating the Bayesian Hypothesis
The unique design of this experimental effort in military trust provides a multitude of avenues by which to test the validity of some evaluative bias taking place among partisans.
The first explanatory hypothesis I consider is the rational Bayesian account (H2A) in which
certain partisans simply possess more prior information about the military institution, making new information comparably weaker in influencing their judgment. The experimental
design I employ allows for some investigation of this hypothesis, though observational data
is more helpful is assessing its validity. Experimentally, the idea that Republican priors
are established on much larger collections of data or high ex ante interest in the subject of
military affairs and foreign policy does not find strong support. Among control group respondents, Democrats and Republicans had nearly identical levels of those expressing “high”
political interest according to the demographic battery, at 51% and 50%, respectively. The
two partisan groups enjoyed similar distributions in those expressing a high interest in both
foreign policy stories and military operation stories in the news, at 59% and 58%, and among
those who indicated just a high interest in the military stories, Democrats outweighed Republicans 71% to 64%. While these are self-reported statistics about interest in these types
of stories and not an objective measure of the respondent’s actual understanding of them,
they provide a measure of internal validity for the experimental design in that respondents
did not express widely different levels of knowledge of the military.

21
Craig Whitlock, “Military brass, behaving badly: Files detail a spate of misconduct dogging armed
forces”, The Washington Post, January 26, 2014; James Dao, “Ex-Soldier Gets Life Sentence for Iraq
Murders”, The New York Times, May 21, 2009.
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While largely dismissive of H2A, these results are not altogether surprising. The large
panel survey of civil-military attitudes conducted by Schake and Mattis (2016) revealed
that while Republicans looked more favorably on the institution’s values and were more
defensive of its standards and performance, there was not a dramatic separation between
partisans in those expressing understanding of the institution itself. In response to the question, “how familiar are you with the U.S. military?”, 80% of Republicans responded with
“very familiar” or “somewhat familiar”, which while high does not substantially out-pace
the 70% of Independents and 65% of Democrats who answered in a similar fashion. The
argument that Republicans may inform their confidence in the institution based on more
direct contact is not wholly without merit. A 2011 Pew Social Trends survey identifies that
Republicans (73%) were more likely than Democrats (59%) to have a family member who
had served in the military (Golby, L. Cohn, and Feaver 2016).22 However, it is important
to note that this pools across all living veterans; focusing on the more relevant subset of
post-9/11 veterans, the large panel survey conducted by Schake and Mattis (2016) in 2013
found that Republicans and Democrats were comparably likely to have one in their family
and far less likely in absolute terms (18% and 12%, respectively).

At a broader level, we have additional reason to doubt the rational process predicted by
H2A. While a truly Bayesian process of updating would allow even partisans from opposite
ideologies to converge on a common evaluation, this is not a trend we observe in the partisan data for institutional confidence in the military. Figure 3.4 reveals a similar pattern
discussed by Liebert and Golby (2017a) through use of the Gallup data, in which recently
divergent trends – particularly in the high intervention environment post-9/11 – between
groups are readily visible.23 These non-convergent trends argue against an unbiased process
22

However, a July 2017 survey by Gallup probed public attitudes specifically among those who expressed
“high” confidence in the military; in this group, Republicans who cited “having a friend or family currently
serving” or “having served themselves” (24.5%) as their rationale for expressing such high confidence only
slightly outnumbered that community among Democrats (21.9%).
23
While Liebert and Golby (2017a) observe this trend through analysis of the General Social Survey (GSS)
Dataset, I depict this pattern through analysis of the Gallup “Confidence in Institutions” surveys for several
reasons. First, regression and factor analyses conducted earlier utilized the Gallup dataset, so I employ
it here for continuity. Second, the Gallup survey formulation probes public attitudes about the military
institution, while the GSS question asks more specifically about “the people running these institutions”;
while the distinction is minimal, I focus on the general impression respondents have of the institution writ
large rather than specific figures that may come to mind. Finally, the Gallup formulation of the question
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Figure 3.4: Public Confidence in Military Institution by Partisan ID (1980-2017)

Confidence in Military by Major Party Identification

Partisan Gap in Expressed Confidence
NOTE: Figure 3.4 depicts high expressed confidence in the military institution conditional on stated
partisan identity as captured by Gallup June Wave “Confidence in Institutions” survey instrument.
“High” confidence categorized as answer of “a great deal” or “quite a lot” to the five-point Gallup
question for institutional confidence. LOESS smoother (span = 0.3) depicts increasing polarization
gap between partisan subgroups for clarity.

uses a five-point scale against the GSS three-point scale, allowing for increased variation in the measured
outcome.
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of updating; as Bartels (2002) remarks, “it is quite difficult to produce parallel opinion shifts
in a Bayesian framework – unless partisan bias is built into different groups’ selection or
interpretation of politically relevant information”. Not only does partisan confidence in the
last several decades occasionally track in this parallel fashion, it widens considerably since
the Iraq War, evidence of an inability among partisans to converge on an unbiased assessment of the same institution (Burbach 2017). This presents additional evidence against a
completely rational process in that partisans do not update to changing events, information,
or shocks in the same way.

Evaluating the Preferences Hypothesis
However, the nature of this design allows for more specific testing of potential biased updating or the influence of divergent preferences. By varying the nature of newly-salient
updating information, we allow partisans to express their preferences in different ways, a
flexibility that builds on past empirical efforts (Brian J. Gaines et al. 2007) and offers an
avenue for the counterargument made by Gerber and D. Green (1999) that a rational process may be at work if partisans simply have different conceptions of what type of military
behavior is positive or negative. If H2B accurately captures the operant process between
partisans, Democrats and Republicans should respond negatively to specific classes of military misconduct. For example, if one partisan group values battlefield effectiveness as a
criteria for evaluation, but another places more stock in the professional integrity and organizational practices of the institution, than divergent opinions at the end of the updating
process need not come from systematic partisan bias.

Despite this accommodation made by the design, the results indicate a profoundly asymmetric use of the new or newly-salient information among partisans. Figure 3.5 reveals the
change in expressed confidence in the military institution from the control condition by partisan subgroup, assessed using the respondent’s identification on the three-point partisan
identity scale. While Democratic respondents express marginal concern for partisan military activity, they indicate a more defined preference against military performance failures
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Figure 3.5: Experimental Results (Partisan Breakdown), YouGov - March 2017

NOTE: This figure depicts deviation in expressed confidence in the military institution as measured
by the 11-pt scale in all experimental conditions. Respondent patterns broken down by identification
into Democrat, Republican, and Independent subsamples based on self-identification on seven-point
partisan identity scale. Reported p-values reflect significance at 95% level for two-tailed t-test for
difference in means between experimental and control subgroups. NT otal = 957

in the tactical setting and professional misconduct, where expressed confidence was reduced
by 8% and 13%, respectively. These results seem to provide empirical replication of the
broader fluctuations we observe among Democrats in Figure 3.4, where confidence in the
military institution responds in tandem with the most violent years of the Iraq War and
tracks more closely with Independents overall. Specifically, Democrats more closely exhibit
the updating sensibilities of non-partisans in their assessment of the military institution,
allowing new information to update their evaluations of the armed forces in the expected
direction.
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Republican response patterns, however, indicate no change in expressed opinion regardless of treatment condition. In all experimental states, Republican changes in confidence for
the military institution were positive and statistically insignificant. This also seems to replicate the broader trend observed in Figure 3.4, where Republican confidence patterns seem
unmoved by indecisive foreign wars and internal scandals that affected Independent and
Democratic levels of trust while stabilizing or increasing Republican levels. Even though
the design allows for Republicans to express different preferences from Independents and
Democrats, no negative information about the military results in an updated expressed
opinion. Attitudes about institutional quality are expected to be quite rigid and difficult to
move with such a design; however, the same treatment moved Democrats and Independents
in a negative direction to a statistically significant degree, while Republicans remained unaffected. As a result, the unbiased learning process advocated by Gerber and D. Green
(1999) and captured in H2B finds little support with these findings.24

The results indicate that Republican respondents had no pronounced predisposition for
greater knowledge of the military institution, nor did they adjust their evaluations of the
military in response to information about misconduct, despite Democrats and Independents
doing so. While offering small support for H2A and H2B, this obliges analysis of the validity of H2C, in which cognitive biases and rationalization steer disconfirmatory information
away from critically affecting Republican assessments of the military institution. Whether
by blaming military failures on political leaders rather than the armed forces, attributing
misconduct to individual failures rather than organizational ones, or downweighting the
value of the information because of its contrary narrative, we have strong reason to believe
that even with available information, Republican respondents are interpreting information
in a far more favorable fashion or polarizing against its substance.
24
This general response pattern is largely robust to re-classification of respondents according to the fivepoint ideology scale, with liberals and moderates expressing clear disapproval of professionalism and performance categories and conservatives exhibiting statistically insignificant changes to expressed trust across all
conditions. Similar patterns are also visible when re-coding partisan identity based on the seven-point scale,
allowing “leaners” to be counted as part of a major party. In this setting, Democrats similarly maintain
strong disapproval of both the professionalism and performance conditions and Republicans are similarly
unmoved across all conditions. Independents, now classified as those who refused to identify even as a
leaner to any party, expressed strong disapproval in the partisan condition (10.4% loss) and the professional
condition (10.9% loss).
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Evidence for Partisan Bias
The importance of partisan bias to this analysis becomes clearer when analyzing the experimental results among strong partisans. Figure 3.6 depicts the percentage change in expressed trust and confidence in the military institution from the control condition by sorted
partisan groups. Moderate Independents are also included and remain a useful quantitative
baseline for the expressed attitudes of individuals with no incentive for partisan biasing or
a desire to minimize dissonance with partisan narratives. At first inspection we observe
that sorted Democrats again trend much closer to the attitudes of non-partisans across
the different treatment conditions. While similarly unaffected by news of partisan military
activity, they express less confidence in the military in response to news of performance
failures (-7.6%) and far less in response to professional misconduct (-13.4%). By comparison, moderate Independents expressed similar distaste for battlefield failures (-15.8%) and
ethical or professional scandals (-16.7%).

However, closer analysis of strong Republicans reveals a broader polarization than is
observable in Figure 3.5 when pooling across the entire partisan subgroup. In addition
to strong Republicans expressing no degradation in their evaluation of the military across
treatment conditions, this group responded with a substantively and statistically significant
increase in expressed confidence in the institution of nearly 10% in the non-partisan condition. This is particularly surprising given the ostensibly limiting “ceiling effects” one should
expect from the conservative Republican control group’s mean confidence level of 9.55 on
an 11-point scale. This response indicates a defensive polarization away from the expected
direction of the treatment and a dramatic departure from the processing that dictated the
response of both moderate Independents and liberal Democrats. While these latter groups
expressed a clear distaste for certain categories of military behavior, the sorted Republican
subgroup actively increased its support for the same institution being evaluated by political
out-groups.
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Figure 3.6: Experimental Results (Strong Partisan Breakdown), YouGov - March 2017

NOTE: This figure depicts deviation in expressed confidence in the military institution as measured
by the 11-pt scale in all experimental conditions. Respondent patterns broken down by combined
identification into Democrat, Republican, and Independent subsamples based on self-identification
on three-point partisan identity scale and sorted political ideology as conservative, moderate, and
liberal on a five-point scale. Reported p-values reflect significance at 95% level for two-tailed t-test
for difference in means between experimental and control subgroups. NT otal = 500

These results present strong evidence for the assertions of the partisan bias hypothesis
(H2C), that polarizing motivated reasoning is affecting what should be a rational valuation
of institutional performance. In addition to Republican responses more broadly exhibiting
no negative updating, the response pattern displayed by strong conservative partisans is
indicative of a motivated counter-arguing of disconfirming information. This “backfire effect” is a well-documented trend in response to weak issue framing (Chong and Druckman
2007) and among strong ideological partisans, particularly when introduced to negative
information about political in-group members (Nyhan and Reifler 2010). Past study on
this phenomenon has found that in a “direct challenge to the notion of voters as rational
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Bayesian updaters”, motivated reasoning led individuals to increase support for a favored
candidate after receiving negative information about the candidate (Redlawsk 2002). The
response patterns exhibited in my experimental results indicate a similar biasing of new
information, in an effort to counter-argue ”preference-incongruent information and bolster
their pre-existing views” (Nyhan and Reifler 2010). It is telling that such a seemingly unexpected increase in strong Republican trust comes in response to information about military
support to co-partisan political candidates, further highlighting the central role played by
partisan identity in rendering their evaluation. In comparison, such knowledge did not effect
strong Democrats or moderate Independents in their evaluation of the military institution.

This response pattern among Republicans is surprising in its reflexive defense of an outside institution, but finds roots within the existing study of affective polarization and its
associated biases. Not only has partisan identity been demonstrated to have strong social
components that increase animosity regarding political out-groups (Mason 2015; Iyengar
and Westwood 2015), but these same mechanisms strengthen the defense of in-group members against disconfirming information, making rational evaluation of institutional quality
unlikely (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012). The results of this experimental design indicate
that Republicans have to a certain extent incorporated support for the military institution
into the social fabric of their partisan identity, defending it as one would a co-partisan.
Their defense of the institution in the face of negative information supports recent study
that Republicans are more ideologically coherent (Lelkes and Sniderman 2014) and that
such “identity politics” are indeed much stronger among Republicans than other political
subgroups due to a lack of cross-cutting identities (Mason and Wronski 2018). As I will
discuss later, this level of partisan bias risks compromising the ability of these partisans
to objectively evaluate an institution’s performance or to properly assess the outcomes of
foreign policy ventures.

Additional support for the partisan bias hypothesis (H2C) can be found by examining
observational survey data as well, in cases where partisans clearly interpreted a common
set of updating information in dramatically different fashions. This process has manifested
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in a variety of ways, with different effects on expressed confidence in the military institution, as Democrats and political centrists have responded to updating events with far more
skepticism than their Republican counterparts when the military is involved. In 2007, the
deadliest year for coalition forces in Iraq, public confidence in the military hit its temporary
nadir, with 69% of Americans expressing high confidence in the institution.25 Mounting
casualties, uncertainty over the success of the “surge” strategy, shifting leadership, and
political divisiveness were compounded by decreasing public confidence in the accuracy of
battlefield reporting. Between 2003 and 2007, Democratic confidence in the accuracy of
battlefield reports from the military dropped from 78% expressing “a great deal” or “fair
amount” to 32%. Republican confidence dropped as well, but three in four still had high
confidence in reporting by the military. Instead, Republicans passed their distrust to the
press, in whom only 29% of Republicans expressed high confidence, down from 81% in
2003. Half of Democrats, by contrast, maintained high confidence in the press reporting
from Iraq.26 In the midst of growing distrust about the military’s wartime performance,
Democrats attributed blame to the institution itself, whereas resistant Republicans instead
passed blame for inaccuracy to the news media. In addition to highlighting Republican distrust of competing media reports (H1A/B), it also sheds light on how updating information
was rationalized to support a prior rather than influence an updated evaluation (H2C).

When military misconduct and accusations of large-scale sexual assault problems within
the institution peaked in 2013, partisans again split over the nature of the problem and its
proposed solutions. While half of Democrats directly attributed the reports of sexual assault
to “underlying problems with military culture”, nearly 70% of Republicans ascribed the incidents to individual acts of misconduct detached from the institution as a whole. When
considering the best way of handling the problem, 58% of Democrats stated that Congress
needed to directly intervene to change military law or strip military commanders of their
legal authority. In contrast, a similar percentage of Republicans believed that the military
25

Gallup, “Confidence in Institutions, June Wave Survey”, 2007
The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, “Little Confidence in Military or Press Depictions
of Iraq”, April 5, 2007.
26
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should be left to handle the problem internally without outside interference.27 Again, with
partisans given similar information about negative military activity, these groups interpret
and employ that information is widely different ways. Conditional on both subgroups believing the factual nature of the information, Democrats negatively updated their evaluation
against the military institution, whereas Republicans drew fundamentally different interpretations that insulated the institution from more direct criticism.

These cases lend additional credence to the validity of H2C, that biased interpretations
driven by partisan sentiment lead Republicans to draw systemically more friendly interpretations from the same information about the military, when that information is substantively
negative, compared to Democrats and Independents. Though not decisively inferential, examination of the cognitive resources expended by partisans on either side can inform our
understanding of the mental process at work. Taber and Lodge (2006) argue that the sort
of disconfirmation bias predicted by H2C could manifest in those respondents taking “more
time processing counter-attitudinal arguments than pro-attitudinal arguments, [...] to spend
the extra time denigrating, deprecating, and counter-arguing the incongruent arguments”.
Across treatment groups, we observe these patterns in a similar fashion. Non-partisan
group Democrats and Republicans spent almost the same amount of time completing the
survey; this is unsurprising as this experimental condition was where partisans actually
expressed similar attitudes. However, Republican respondents in the professionalism and
performance conditions spent on average nearly 20-25% more time completing the survey
than their Democrat counterparts.28 Again, though not conclusive in its own right, further
study should examine this causal pathway more closely.

Collectively, both this complementary data and the results of the experiment promote
strong support for a cognitive bias born of partisan affiliation when interpreting information
27

Pew Research Center/Washington Post Survey, “Sexual Assault in the Military Widely Seen as Important Issues, But No Agreement on Solution”, June 12, 2013.
28
After removing outliers who took more than 1000 seconds to complete the survey, I found that Republicans and Democrats in the non-partisan condition spent approximately 83 and 86 seconds on the survey
instrument, respectively. In the professionalism condition, the same subgroups spent approximately 84 and
100 seconds, respectively, and 76 and 97 seconds, respectively, in the performance condition. The amounts
to a 19% increase in Republican time expenditure in the former and a 27% increase in the latter.
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regarding the military institution. While political liberals and centrists seem to utilize new
or newly-salient information in the expected fashion, updating their opinions of the organization based on knowledge of negative actions or behavior, conservatives seem to defend
the institution as they would an extension of their own political party. Given the apolitical
nature of the military, this is particularly puzzling and potentially dangerous. If conservative confidence in military elites is seen by politicians to be highly durable, the latter may
increase appeals to the military as a political device for electoral gains or policy support,
bringing the military institution closer into the political fold and risking a dangerous erosion
of civil-military balance.

Discussion
The results of both of my observational and experimental design strategies generate several points for discussion. What are the implications of these empirical findings? As I
have stated, neither Republican favor for the military establishment at the elite level, nor
popular military identification with the Republican party are particularly novel concepts.
However, this analysis makes the case for a complementary and dynamic process in which
partisan Republicans in society are less likely to accurately evaluate the military institution
based on its conduct. The core of institutionalist theory envisions that citizens continually
update their evaluations of social and political institutions, rewarding positive performers
and pressuring negative ones to reform and improve. However, these results indicate that
the military may benefit from a nearly unconditional deference from targeted partisans. I
organize the principal findings of this analysis and briefly discuss their potential implications.

First, these findings suggest that both polarization over military credibility and military politicization will likely continue into the future. The principal findings of my analysis
include (1) the wide variation in reporting on military conduct and performance across
media outlets and (2) that even when offered the opportunity to express expectations of
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military conduct differently, Republicans display a biased processing reflective of political
in-group members. Indeed, this analysis likely exists in the midst of a consistent loop of
demand-based media biases, wherein media outlets respond to audience preferences. While
this study makes no claim as to the direction of this process, it is not significant to the
observations made through analysis of media reporting on the military. Whether reporting
biases exist in response to audience preferences, actively shape them, or some combination
of both, conservative partisans are observed to be more likely to receive only limited information on military failures.

The lack of response to new or newly-salient information displayed further by this group
in my experimental framework mirrors both the aggregate confidence trends we observe over
time and the sensibilities of a literature in partisan resistance and “perceptual screening” in
which contrary information is more easily dismissed for challenging prior beliefs (Campbell
et al. 1980; Zaller 1992; Gerber and D. Green 1999). One implication of these findings
is that both information exposure and partisan bias in evaluating the military interact to
collectively solidify this polarization between partisans: if a subset of society is less likely to
receive contrary information, it is less cognitively costly to dismiss the residual information
or for the news to create a “backfire effect”, even if that information is useful to an informed
evaluation. Consistent exposure to positively-framed or under-reported information on military failures could perpetuate this inaccurate prior among partisans, particularly strong
Republicans, making new information less likely to update their evaluations.

The fact that strong Republicans in this analysis exhibit a seemingly partisan bias in defense of an apolitical institution is particularly curious and potentially damaging to preserving the non-partisanship of the military. Both the experimental results and observational
survey data on military failures have shown Republicans are more likely to consider military
misconduct a product of individual actors rather than large organizational flaws. These defensive patterns reflect a political tribalism among Republicans with respect to the military,
conforming to patterns of in-group favoritism and partisan biases (Hewstone, Rubin, and
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Willis 2002; Iyengar and Westwood 2015). When confronted with the prospect of inaccurate information coming from the battlefield, Republicans were far more likely to blame the
news media, while Democrats and Independents more directly charged the military itself.
It is telling that just as military confidence has been consistently high among Republicans,
an equivalent pattern is found among Democrats for the mass media.29 Though it may be
overly simplistic to ascribe partisan affiliations to either institution writ large, Republican
distrust in a liberal-favored institution like the mass media has the dual effect of discrediting new information and striking at a perceived partisan opponent. As such, Republican
trust in the military would not be a purely rational valuation, but rather an expression of
partisan attitudes. Collectively, these patterns provide strong reasons to suspect that the
partisan “gap” in confidence is likely to continue.

Second, a reflexive defense of the military institution from criticism can prevent not only
an objective evaluation of that institution’s quality, but of foreign policy ventures in which
the military is a principal actor. In-group defensiveness not only insulates the military
from direct criticism, but also re-directs blame for the outcomes of military intervention
to other sources. Recent polling on public attitudes about ongoing US military interventions has revealed that a plurality of individuals believe that civilian decision-making is
to blame for a lack of strategic victory, rather than military incompetence (Schake and
Mattis 2016). Partisan defense of the military institution risks compounding the problem
that polarization over foreign policy already presents; namely, that partisans will base their
impressions of war outcomes on inaccurate information (Adam J. Berinsky 2009) or partisan narratives (Brian J. Gaines et al. 2007), as evidenced by previous study on the Iraq War.

If civilian leaders are sensitive to public attitudes on the merits of military interventions,
this type of biased processing compromises the ability of the public to effectively learn the
proper lessons of select foreign policy ventures and aggregate them into effective choices.
29
Democratic trust in the mass media has remaining consistently high since 2001, with a nadir of 51%
expressing “a great deal” or “fair amount” in 2016; however, Democrats expressed more traditionally high
levels of trust in the media in 2017 at 72%, as Republican trust cratered to 14% in the same year. Art Swift,
“Democrats’ Confidence in Mass Media Rises Sharply From 2016”, Gallup, September 21, 2017.
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The inability to concede when out-group partisans are successful – or in this case, when
in-group members fail – has been advocated by some scholars as another product of polarization (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012). As K. A. Schultz (2018) argues, this is one of the
principal challenges of polarization’s intersection with foreign policy: more than any time
in recent US history, wars are seen as the extension of a specific party’s agenda rather than
a national effort. The incorporation of military interventions into a partisan dialogue may
therefore “impede the country’s collective ability to learn and adapt from foreign policy
failures.” If partisan biases already threaten the ability of the public to objectively evaluate
war outcomes, a subjective defense of the military institution from criticism compounds
this problem.

The third dimension I consider is the potentially damaging influence of this partisan
incorporation of high military trust on the stability of US civil-military relations. The
maintenance of a non-partisan and apolitical military is a foundational characteristic of a
functioning democracy where civilian control of the armed forces is assured. Furthermore,
a broad consensus across civil-military relations scholars concludes that continued military
interference into the political sphere will damage institutional credibility among the public
and weaken the voices of active-duty officers seeking to responsibly advise civilian leaders (Golby 2011; Liebert and Golby 2017a; J. K. Dempsey 2009; Urben 2010). However, a
military institution with perceptibly rigid levels of appeal to a subset of the public could become an increasingly politicized instrument in partisan debates through several mechanisms.

First, political leaders may be tempted to continue to incorporate military elites into the
political debate in an attempt to leverage high credibility with their audience. Prominent
endorsements from military elites for political candidates, though they have been found
ineffective in absolute terms (Golby, Dropp, and Feaver 2012), have become increasingly
frequent across both parties. Military appointments to posts typically occupied by civilian
experts have also increased across both parties. Though high-profile ex-military appointments are not new, the Trump administration placed such figures closer to the political
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functions of the executive branch. The installment of recently-retired James Mattis as Secretary of Defense met with consternation from political opponents concerned about the
preservation of civilian control of the military.30 The elevation of John Kelly to the post
of White House Chief of Staff was similarly admonished by civil-military scholars on the
grounds that “having a retired general serve in such an unabashedly partisan role further
blurs the boundaries between the military and politics, and erodes the long-standing reputation of the U.S. military as an apolitical institution”.31 The result has been an increasing
discussion on the emergence of a “tipping point” in American confidence in the military.32
Yet the principal utility for politicians in such appointments comes from the clout of the
military institution with a public audience. The desire to utilize highly-trusted military
elites as a source of public-facing credibility may be irresistible to political elites cognizant
of the seemingly unconditional trust their audience places in such figures.

Second, a more politically-active military is inherently problematic for traditional theories of stable civil-military relations. If military elites are continually sought out for incorporation into a partisan political agenda, military leaders themselves may recognize their
position with the conservative public as irrevocably durable and embolden them to intervene more in the political sphere. Remarking on the military’s seemingly immovable trust
with the public, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey remarked in
2011 that, “maybe if I knew what it would take to screw it up, I could avoid it”.33 This
wide latitude with the public, specifically the subset of political conservatives, combined
with an increasingly political role for the military, is likely to create strong incentives for an
activist military institution that leverages its clout with the public as a means for securing
its own policy preferences. While J. K. Dempsey (2009) argues that a “paradox of prestige”
will incrementally damage military credibility with each new foray into the political debate,
30

Rebecca Shabad, “How unusual is Trump’s Cabinet of generals?”, CBS News, December 9, 2016.
David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “Why No General Should Serve as White House Chief of Staff”, War
on the Rocks, September 12, 2017.
32
Daniel Drezner, “Is this the tipping point for trust in the U.S. military?”, The Washington Post, October
26, 2017. Drezner remarks on the 2017 Gallup data directly, saying that “[s]eventy-two percent of trust is
pretty high. But it is worth noting that this number was 82 percent a decade ago. I am beginning to wonder
if Trump’s elevation of the military to such a high-profile role risks the reputation of the armed forces.”
33
Quoted in Jim Gourley, ”Where is the Tipping Point for Trust in America’s Military? And are we near
it?” Foreign Policy, February 14, 2014.
31
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a high level of trust in the military among Republicans – crystallized by biased processing
and limited information exposure – could render that process inert. The result is a potentially damaging and reciprocal process of political leaders designing a more partisan role
for military elites, who in turn use that placement for agenda-setting or partisan activity
of their own.

The central claim of this analysis is that political polarization in institutional confidence
for the military cannot be explained solely by a baseline difference in preferences across parties, but must account for dynamic processes of updating and re-evaluation. Partisans on
both sides have neither converged on a common understanding of the institution’s quality
– the only true “rational” process according to Bartels (2002) – nor have they responded in
parallel during wartime or other key shocks. Instead, the divergence in partisan confidence
in the armed forces indicates a fundamentally different evaluation process between these
groups. However, as I summarize here, it is equally important to understand the negative
externalities of polarization in this domain. A large segment of the public observes the
military as a credible voice in the political debate, especially with regards to the prospect
of military intervention.34 Such an unconditional trust in the institution to provide credible
information, as traditional expert communities have been increasingly discredited, can have
potentially negative ramifications for the preservation of an apolitical military.

Conclusion
Elite communities perform an essential function in democratic society, providing the public
with information about the functioning of government and cues for opinion-formation on
complex policy. In an environment of increasing skepticism for traditional social and policy
elites, the process by which individuals choose to select and trust specific elite sources in the
political discourse is of great importance. As the most respected and trusted institution in
American society, the military factors prominently into the discussion regarding elite source
34
Scott Clement and Philip Rucker, “Poll: Far more trust generals than Trump on N. Korea, while
two-thirds oppose preemptive strike”, The Washington Post, September 24, 2017.
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credibility; however, theoretical and empirical efforts to explain differences in public trust
in that institution among different political subgroups have been limited in scope. Indeed,
aggregate trust and confidence figures, usually referenced as indicative of broad public support for the military’s performance, conceal an underlying polarization in which different
partisans observe information about an institution in society and yet render different levels
of expressed confidence in that organization.

This analysis has contributed to the broader bodies of study in civil-military relations,
elite credibility, political polarization, and institutional confidence by proposing a potential
cause of polarization in expressed trust for the military as a dynamic process. While a
considerable literature has utilized elite-level policy preferences or mass politicization as
an explanation for Republican-military proximity, this does not explain why polarization
would persist or even intensify, particularly during periods of wartime without a decisive
victory. I argue that a dynamic theory of evaluative updating helps to complete this picture. Using text-data and observational data on reporting trends, I have demonstrated that
during a key period in the Iraq war, conservative media consumers were much less likely
to be exposed to useful updating information about military performance, misconduct, or
scandals. When these stories were reported, they were often framed in such a way that
minimized direct criticism to the institution or to draw attention away from the costliness
of war. With the persistent effect of media “echo-chambers” in the modern information
environment, there is little reason to believe this trend will end into the future.

Even if information regarding military misconduct or failures is directly provided to individuals, my experimental design reveals that Republicans, particularly strong or “sorted”
ones, are far more resistant to this new or newly-salient information. While liberals and
moderates express clear preferences for military behavior – losing more confidence in response to professional misconduct or performance failures – conservatives are almost uniformly undeterred. I find that this is less likely to be the result of a rational updating
process, better-informed priors, or divergent preferences, and more likely to be the result of
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biased evaluative processes, in-group affective polarization, and motivated partisan reasoning. Limited information exposure makes contrary information cognitively easier to dismiss;
however, there is also evidence of the type of partisan bias and “backfire” attitude polarization that indicates Republicans see the military as an extension of their political in-group.

As I have discussed, the negative ramifications of unconditional trust in the military
are self-evident: reflexive insulation of the military institution from criticism risks compromising the public’s ability to effectively judge its performance and the merits of foreign
policy outcomes. Furthermore, political elites seeking to leverage the reflected credibility
of the military may pull that institution into the partisan debate with increased frequency.
Though many civil-military scholars have stressed that restraint among military elites from
political interference is necessary for the preservation of an apolitical military, it is also contingent upon a similar restraint among political elites not to incorporate such interference
into partisan strategies. Further study into the processes by which individuals in society
choose credible elites requires increased focus on the military, especially as active and retired officers play an increasingly central role in the political discussion.
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Appendix A: Covariate Balance and Regression Results
A.1 Confidence in US Institutions
Figure 3.7: Public Confidence in US Institutions (1973-2016)

NOTE: Figure 3.7 depicts aggregate levels of public confidence in institutions as measured by Gallup “Confidence in Institutions” annual survey; additional information
on military confidence comes from General Social Survey (GSS). Note: Gallup collection on Presidency confidence did not begin until 1991 survey fieldings.

143

Chapter 3: Who Follows the Generals? Partisan Polarization and Military Credibility

Figure 3.8: Principal Component Analysis of Institutional Feeling Thermometer Ratings,
ANES (2012)

NOTE: Figure 3.8 depicts the results of principal component analysis (PCA) on the feeling
thermometer scores for several institutions in US society according to the 2012 ANES, broken
down by partisan subgroups. First two principal components depicted for clarity. Unit circle
denotes maximum value of factor loading for each institution’s rating among these subgroups.
Relative proximity and angle between vectors denotes similar factor loadings on the first two
principal components.
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Figure 3.9: Principal Component Analysis of Institutional Confidence, Gallup (2016)

NOTE: Figure 3.9 depicts the results of principal component analysis (PCA) on the institutional
confidence ratings for several institutions in US society according to the 2016 Gallup poll, broken
down by partisan subgroups. First two principal components depicted for clarity. Unit circle
denotes maximum value of factor loading for each institution’s rating among these subgroups.
Relative proximity and angle between vectors denotes similar factor loadings on the first two
principal components.
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A.2 Regression-based Analysis for Predictors of High Military Confidence
Table 3.3: Gallup Institutional Confidence Dataset, 1977-2016

DV = Binary Confidence Indicator (Great deal/Quite a lot)
(LPM - Base)
∗∗∗

(LPM - Full)

Constant

0.546∗∗∗
(0.012)

0.115∗∗∗
(0.006)
0.002
(0.006)
−0.062∗∗∗
(0.005)
0.060∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.074∗∗∗
(0.007)
0.001
(0.007)
−0.051∗∗∗
(0.013)
0.039∗∗∗
(0.005)
0.028∗∗∗
(0.006)
0.430∗∗∗
(0.014)

Year FE

X

X

41,722
0.055
0.054
0.458 (df = 41684)
65.600∗∗∗ (df = 37; 41684)

41,718
0.067
0.066
0.455 (df = 41674)
69.739∗∗∗ (df = 43; 41674)

Republican

0.136
(0.006)
0.005
(0.005)

Democrat
College Educ
Male
White
GenX Cohort
Millennial Cohort
Silent Cohort
Co-Partisan POTUS

N
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
F Statistic
∗

p < .1;

∗∗

p < .05;

∗∗∗

p < .01
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Table 3.4: General Social Survey (GSS) Dataset, 1973-2016

DV = Binary Confidence Indicator (Top 1 of 3 Scale)
0.040∗∗∗
(0.009)
0.134∗∗∗
(0.047)
−0.005
(0.047)
−0.045
(0.047)
0.016∗∗
(0.007)
2.086∗∗∗
(0.050)

White
Republican
Democrat
Independent
Co-Partisan POTUS
Constant
Year FE

X

N
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
F Statistic
∗

p < .1;

∗∗

p < .05;

39,317
0.039
0.038
0.656 (df = 39284)
50.088∗∗∗ (df = 32; 39284)
∗∗∗

p < .01
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Table 3.5: World Values Survey, Wave 5 (2011), US Sample

DV = Binary Confidence Indicator, Military
(LPM-1)

(LPM-2)

(LPM-3)

−0.011
(0.016)
−0.002
(0.016)
0.132∗∗∗
(0.020)
−0.016
(0.019)

0.012
(0.015)
−0.005
(0.016)
0.079∗∗∗
(0.020)
−0.004
(0.018)
−0.001
(0.015)
−0.076∗∗∗
(0.016)
0.083∗∗∗
(0.020)
−0.479∗∗∗
(0.045)
−0.034∗∗∗
(0.011)
0.075∗∗∗
(0.012)
−0.036∗∗∗
(0.008)

0.813∗∗∗
(0.017)
2,189
0.029
0.027
0.365 (df = 2184)
16.222∗∗∗ (df = 4; 2184)

0.886∗∗∗
(0.040)
2,150
0.138
0.134
0.341 (df = 2138)
31.231∗∗∗ (df = 11; 2138)

0.007
(0.015)
−0.013
(0.016)
0.067∗∗∗
(0.020)
0.010
(0.018)
0.014
(0.016)
−0.058∗∗∗
(0.015)
0.077∗∗∗
(0.020)
−0.301∗∗∗
(0.057)
−0.029∗∗
(0.011)
0.065∗∗∗
(0.012)
−0.029∗∗∗
(0.008)
−0.042∗∗
(0.018)
0.015∗∗
(0.007)
−0.063∗∗
(0.028)
0.110∗∗
(0.050)
0.082∗∗∗
(0.014)
−0.006∗
(0.003)
0.558∗∗∗
(0.081)
2,069
0.157
0.150
0.330 (df = 2051)
22.421∗∗∗ (df = 17; 2051)

Male
College
Republican Vote Intent
Independent Vote Intent
Expert Govt
Interpersonal Trust
Democracy Good
Defiance Score
Worry War
Worry Terror
Worry Surv
Strong Ldr
Autonomy Score
Disbelief Score
Auth. Score
Natl Pride
Science Faith
Constant
N
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
F Statistic
∗

p < .1;

∗∗

p < .05;

∗∗∗

p < .01
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A.3 Randomization Checks and Covariate Balance
Table 3.6: Randomization Checks and Covariate Balance
Respondent Demographic

Control

Professionalism

Performance

Partisanship

Party Identification
Democrat
Republican

37.5%
20.8%

44.1%
21.4%

34.7%
22.1%

35.7%
28.4%

Gender
Male
Female

44.1%
60.0%

46.1%
54.0%

40.0%
60.1%

46.3%
53.6%

Age
25th Percentile
50th Percentile
75th Percentile

37
50
62

35.75
47
61

29
46
61

33
48.5
60

Race
White
Non-white

69.0%
31.0%

67.5%
32.4%

71.1%
28.8%

65.4%
34.5%

Sample Size

245

256

253

246

NOTE: Percentages reflect segment of survey population assigned to each experimental condition
broken down by key demographic values. Subjects were assigned on a random basis to each of the
four conditions.
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Table 3.7: Randomization Check: Logit Regression with Treatment Assignment as DV
Dependent variable: Treatment Assignment
Control

Partisan

Professional

Performance

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Democrat

−0.069
(0.174)

−0.206
(0.171)

0.232
(0.171)

0.037
(0.173)

Independent

0.212
(0.207)

−0.365∗
(0.215)

−0.038
(0.215)

0.174
(0.207)

Male

−0.024
(0.150)

0.132
(0.149)

0.125
(0.147)

−0.236
(0.149)

Age

0.007
(0.004)

−0.002
(0.004)

0.001
(0.004)

−0.005
(0.004)

White

0.002
(0.165)

−0.227
(0.162)

−0.024
(0.161)

0.250
(0.165)

Constant

−1.459∗∗∗
(0.290)

−0.757∗∗∗
(0.285)

−1.241∗∗∗
(0.286)

−0.958∗∗∗
(0.284)

Observations
Log Likelihood
Akaike Inf. Crit.

1,000
−554.703
1,121.407

1,000
−555.304
1,122.608

1,000
−567.054
1,146.109

1,000
−562.331
1,136.662

NOTE: †p < 0.10,∗ p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Appendix B: Media Reporting Supporting Results
B.1 Supplementary Wartime Reporting Statistics
Table 3.8: Descriptive Statistics, Iraq War Reporting: Cable News (2007)
Mean Percentage of Sampled Newshole
PBS

CNN

MSNBC

FOX News

News Source

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Combat Events

9.18
(< 0.001)

6.12
(< 0.001)

6.85
(< 0.001)

3.62

Domestic/Homefront

27.12
(< 0.001)

6.57
(0.07)

10.75
(0.01)

4.62

Policy Debate

26.38
(< 0.001)

13.03
(0.01)

25.28
(< 0.001)

9.97

Observations

431

468

243

394

NOTE: Reported figures depict average percent of daily newshole dedicated
to segments on Iraq War stories across the entire 2007 news year. Values in
parentheses () indicate p-values for two-tailed t-test for difference in means
between reported news source and FOX News as reference category.
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Figure 3.10: Media Coverage of Military News Stories by Source, 2007

(a) ”2007 Troop Increase” Coverage

(b) ”Petraeus Report to Congress” Coverage

(c) ”Pat Tillman Scandal” Coverage

(d) ”Comparisons to Vietnam” Coverage

NOTE: These figures display the total duration (in on-air seconds) devoted by each of
the major television news sources to each of the indicated sub-storylines as coded and
sampled by the 2007 Pew Research News Content Index (NCI) dataset. Total source
broadcast time calculated by summing total on-air time spent on each sub-storyline
across all segments in each source.
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NOTE: This figure depicts media coverage of Afghanistan events and related news stories as coded by Pew
Research News Content Index (NCI) 2010 Dataset. Points represent day totals for percent of newshole or
prominence proportion. LOESS smoothers are added to depict broader trend over time (span = 0.15).

Figure 3.11: Media Coverage of Afghanistan Events by Source, 2010
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NOTE: This figure depicts the number of print media articles per source dedicated to select military events outside
of the 2007 NCI coding scheme. Article counts were obtained for the New York Times and Washington Post
through the LexisNexis database and for the Wall Street Journal through the ProQuest database. Dates of search
fields are included in parentheses. Abu Ghraib stories were those containing “Abu Ghraib/Ghuraib” in the article
body; similarly, Haditha stories had to contain “Haditha” and “killing OR murder” in the body, to distinguish
it from other combat events in the area; Walter Reed stories contained the name of the medical facility in the
article body, and sexual assault stories contained both “military” and “sexual assault”.

Figure 3.12: Print Media Coverage of Other Military Events, 2004-2013
Chapter 3: Who Follows the Generals? Partisan Polarization and Military Credibility
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B.2 Topic Model Articles
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NOTE: This figure depicts metadata for the top 10 articles with the highest topic prevalence for the “New Course for Iraq” and “Petraeus” topics
estimated by the structural topic model.

Figure 3.13: Media Coverage of Iraq Combat Events by Source, 2007
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NOTE: This figure depicts metadata for the top 10 articles with the highest topic prevalence for the “Costs of War” and “Iraq Withdrawal” topics
estimated by the structural topic model.

Figure 3.14: Media Coverage of Iraq Combat Events by Source, 2007
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NOTE: This figure depicts metadata for the top 10 articles with the highest topic prevalence for the “Coalition Death Toll” and “Funding/Dem.
Congress” topics estimated by the structural topic model.

Figure 3.15: Media Coverage of Iraq Combat Events by Source, 2007
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NOTE: This figure depicts metadata for the top 10 articles with the highest topic prevalence for the “Selling the Surge” and “Anti-Media Coverage”
topics estimated by the structural topic model.

Figure 3.16: Media Coverage of Iraq Combat Events by Source, 2007
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B.3 Supplementary Experimental Results
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NOTE: This figure depicts deviation in expressed confidence in the military institution as measured by the 11-pt
scale in all experimental conditions. Respondent patterns broken down by identification into liberal, conservative,
and moderate subsamples based on self-identification on five-point political ideology scale. Reported p-values
reflect significance at 95% level for two-tailed t-test for difference in means between experimental and control
subgroups. NT otal = 907

Figure 3.17: Experimental Results (Ideology Breakdown), YouGov - March 2017
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NOTE: This figure depicts deviation in expressed confidence in the military institution as measured by the 11-pt
scale in all experimental conditions. Respondent patterns broken down by identification into cross party-ideology
subsamples based on self-identification on five-point political ideology scale and identification on the seven-point
party ID scale (including leaners). Reported p-values reflect significance at 95% level for two-tailed t-test for
difference in means between experimental and control subgroups. NT otal = 678

Figure 3.18: Experimental Results (Expanded PID Breakdown), YouGov - March 2017
Chapter 3: Who Follows the Generals? Partisan Polarization and Military Credibility
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Appendix C: Pew Research News Content Index (NCI) Dataset
C.1 Dataset Methodology
Analysis of the selective exposure hypotheses conducted in the main body of the text draw
extensively on media reporting data provided by the Pew Research News Content Index
(NCI) Dataset, a sampling-based index of stories reported by major media outlets across
television, the internet, radio, and print newspapers. A full description of the dataset’s
methodology can be found on the Pew Research website.35 However, for the purposes of
this analysis, I provide an overview of the collection and coding schemes for the NCI dataset,
as the selective exposure argument uses this data in 2007 to make the case for limited reporting across conservative outlets on Iraq Combat Events.

The population of data points captured by the dataset’s sampling process produces an
image of the media information environment per day, meant to be “illustrative but not
strictly representative”. This is to say that the dataset employs quasi-random sampling of
news stories across the different media, weighting these observations based on the number
of outlets per medium, the number of programs per outlet, and the volume of news to be
collected during given periods of time. Coding the entire content of a news segment or
newspaper is prohibitively time consuming. As a result, the collection process increases
efficiency at the cost of completeness by focusing on the most prominent aspects of these
segments, such as using the first 30-minutes of television news segments or the front page
of print media sources in order to provide an accurate picture of the predominant stories
during a given news cycle. While this means the image captured by the dataset is a sampled subset of prominent stories, this does not pose a serious threat to inference in the
selective exposure argument discussed in the main body of the text. Lead stories and newspaper headlines are precisely the high-salience, high-exposure stories that this hypothesis
is attempting to test for distribution and acceptance by the public; as a result, “D-block”
television segments or non-front page, under-the-fold print stories are less important to our
35
Pew Research Center Journalism and Media, News Content Index Methodology,http://www.
journalism.org/news_index_methodology, accessed October 18, 2017.
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consideration.

Network Television News

The network television news medium includes morning and evening segments broadcast by
the three major networks (ABC, CBS, and NBC) and the evening segments of PBS. The
three primary networks typically air two daytime programs (such as the Today Show or
Good Morning America) and one evening program, whereas PBS is typically captured in a
sampling of Newshour with Jim Lehrer. Collection of story topics for these programs codes
the substance of the first 30 minutes of one or two of the three programs, which typically
focus on stories of national importance. Though this means that stories at the end of the
broadcast are less likely to be collected, Pew Research asserts that “we have learned that
the morning shows generally move away from the news of the day after the first 30 minutes”.
Evening news segments are collected in a similar fashion, with the entire 30 minutes of two
of the three programs a day being sampled. Finally, the PBS Newshour broadcast rotates
to be coded based on the first 30 minutes, followed by the second 30 minutes, followed by
its non-collection.

All television programs, both network and cable news, are coded based on the entire 30
minutes time frame of collection, discounting inserts from local affiliates, advertisements,
promotions, or weather reports. Furthermore, segments within a programs will be coded in
their entirety even if they run past the 30 minute time window (for instance, a three-minute
segment that started at the 28-minute mark would be coded even though it concludes at
the 31-minute mark). Removing local inserts, non-substantive information, and “teasers”
of upcoming stories narrows the collected sample to the top stories of national importance.
Therefore, despite the rotating sample scheme, the information collected is representative
of the prevailing news stories of the day.
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Cable Television News

Cable news focuses on particular sources in a similar fashion, utilizing the top three cable
news distributors by audience reach (MSNBC, CNN, and FOX). Selection on these subsets precluded the inclusion of corporately-related by unsampled news source like CNBC,
or CNN Headline News. Because cable news broadcasts on a continuous basis, a different
scheme of collection is adopted due to the indistinguishability of segments from the same
network to a broad audience. Instead, Pew breaks the reporting day into four time periods: early morning, daytime, early evening, and primetime. Early morning segments are
not collected due to the fact that they are not uniformly available to a national audience;
east coast segments are broadcast too early for west coast audience to consume. Daytime
segments are collected in a manner similar to network news, with two 30 minute segments
collected per day, rotating among the three networks.

Early evening and primetime, taken together, form a news block typically lasting from
6PM to 11PM on weekdays. Prior to 2009, CNN and FOX had three of their four cable news
programs coded, with MSNBC having two of their four coded. This was done is reflection
of the audience reach at the time, in which MSNBC had lower ratings than CNN and FOX.
Since 2009, this has been amended to sample one or two segments from CNN, one or two
segments from MSNBC, and two segments from FOX, for a total of between 30-60 minutes
of coded substance per source per day, for a total of nearly 3.5 hours of coded substance
per day.
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Figure 3.19: Pew Research NCI Dataset, Cable News Sampling Scheme
Post-2011

NOTE: This figure depicts the post-2011 collection scheme for cable news
segments during the critical early evening-primetime joint period. This is an
amendment from the collection scheme used for the main body’s data from
2007 in that while CNN and FOX would have had three of their programs
sampled, MSNBC would only have had two sampled. Figure created by
Pew Research available at http: // www. journalism. org/ news_ index_
methodology .

For our purposes, the sampling scheme for collection of the news story data warrants
several considerations. First, the rotating basis of the collection during the relevant time
period of analysis (2007) means that liberal news source MSNBC would have had far fewer
opportunities to be collected; as a result, the gap in reporting trends between conservative
and liberal media outlets on Iraq Combat Events may actually be biased downward since
more MSNBC stories were not collected to this end. FOX and CNN would have been, on
average, collected 50% more than the MSNBC segments; while this is reflective of differing audience reach, it also heightens the importance of reporting biases between sources as
discussed in the main analysis. Second, the rotation scheme does not harm inference based
on ‘% of newshole’ dependent variable use. The graphically displayed reporting trends in
Figure 3.1 utilize daily percentages of the Iraq Combat Event-related segments as a percentage of the collected outlet airtime. Because of the rotating collection scheme as it was
conducted pre-2011, this means that day-to-day total time per outlet would have remained
fixed, while segment length devoted to this story, our main variable of interest, was allowed
to vary based on news source. These daily percentages were then plotted as individual
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pointed that the LOESS smoother could visually depict in a more substantively useful fashion.

Newspapers

Analysis of print media relied on collection of same-day delivery of electronic, full-text versions of the major newspapers through various providers available to Pew Research. The
newspapers are organized on a three-tiered system of audience reach and level of distribution. As of 2007, when the substantive data used in the main analysis was collected,
Tier 1 included The New York Times, Wall Street Journal, LA Times, USA Today, and
The Washington Post, though the latter has since fallen to Tier 2 due to lower circulation. Tier 2 newspapers typically include regionalized print media with local audiences and
non-national distribution, such as the Atlanta Constitution-Journal, while Tier 3 are more
localized. Collection on a daily basis included coding two of the four Tier 1 papers per day.
Since no Tier 2 or Tier 3 papers enter in our analysis, I leave discussion of that analysis
scheme out.

Again, complete coding of the entire newspaper is cost prohibitive for minimal quantitative value. Two of the four Tier 1 papers are sampled each day, with the sampled
newspapers being coded based on the stories which appear on page A1, both above and
below the fold, and any substance continued inside the newspaper so long as it begins on
the front page. The logic for consideration of these stories is that editors make a conscious
choice to allocate finite column-inches to stories of particular import. Just as non-collection
of local inserts or the last 30 minutes of network news increases efficiency with little loss of
substance, so too does ignoring inside-the-fold stories that were not prominent or important
enough to be placed on the front page. The purpose of the index, and its application for
this study, is the frequency and location of specific story topics in the information environment; as such, study of headlines and lead stories is precisely where focus ought to be. This
scheme results in about 20 newspaper stories collected and coded per day.
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For this analysis, newspaper prominence was calculated using the NCI’s five-point scale
of story prominence, inverting the scale, and dividing the selected story by the sum of all
stories from that paper per day. For example, a story about Iraq Combat Events featured
on the front page of The New York Times that was coded as “Front Page/Second Prominent”, would have been entered as 102 in the dataset, on the scale of 101 (Front Page/Most
Prominent) to 105 (Front Page/Other, Below the Fold). I repurpose this measure into an
inverse five-point scale of importance; the above story would be given a score of 4, just as
a story that was 104: Front Page/Other, Above the Fold would have been given a 2. I sum
the total prominence of stories reported by that source as divide it by the prominence of the
observed story, in order to ascertain a proxy measure of the percentage of finite prominence
the editor’s devoted to the story. As argued here, this is a fair measure of the importance
of the story to this source and its availability to its audience.

Radio

Because online news sources do not factor in my analysis, I also forgo discussion of their
collection scheme. Radio sources, however, factor prominently in my analysis as a decidedly
conservative-heavy transmission medium for information. Because of the wide variation in
types of radio sources, Pew subsets the available radio outlets into one of three categories.
First, Public Radio collects rotating 30-minute segments of National Public Radio’s (NPR)
Morning Edition and All Things Considered. The scheme of sampling rotates between the
first 30 minutes of the former, the second 30 minutes of the former, the first 30 minutes of
the latter, and the second 30 minutes of the latter. NPR broadcasts are typically two hours
in length for either segment, with member stations picking which parts of that broadcast to
incorporate into their own. The dataset includes additional 30-minute sampling of WFYI,
the member station from which Pew collects NPR broadcasts.

The second category, Talk Radio, includes those outlets with a public affairs of newsoriented tone. Just as larger conservative audiences on cable news leads to a sampling
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scheme that favors FOX over MSNBC, the vastly larger conservative audience for talk radio favors Hannity and Rush Limbaugh over Ed Schultz ; as of 2007, Schultz and Hannity
were sampled every other day and Limbaugh was sampled everyday, with all coded based
on the first 30 minutes of the broadcast. Again, this upweights the conservative outlets
measured in the 2007 version of the dataset, with conservative media outlets collected more
frequently in line with their larger audience reach. The third category is Headline Feeds,
which are hourly news feeds from larger national outlets like CBS or CNN, but are of limited length and typically sum up national or international headlines from the parent news
source. Pew NCI collects two Headline Feeds per day, at ABC and CBS Radio, each for
five minutes in length for a total of 10 minutes per day.

This analysis calculated the length of the segment spent of specific topics (like Iraq
Combat Events) as a percentage of the total length of the segment. Again, the total length
of the recorded segment is fixed while the time spent on specific subjects is allowed to vary.
One key consideration for this analysis is the large oversampling of conservative radio outlets compared to only five-minute headline feeds from more centrist or liberal news sources.
In any given day, Hannity or Limbaugh have nearly 5-10 times more airtime to discuss highsalience news stories than the headline feeds. This imbalance biases the expected result of
our analysis downward, making the gap in reporting trends even more stark. With less time
to report on specific stories, headline feeds still spend more time talking about war events
than conservative radio hosts, as seen in Figure 3.1.
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Appendix D: Survey Experiment Supplementals
D.1 Questionnaire Design
Programming Instructions: Assign random integer from 1 to 4, record this integer as assignment. Assignment of this integer is recorded and dictates the value of [Prompt1],[Prompt2],
and [Text].
Assigning Textual Prompt

The variable [Text] takes on the following values depending on integer assignment:
• Assignment=1, [Text]= We are interested in how well certain news stories regarding US
foreign policy can reach the public. The length of the ‘war on terror’ and associated US
military activities have created a large amount of information that can be hard to follow.
• Assignment=2, 3, 4, [Text]=We are interested in how well certain news stories regarding
US foreign policy can reach the public. The length of the ‘war on terror’ and associated US
military activities have created a large amount of information that can be hard to follow. We
want to ask about some stories that occurred and were reported to see if you happened to hear
about them.

Assigning News Vignette #1

The variable [Prompt1] takes on the following values depending on integer assignment:
• Assignment=1, [Prompt1]= Would you say that you follow stories about US foreign policy
in the news?
• Assignment=2, [Prompt1]=Story 1: The 2012 presidential election saw candidates Barack
Obama and Mitt Romney receive many high-profile endorsements, several hundred of which
coming from the military community. Among these were retired military officers General Wesley Clark, former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, and General Tommy Franks, former
commander of US forces in the Middle East, who publicly supported Obama and Romney, respectively.
• Assignment=3, [Prompt1]=Story 1: In 2009, several former Army soldiers received multiple
life sentences for an event in 2006 where the men had participated in the rape and murder of

170

Chapter 3: Who Follows the Generals? Partisan Polarization and Military Credibility

a 14-year old Iraqi girl. The soldiers, stationed near the town of Mahmudiyah at the time,
were convicted of this crime along with the murder of the girl’s mother, father, and younger
sister.
• Assignment=4, [Prompt1]=Story 1: A British development aid worker named Linda Norgrove was captured by Taliban forces in eastern Afghanistan in late 2010. During an attempted
raid to free the captured civilian, members of the Navy’s SEAL Team Six accidentally killed
Norgrove when one of the sailors mistakenly threw a grenade into the area where she was
hiding.

Assigning News Vignette #2

The variable [Prompt2] takes on the following values depending on integer assignment:
• Assignment=1, [Prompt2]= Would you say that you follow stories about US military operations in the news?
• Assignment=2, [Prompt2]=Story 2: During the 2016 presidential campaign, both presidential candidates announced broad support from retired military officers like General Mike Flynn
and General John Allen, who supported Trump and Clinton, respectively. Donald Trump released a list of 88 retired generals and admirals that publicly supported his candidacy, while
Hillary Clinton released a similar list of 110 retired generals and admirals that supported her
campaign.
• Assignment=3, [Prompt2]=Story 2: In the last few years, the military has experienced problems with misconduct by high-ranking officers, prompting the resignation of figures like former
General David Petraeus, for example. A report commissioned by the Defense Department in
2012 found that nearly thirty generals and admirals had been investigated for offenses ranging from sexual assault, misuse of government funds, gambling scandals, and inappropriate
statements about members of Congress.
• Assignment=4, [Prompt2]=Story 2: In October 2015, US and Afghan forces fighting in the
city of Kunduz struggled to remove Taliban elements from the town. During the fight, US
combat aircraft misidentified a nearby medical facility staffed by Médecins sans Frontières
(Doctors Without Borders) and destroyed the hospital, killing more than 30 aid workers and
wounding many more. A follow-up investigation attributed the accident to “human error” by
US service members.
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Survey Progression
Standard demographic battery precedes the experimental portion of the survey.
[TEXT]

[PROMPT1]
Question 1: SINGLE CHOICE. Interest/Knowledge
• Control Group (Assignment=1 ) Foreign Policy Interest
• Treatment Groups (Assignment=2,3,4 ) News Knowledge 1
Did you hear this story?
• Yes/No

[PROMPT2]
Question 2: SINGLE CHOICE. Interest/Knowledge
• Control Group (Assignment=1 ) Foreign Policy Interest
• Treatment Groups (Assignment=2,3,4 ) News Knowledge 2
Did you hear this story?
• Yes/No

Question 3-5: DYNAMIC GRID. Institutional Confidence
On scale of 0-10 (with 0 being the least and 10 being the most), how much trust and confidence
do you have in each of the following institutions?
Rows [randomized order]
• Congress
• The presidency
• The military
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D.2 News Vignette Analogs
Each of the treatment conditions in this experimental design was exposed to news stories
that were intended to provoke “top-of-the-head” thinking and introduce specific types of
newly-salient information regarding military misconduct of poor performance. In order to
minimize deception and increase external validity, the stories used were actual cases of partisan, professional, and performance-based events reported in multiple news outlets. Below,
I provide a short summary of each of the cases used for vignettes in this experiment and
the relevant cites for these stories in the information environment.

Partisan Activity

The first partisan vignette included information about retired military elites, including
General Wesley Clark and General Tommy Franks, providing high-profile endorsements to
presidential candidate Mitt Romney and President Barack Obama in the 2012 presidential
campaign. Clark, a retired Supreme Allied Commander of NATO Force Europe and former 2004 Democratic presidential candidate, was one of several prominent military officers
to endorse the incumbent president; along with retired Major General Paul Eaton, these
officers opposed Mitt Romney’s take on foreign policy early in the campaign season and
touted Obama’s successful operation to kill Osama bin Laden.36 Obama’s campaign cochairs included retired Admiral John Nathman, the former second-highest ranking officer
in the Navy, who would go on to speak at the Democratic National Convention.37 The
endorsements for Mitt Romney were considerably more numerous; on the eve of the election, nearly 500 retired generals and admirals sponsored a full-page ad in the Washington
Times endorsing Romney. The list involved five former Chairmen of the Joints Chiefs of
Staff – including Clinton appointee General Hugh Shelton – and General Tommy Franks,
the former Central Command (CENTCOM) commander in 2003 during the Iraq invasion
36
Nia-Malika Henderson, “Gen. Wes Clark set to pound Romney on foreign policy”, The Washington
Post, November 21, 2011.
37
Byron Tau, “Obama campaign announces co-chairs”, Politico44 Blog, February 22, 2012.
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under President Bush.38

In the second vignette, similar information is exposed to the respondent regarding endorsement in the 2016 president campaign, though in this election both candidates displayed
both high-profile individual endorsements and large blocs of retired officers. Republican
nominee Donald Trump released a letter in September 2016 with the endorsement of 88
retired generals and admirals, including former commander of US forces in Korea General
Burwell Bell and former commander of the US Army’s Delta Force, Lieutenant General
Jerry Boykin. Trump’s list boasted officers who were more advanced in age and had retired
ten or more years previously, though most notable among his military endorsements was
that of retired Lieutenant General Mike Flynn, a close adviser and former intelligence officer
who would go on to speak at the Republican National Convention.39 Democratic nominee
Secretary Hillary Clinton responded with her own list of 110 retired officers’ endorsements,
including recent Afghanistan forces commander General John Allen and General Wesley
Clark once again. Allen would go on to speak at the party nominating convention that year
as well, with Clark leading a cadre of 15 officers who independently voiced their fears over a
Trump presidency and the denigration of fellow veteran Senator John McCain that Trump
has stated earlier.40

Professionalism Failures

In the second treatment condition, individuals were exposed instead to priming information
regarding professional or ethical failures by military elites or the institution as a means for
making such calculations salient to the respondent’s calculation of confidence in the military. The intent in this treatment condition was to focus on events of singular or collective
38

Stephan Dinan, “Retired top military brass push for Romney”, The Washington Times, November 4,
2012.
39
David Wright, Ryan Browne, and Naomi Lin, “88 former military leaders write letter backing Donald
Trump for president”, CNN, September 6, 2016.
40
Dianna Cahn, “Former admirals and generals warn Trump is ‘dangerous’ to military and country”, Stars
and Stripes, September 21, 2016; Dan Merica, “Clinton to Trump: My military endorsements are bigger
than yours”, CNN, September 9, 2016.
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values violations in which the driving mechanism was not incompetence, but rather motivated harm or ethical faults. In the first vignette, respondents were exposed to a news story
regarding the trial and conviction of several US soldiers in 2009 for an event which occurred
in Mahmudiyah, Iraq in 2006. A group of five soldiers led by Private Steven Dale Green,
raped a 14-year old Iraqi girl before proceeding to kill both her and her family. Green’s unit
was serving in the famed Sunni “Triangle of Death” outside of Baghdad when the incident
occurred, followed by his arrest and the arrest of four other soldiers who participated in the
crime. The event was all the more damaging to the military’s institutional reputation as
Green had been arrested shortly before his enlistment, admitted to the Army on one of the
many “moral waivers” the military had issued in an attempt to boost recruitment in the
worst years of the Iraq war.41

In the second vignette, respondents were exposed to a news story that focused on the
elite-level of the military institution and its misconduct. This involved the 2014 publication
of the increasingly list of senior military officials relived of command or fired due to various
forms of misconduct and professional failures. Citing the 2012 resignation of retired General
David Petraeus from his post as Director of Central Intelligence due to an unknown affair
as the impetus, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta commissioned a study of ethical standards
for senior officers. Resulting media exposure captured misconduct ranging from sexual assault, sexual misconduct, forgery, public intoxication, bribery, unauthorized gift acceptance
from foreign entities, and misuse of government funds.42 In many cases, the hypocrisy of
the violations was particularly egregious, from a South Carolina-based one-star general advocated “zero-tolerance for sexual harassment” while being investigated for assaulting his
mistress, to the relief of a high-ranking nuclear commander for public drunkenness while
with Russian military officials in Moscow.

41
Jim Dwyer and Robert F. Worth, “Accused G.I. Was Troubled Long Before Iraq”, The New York Times,
July 14, 2006.
42
Craig Whitlock, “Military brass, behaving badly: Files detail a spate of misconduct dogging armed
forces”, The Washington Post, January 26, 2014.
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Battlefield Performance Problems

In the third treatment condition, respondents were subjected to news stories regarding military failures of a standard variety: battlefield results. This included cases of incompetence,
miscalculation, miscoordination, or tactical lack of proficiency designed to make salient the
standard calculation of confidence in the military institution according the institutionalist
theory. The first vignette detailed the failure of a 2010 mission by the Navy’s SEAL Team
Six to rescue Linda Norgrove, a British national and aid worker captured by elements of
the Taliban. Norgrove was moved outside the compound in which the SEALs believed she
was housed by her captors and one of the team’s members accidentally killed Norgrove with
a grenade believing her to be an enemy combatant.43 In addition to drawing attention to
a tactical failure by the military institution, it also invokes the popularly-recognized SEAL
Team Six, made famous from successful operations in anti-piracy off the coast of Somalia
in 2009 and in Pakistan to killed Osama bin Laden in 2011. Using such an organization is
meant to draw a stronger contrast in the miscalculation between expectation and newlysalient information.

In the second vignette, respondents were exposed to a story detailing the accidental bombing of a Medecins sans Frontieres (Doctors without Borders) clinic in Kunduz,
Afghanistan, in 2015. The clinic’s staff were administering to the increasing number of
wounded created by Taliban resurgence in Kunduz. Part of coalition response to the increased violence included fire from a nearby AC-130 Spectre gunship, which despite initial
reports was called in to support US efforts on the ground. In the subsequent investigation,
it was clear that the location of the hospital was in dispute at numerous points, resulting
in a nearly 30-minute barrage on the clinic that left 42 dead and dozens more wounded.
President Obama apologized directly to the president of MSF, admitting US miscalculations in the incident.44 In this case, miscalculations of targeting and tactical proficiency
43
Anthony Faiola, “British aid worker Norgrove killed accidentally bu U.S. soldier, inquiry finds”, Washington Post Foreign Service, December 3, 2010
44
“Obama apologises to MSF president for Kunduz bombing”, BBC News, October 7, 2015. Obama’s
apology was also given amidst increasing rumors that the attack was a deliberate move by the US to dislodge
Taliban fighters “holed up” in the clinic, though this was eventually denied by both the US and MSF.
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not only failed to produce a positive outcomes, but created a tangibly negative one in the
destruction of a medical facility crewed largely by third-party nationals.
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Chapter 4
What Discord Follows:
Partisan Polarization and Civil-Military Norms

Introduction
Individuals navigate a diverse and competitive information space when forming attitudes on
complex political issues. The influence of elite communities, whether in the form of policy
experts, partisan leaders, or media outlets, are some of the most important actors in this
process. As issues increase in technicality or complexity, individuals are more likely to focus
on the credibility of the source of information as a guide for attitude formation (Lupia and
Mathew D. McCubbins 1998; Petty and Cacioppo 1986; Hovland and Weiss 1951). This
connection between elite credibility and political influence is particularly significant amidst
an ever-changing information environment and decreasing public trust in traditional expert
institutions.1 As an elite community with high levels of public trust and localized subject
matter expertise, the military and its representatives are ideally placed to be influential
speakers, providing seemingly objective and unbiased information. However, a broad consensus among civil-military relations scholars argues that such political activity by military
1

Recent polling on public skepticism towards experts has found this trend is broad. In December 2016,
53% of those surveyed agreed with the statement “Everyday Americans understand what the government
should do better than the so-called ‘experts”’. Peter Moore, “Poll Results: Civil Service”, YouGov, December
7, 2016.
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elites is functionally and normatively problematic (Huntington 1957; J. K. Dempsey 2009;
Cohen 2003; Golby, Dropp, and Feaver 2012; Owens 2015). Paradoxically, the elite community most trusted by the public is the one most heavily proscribed from using that influence
in political activity.

However, the influence of military elites in the political sphere has nonetheless increased,
particularly due to retired military officials whose post-service careers include media commentary, political activism, or legislative lobbying. Recent scholarship in military politicization has asserted that continuous interventions by these figures into politics will be met
with a broad public devaluation of the institution’s credibility (Urben 2017; Liebert and
Golby 2017a; Owens 2015; Hill, Wong, and Gerras 2013). The central assumption of these
arguments is that military credibility is conditional on its image as a non-partisan entity.
However, while the salience of this “apolitical norm” is nearly a consensus among civilmilitary scholars, the proposition that the public objectively considers this norm important
has been subjected to surprisingly little empirical scrutiny. Despite increasing political activity and partisan activism by both active and retired officers, public confidence in the
armed forces remains the highest among institutions in US society.2 This potential weakening of a critical civil-military norm occurs amidst increasing partisan polarization, changing
attitudes about the role of government, and a broader shift among younger Americans in
acceptance of illiberal governance (Foa and Mounk 2016).

In this study, I address this research question directly: how does political activity by
military elites influence public perceptions of their credibility and that of the military institution? Review of the extant literature would suggest that the public can respond to such
information in one of several ways. First, as a principled public that uniformly sanctions
elite sources that are perceived as violating the professional norm against such activity. This
pattern, reflective of the civil-military normative consensus, would reveal that individuals
lend less credibility to partisan sources and do so objectively, with no bias towards their
2

Frank Newport, “Americans’ Confidence in Institutions Edges Up”, Gallup, June 26, 2017. http:
//news.gallup.com/poll/212840/americans-confidence-institutions-edges.aspx
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own political ideology. Second, as an indifferent public that does not allow political activity
to update their impressions of military elite credibility in a significant way. Such a response
would indicate a weakening of the normative consensus embraced by civil-military scholars
as the expected consequence of partisan behavior. The limited empirical work conducted
towards this question has suggested that the public may indeed be unmoved by such activity
(Golby, Dropp, and Feaver 2012).

However, I argue that while the indifferent public underestimates the influence of military political activity, the principled public overestimates the objectivity of the audience.
As a result, I argue a third hypothesis: the partisan public. This image of the public departs
from the previous two in that it is neither principled nor objective; individuals selectively
view military partisans as less credible not for violating a professional norm, but for adopting a politically contrary position. In this framework, military credibility is not conditional
on adopting non-partisan attitudes, but rather on adopting the “correct” partisan attitudes.
Focusing on retired military elites in original survey experimentation, I find significant evidence for this version of the public, indicating a weakening of an apolitical norm considered
to be an important structural component of democratic regime quality. Furthermore, I
discuss how such an environment of partisan polarization both incentivizes further military
politicization and limits the reach of military elites in broadcasting information.

I conduct this analysis as follows: first, I outline the fundamental conflict between the
normative demands of civil-military scholarship and the predictions of the body of work in
public opinion formation. The purpose of this section is to demonstrate that while military
elites satisfy many of the theoretical criteria to be credible sources in providing political information, that civil-military theory broadly considers such activity to be normatively and
functionally problematic. Second, I argue that an objective norm against political activity
by the military may be weaker than previously contemplated and argue a comprehensive
theory for the different attitudes the public may adopt in response to knowledge of military
politicization. This section will outline the potential response patterns empirically measured
by my survey instrument, in whether such norms against a political military are objectively
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strong (principled public), objectively weak (indifferent public), or selectively weak (partisan
public). Third, I will incorporate the results of original survey experimentation designed to
measure how military politicization (1) influences the public’s estimation of the endorser’s
credibility and (2) influences the perceived credibility of the larger institution. Whether
the public adopts indifferent, principled, or partisan attitudes in each domain has decidedly different and significant implications for civil-military relations and elite-driven politics.

Political Activity and Military Credibility
Credible Elite Sources
Examining the impact of military politicization on elite credibility requires placing two distinct literatures in political science into a common frame. While theories of elite-driven politics suggest that a highly-trusted and knowledgeable organization like the military should
be an effective cue-giver to the public, the civil-military relations literature extensively argues the necessity of an apolitical military. Theorizing on this conflict first requires an
understanding of the role of elites in public opinion development. Underlying the study of
elite cues is the assumption that individuals in society lack the resources to form expert
opinions on every issue in politics; instead, these citizens can reach “reasoned choices” from
the heuristic offered by information given through trusted elites (Lupia and Mathew D.
McCubbins 1998; Downs 1957; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1993). However, with access to a substantial variety of voices in the information space, individuals seeking to reach
informed opinions must make similarly reasoned choices about the messages – and sources
– to which they attend.

Petty and Cacioppo (1986) find that when issues are personally important, individuals ‘centrally’ attend to the substance of the argument; however, when the information
environment is distracting or the issue is exceedingly complex, these same individuals ‘peripherally’ attend to the attributes of the source itself. Political issues like military intervention (Baum and Groeling 2009; Golby, Feaver, and Dropp 2017), foreign policy (Grieco
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et al. 2011; Guardino and Hayes 2017), or international agreements (Guisinger and E. N.
Saunders 2017) have been found to fit into this mold of complexity and distance, where
individuals rely more on attributes of the source of information than its substantive content. Among the characteristics most closely tied to source credibility are trustworthiness
(Hovland and Weiss 1951; Lupia and Mathew D. McCubbins 1998) and knowledgeability
(Lupia and Mathew D. McCubbins 1998; McGuire 1969). These attributes collectively
speak to the source’s credibility in the eyes of the individual; elite communities with high
public esteem and subject matter expertise should be the most influential, particularly in
technical or complex political issue domains.

While this analysis similarly incorporates expertise and trustworthiness as suitable measures of credibility, I capture these attributes on two distinct levels: the individual source
and the broader institution. The relationship between both levels of credibility has been
studied at length in the research governing the effectiveness of corporate sponsors and their
public brand. The extent of elite endorser credibility from an individual source operates in
conjunction with the corporate credibility of the larger institution that the individual represents (Goldberg and Hartwick 1990). Both the perceived expertise and trustworthiness
of the individual source and its parent organization act as reinforcing or supportive forces
in persuading the public about the reliability of their claims (Ohanian 1990; Hovland and
Weiss 1951; Newell and Goldsmith 2001). As such, this analogous literature in business research envisions both trustworthiness and expertise as significant insofar as they influence
attitudes towards the endorser, the corporate firm, and “purchaser intent”, linking perceived credibility to a higher likelihood that the “product” will be accepted by the public
(Newell and Goldsmith 2001; Lafferty and Goldsmith 1999).

I extend this logic to public opinion formation on political issues, in which an individual
source and its institution operate in the roles of endorser and corporate entity, respectively.
Just as corporate endorsers and firms seek to develop public credibility in order to increase
purchaser intent, so too do political elites look to maintain the same public credibility in
an effort to persuade individuals in society to adopt specific policy preferences. As I will
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discuss later, this more comprehensive framework for understanding public perceptions of
elite credibility allows for a better method of examining changes in trustworthiness and expertise among specific elite communities like the military. As an institution with high levels
of public confidence, the military and its elites should serve as powerful voices of influence,
combining broad public appeal, subject matter expertise, and a professional reputation as
trustworthy dispensers of information.

Collectively, these efforts make clear why the military should – at least theoretically
– possess considerable “latent political influence” on complex policy issues (Risa Brooks
2009). For the purposes of this study, I characterize military elites as those officials – active
and retired – whose rank, status, or notoriety provides a sufficient base of influence with the
public. Such figures include general officers, media commentators, political activists, or even
ex-military elected officials. With high and consistent levels of public trust, a broad potential audience, and perceived expertise, individual military elites have the ability to transmit
informative signals that have a high probability of acceptance as credible. Furthermore, the
institutional credibility of the larger military establishment may have a strong interactive
effect in the persuasiveness of representative endorsers. Indeed, empirical efforts exploring
the influence of military elite cues have become a subject of increasing focus, examining
their impact on presidential candidate approval (Golby, Dropp, and Feaver 2012), the acceptability of nuclear weapons use (Post and Sechser 2016), military intervention policy
(Golby, Feaver, and Dropp 2017), and wartime success probability (Sidman and Norpoth
2012). However, while the potential of this community to influence public attitudes may
be high, the prospect of political interference by military elites runs afoul of a substantial
normative consensus in political science regarding the role of the military in civic society.

Military Credibility and the Apolitical Norm
If the study of elite-driven politics theorizes that military elites should be seen as credible,
much of the civil-military relations literature would argue that this is because of their perceived objectivity and adherence to a long-held standard of non-partisanship. Through a
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normative lens, civil-military theory has attempted to capture the optimal power arrangements that ensure civilian supremacy of the armed forces and the political decision-making
process (Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1960; Kohn 1994; Kohn 1997). As these scholars argue, durable democratic governance requires a high degree of civilian control, which in
turn demands an apolitical, yet effective military. Huntington (1957) captures this as the
military’s precarious position between two forces: the functional imperative requiring a
competent institution capable of securing the national defense and a societal imperative requiring its deference to liberal democratic values of government. Huntington advocates for
a system of objective civilian control, in which an institutionally subordinate military and
a superior political elite engage in a pure division of labor between military and political
affairs, a system he argues is best achieved by the professionalization of the officer corps
while “rendering them politically sterile and neutral”. This framework has shaped both
subsequent civil-military theory and the professional standards of the American military
itself, ascribing normative and practical utility to a military institution that exists outside
the realm of politics, particularly the partisan variety.

However, while I examine how partisan activism might harm this normative framework,
this is not to suggest that a politically knowledgeable military is fundamentally undesirable.
It is therefore important to distinguish between the types of political competency that satisfy the two “imperatives” and those that violate them. The complexities of modern warfare
have made striking the delicate balance between the functional and societal imperatives increasingly difficult. While a politically “neutral” military may be desirable from the societal
perspective, a military that does not understand the political dimensions of warfare quite
clearly violates the functional imperative. This philosophy springs from one of Clausewitz’s
most significant observations, that political concerns are inseparable from war: “its grammar, indeed, may be its own, but not its logic” (Clausewitz 1989). A politically “neutral”
military, therefore, is quite different from a politically illiterate one. Rather than achieving
a pure division of labor between political and military spheres, recent scholarship has theorized on the tenuous nature with which military leaders must balance an understanding
of politics with a professional abstention from the partisan strain of politics (Owens 2015).
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In her typology of political activity by military elites, Risa Brooks (2009) describes the
potential gains that such partisan actions can achieve for the military institution through
alliances with legislative members or public appeals; however, these benefits are theorized
as transitory and ultimately damaging. Cohen (1997) similarly argues that in increasing
their efforts to understand political processes, military elites posture themselves to engage
in it directly, to the detriment of both the military and the public good.

A politically-competent military may well satisfy a functional imperative for effectiveness in wartime; however, an ostensibly partisan one violates the societal imperative for
civilian control and the corresponding norm against partisan activity. As a result, it is
important to distinguish political awareness and understanding among military elites from
active participation or agenda-setting in that process. This distinction in the civil-military
literature between political activity conducted within the constraints of functional military
performance and normatively subversive partisan activity is best captured by Owens (2015):
Political activity from which officers should be expected to refrain are those acts of
partisanship, including attempts by political parties to enlist soldiers – including retired
officers – to endorse candidates, as happened during the 1992 and 2000 presidential
elections, or public criticism by an officer of an administration’s policy.

Though this apolitical norm has been broadly codified in the legal proscription against
serving military servicemembers publicly advocating for a political cause or candidate in person,3 the recent availability of social media platforms has made the proliferation of political
attitudes less costly and more threatening to traditional civil-military norms (Urben 2017).
This gap between normative standards and the law is particularly pronounced among retired
military elites unencumbered by such regulations and – acting as political appointees, media
commentators, policy activists, or business lobbyists – nonetheless “represent the culture
and the profession just as authoritatively as their counterparts on active duty” (Kohn 2002).

3

This is most pointedly captured by Department of Defense Direction (DoDD) 1344.10, which specifically
enjoins servicemembers from serving in partisan clubs, engaging in public endorsement or advocacy, perform
duties for political campaigns, or display signs or posters on their vehicles or property if living on a military
installation. The complete list of these banned activities can be found in paragraph 4.1.2 in DoDD 1344.10,
“Political Activity by Members of the Armed Forces”, US Department of Defense, February 19, 2008.
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Despite professional efforts to keep the military outside of partisan politics, the institution has nonetheless drifted into politically murky territory. More recent scholarship has
drawn attention to the creeping influence of partisan polarization on the ability of the military to remain an apolitical entity in society. Part of this trend has been the changing
demography of the military itself. The development of the post-conscription force in the
United States has led to a military that is demographically both decreasingly representative
of society and increasingly partisan in political identification. This has manifested in wider
partisan alignment with the Republican party, (O. R. Holsti 1998; Feaver and Kohn 2001),
decreasing alignment with the Democratic party due to attrition of junior officers (J. K.
Dempsey 2009), and a broad demographic shift to the states of the American South (Liebert
and Golby 2017a). This shift has not gone unnoticed among members of the broader public.
Among individuals asked in a comprehensive 2013 YouGov survey on civil-military attitudes
by Schake and Mattis (2016), 42% of respondents believed military service-members were
“much more” or “somewhat more” likely to vote for Republicans, compared to only 11%
that believed the same for Democrats. Another contributing force to this trend is increasing political activism by military elites. Retired military officers have become increasingly
vocal in policy debates, including editorial challenges to US foreign and domestic policy,
and frequent endorsements of political candidates (Golby, Dropp, and Feaver 2012).

Numerous scholars have expressed concern that the very credibility the military enjoys
among the public is inextricably tied to its ability to remain an apolitical institution. J. K.
Dempsey (2009) argues that a failure by military elites – both active and retired – to refrain from political activity will result in a loss of trust from the public and an increasingly
politicized force. In addition to compromising the veracity of military advice provided to
civilian leaders while in uniform, Dempsey argues that the very credibility that provides
military advice its value will be degraded by a broader society that only imbues trust in
the military because “it is seen as being above the political fray.”4 Owens (2015) similarly
argues that while the military must be politically literate for its functional role in warfare,
4

Quoted in Bryan Bender, “Twitter and Facebook are politicizing the military”, Politico, February 26,
2017.
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a politicized military “will lose legitimacy in the eyes of the American people” and hamper
its ability to functionally contribute to the maintenance of national security. However, this
conditional relationship between military credibility and non-partisanship requires a principled audience for whom the apolitical norm is salient.

Civil-military scholars have consistently placed the apolitical norm at the center of
nearly every substantive model of the military institution’s place within a democratic society. Though theories of elite-driven politics predict that such a seemingly trusted and
competent institution should be an effective source of political information, military elites
are normatively and structurally discouraged from such behavior. The argument that military credibility with the public is tied to a non-partisan image is prevalent in recent studies
of US civil-military relations (Golby, L. Cohn, and Feaver 2016; Urben 2017; Hill, Wong,
and Gerras 2013; Golby, Dropp, and Feaver 2012). However, while there appears to be
considerable theoretical consensus on this point, there is little empirical validation for the
argument that the apolitical norm is salient among the public; as I will discuss in the next
section, there is instead strong reason to believe that this norm has weakened considerably.

Challenging the Normative Consensus
The notion that the civil-military norm of an apolitical military is strong among the American public should generate considerable skepticism. As it exists, this theoretical consensus
hinges on a key assumption about the public: that it objectively views civil-military norms
as salient. First, there is strong reason to believe that the public is not as principled or
normatively-grounded as scholars believe. Figure 4.1 depicts levels of public approval for
select surveys items in the World Values Survey (WVS), the 1999 Triangle Institute for
Security Studies (TISS) survey conducted by Feaver and Kohn (2001), the 2013 YouGov
Civil-Military Attitudes survey conducted by Schake and Mattis (2016) and a 2015 YouGov
survey on military interventions in politics.5 Between WVS waves in 1995 and 2011, US
5

Peter Moore, “Could a coup really happen in the United States?”, YouGov, September 9, 2015.
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Figure 4.1: Degradation of Civil-Military Norms Among the Public

(a) World Values Survey:
(b) TISS/YouGov:
Respondents Expressing Support Respondents Supporting Military
for Military Rule
Leaks over Unwise Orders

(c) YouGov 2015:
Respondents Supporting Potential
Military Coup

NOTE: This figure depicts changes in select civil-military norms across several historical surveys,
the World Values Survey (1995, 2011), the Triangle Institute for Security Studies Survey (1998-99),
the Schake/Mattis YouGov Survey (2013), and a YouGov survey exploring attitudes on domestic
political military intervention (2015).7 Figure 4.1(a) depicts the percentage of WVS respondents
who answered “fairly good” or “very good” to the question: “I’m going to describe various types
of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For
each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this
country?” Figure 4.1(b) depicts a comparison of the percentage of respondents who approved of
military officers responding to unwise orders by deciding to “leak the material to the press to alert
others to this problem”. Figure 4.1(c) depicts the percentage of respondents in the 2015 YouGov
surveying answering “yes” to the question “Is there any situation in which you could imagine yourself
supporting the U.S. military taking over the powers of the federal government”, displayed by partisan
identity on a three-point scale.

respondents believing that “having the army rule” was a good or fairly good “way of governing the country” went from 6% to 17%, with even larger support among “millennials” (Foa
and Mounk 2016). Though still a minority opinion, this constitutes a significant increase in
support for illiberal governance in clear violation of not only the military’s apolitical norm,
but broader democratic norms of civilian control.6

The YouGov survey conducted by Schake and Mattis (2016) similarly uncovers a weakening of traditional civil-military norms against political or activist behavior. Compared
to respondents asked the same question in the TISS survey, the percentage of respondents
6
Analysis of the WVS data reveals that respondents under the age of 30 in the 2011 wave expressed 23%
support for army rule. Foa and Mounk (2016) specifically draw attention to this trend among rich, younger
Americans, whose expressed support for army rule was nearly 35%. These patterns match with a broader
shift in acceptance for both technocratic rule and for leaders who don’t have to “bother with parliament
and elections”.
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believing that leaking material to the press was an acceptable action by military officers
in response to “unwise orders” increased from 5% to 19%.8 Liebert and Golby (2017a)
draw attention to this trend, noting that one of the most “disturbing” findings was the high
levels of individuals who seemed accepting of “improper civil-military norms”.9 The 2015
YouGov survey audience expressed a similarly weak resistance to the notion of domestic
political intervention: nearly 30% of respondents would support the military taking control of the federal government, a figure which increases to 43% in the event of a perceived
constitutional violation. More than half (53%) agreed that “active duty military personnel
should be active in politics if they want to be”. These shifts in public attitudes regarding
the proper role of the military in politics and society provide strong reason to believe that
traditionally-held norms of the apolitical military may be less salient than previously believed.

Second, there is some empirical evidence to suggest that the public may not only be less
principled than previously theorized, but more systematically indifferent. Activism among
military elites has increased over the same period with no aggregate decrease in public confidence for the institution.10 This activity has manifested in a variety of forms. Political
endorsements by military elites have become more prevalent in partisan campaigns, from
the singular endorsements by retired General P.X. Kelley for George H.W. Bush in 1988 and
retired Admiral William Crowe for William Clinton in 1992, to the list of nearly 500 retired
generals and admirals supporting Mitt Romney in 2012 in a full-page advertisement in The
Washington Times (Urben 2017; Kohn 2002). Golby, Dropp, and Feaver (2012) evaluate
one way in which such endorsements effect public perception of the broader military institution. They find that while public knowledge of this political activity – in violation of
8

The TISS and YouGov surveys included both elite and mass subsamples; this increase is among the
non-veteran masses, the most salient subsample for our purposes, as it indicates a shift in attitudes about
civil-military norms among those citizens with no military experience.
9
In response to the same question, the 2013 audience expressed much higher levels of approval for military
officials retiring in protest or refusing to carry out the order at all compared to the TISS sample, and far
lower levels of approval for “carrying out the orders anyway”.
10
Newport, Gallup’s annual Confidence in Institutions survey has found a stable or steadily increasing
level of public confidence in the armed forces, despite decreasing confidence in legal, media, representative,
and business institutions across US society. The most recent survey (2017) found that 72% of respondents
expressed “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the military.
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theoretical norms – had little influence on public trust in the military, it did make individuals more likely to feel that this activity was appropriate, potentially indicating that “such
norms are obsolete”. In this view, a weakening of the apolitical norm not only questions
the theory of a principled public, but suggests the public may be indifferent enough that
political activity has no effect on expressed confidence in the military source.

However, if my analysis challenges the theoretical consensus of a principled public, it
also tests this empirical claim for an indifferent one. While Golby, Dropp, and Feaver
(2012) find evidence for the latter, they concede that their survey instrument “does not
adjudicate decisively between these competing views” that political activity by the military
does or does not influence public trust negatively. While the authors measure the level of
confidence individuals have in the military, the metric used was a low-resolution five-point
semantic scale analogous to that used by Gallup, preventing a granular detection of effects.
Specific claims about effects on credibility would instead benefit from a measurement device
that is more appropriately calibrated to detect changes in both overall credibility and its
component dimensions. Additionally, while the authors remark on the potential damage
that individual retired elites can inflict on military credibility through political activity,
both measurement and treatment information focused on the institutional level, informing respondents that “most members of the military and veterans” supported a particular
candidate. While useful for their purpose of measuring the endorsement effect, this broad
characterization provides less insight into the effect of such political activity by elites on
their own credibility. This misses the micro-foundational incentives and effects of individual
elite activity, a problem compounded by the relatively mild treatment employed when measuring military confidence; while it broadly informs the respondent about an endorsement,
this type of action is likely to be correlated with a variety of other types of partisan behavior.

Partisan activity therefore exceeds simple endorsements for political candidates. Media
commentary and political activism by military elites have also become increasingly present
in political debates over a wide range of issues. Across several administrations, retired
general officers have engaged in collective activism over defense policy, security strategy, or
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budgetary priorities.11 Retired military officers commonly serve as analysts and commentators on cable news, pen independent editorials on foreign policy and security strategy,12 and
have been appointed to increasingly central and partisan roles in government (P. Carter et
al. 2016). A more targeted analysis of the effects of political activity on military credibility
would benefit from including knowledge of these types of behaviors among the public as well.

In this section I have discussed how public influence by military elites places two large
scholarly efforts in political science into a single frame: while these figures are normatively
– and in some cases structurally – proscribed from engaging in such activity, they are also
perceived by the public as exceedingly knowledgeable and trustworthy, the two principal
components of source credibility. I have also demonstrated how the civil-military relations
literature offers two potential theories of public response to political activity by military
elites: a principled and norms-based public in which credibility hinges on the perception
of non-partisanship and an indifferent public in which political activity has little effect on
public trust. While recent trends in public opinion and normative sentiment call the first
into question, testing the second requires more precise measurement that explores not only
institutional-level effects, but the micro-foundational influence of partisan behavior on the
credibility of individual elites. As I will outline in the following section, there is reason to
believe that the public may be responsive to knowledge of partisan behavior, but outside the
normative framework that much of the civil-military relations literature asserts. As such, I
argue a third potential image of the public, neither normatively-grounded nor indifferent,
11

On torture and the budget, these figures included former commander of US Special Operations Command
Admiral William McRaven, former CENTCOM commanders General David Petraeus and General James
Mattis, and nearly 100 other general and flag officers who co-signed the open letters to the administration.
The transgender ban was opposed by former Afghanistan commander General John Allen and ‘revolt’ figure
Major General Paul Eaton, though was more remarkable in that it was also openly opposed by active
military elites such as serving Coast Guard commandant Admiral Paul Zukunft. Dan Lamothe, “Retired
generals cite past comments from Mattis while opposing Trump’s proposed foreign aid cuts”, The Washington
Post, February 27, 2017; Kristine Phillips, “‘Greatest threat to democracy’: Commander of bin Laden raid
slams Trump’s anti-media sentiment”, The Washington Post, February 24, 2017; Michael D. Shear, Nicholas
Fandos, and Jennifer Steinhauer, “Trump Asks Critic of Vaccines to Lead Vaccine Safety Panel”, The New
York Times, January 10, 2017; Chris Kenning, “Retired military officers slam Trump’s proposed transgender
ban’, Reuters, August 1, 2017.
12
Robert H. Scales, “U.S. military planners don’t support war with Syria”, The Washington Post, September 5, 2013; Michael G. Mullen, “I Was on the National Security Council. Bannon Doesn’t Belong There”,
The New York Times, February 6, 2017; Anna Fifield, “Retired military leaders urge Trump to choose words,
not action, to deal with North Korea”, The Washington Post, December 13, 2017.

191

Chapter 4: What Discord Follows: Partisan Polarization and Civil-Military Norms

but rather decidedly partisan.

Theorizing Public Response to Military Politicization
The central inquiry of this analysis is to determine how partisan political activity by military
elites effects public perceptions of credibility. In order to address this question, I develop a
series of testable hypotheses that envision different pathologies for the public in responding
to knowledge of partisan military activity. Each of these images serves either to empirically
validate existing theoretical assumptions about the public’s preferences or to challenge these
same consensus opinions. In addition, I examine how each of these depictions of the public
would manifest along two measurable levels: (1) how knowledge of political activity by a
military elite source affects impressions of that source’s credibility and (2) how this knowledge influences the perceived credibility of the broader military institution. Both patterns
have independent and interactive implications for the quality of civil-military relations and
the future of potential military politicization.

The Principled Public
The first image of the public I examine is that most commonly embraced by the existing
civil-military scholarship, which I term the principled public. In this framework, military
credibility indeed depends upon the preservation of a non-partisan image; the public commensurately embraces the norm of an apolitical military and the necessity of such an institution to the proper functioning of democratic society. In line with the basic assumptions
of the formative civil-military theorists, the military is viewed as a fundamentally martial
and conservative organization whose institutional subordination to civilian leadership – regardless of partisan identity – is essential to the preservation of both democratic norms
and effective government (Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1960). As discussed previously, considerable theorization in this regard has more recently predicted that partisan activity will
directly damage military credibility due to public backlash (Owens 2015; Golby, Dropp, and
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Feaver 2012; J. K. Dempsey 2009). Knowledge of political activity by representatives of
this institution would therefore be greeted by broad disapproval from the public, regardless
of the position espoused by these representatives.

This notion is rooted in a generalized image of the public as a an objective audience
with fixed collective preferences in favor of non-partisan military behavior. Feaver and
Kohn (2001) argue that partisan behavior or the perception of being “just another interest
group” would degrade public trust and make the professional advice of uniformed officers
less credible to civilian leaders and the public. This sentiment has been more recently voiced
by former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey in reference to remaining
apolitical: “That’s how we maintain our trust with the American people. The American
people don’t want us to become another special interest group. In fact, I think that confuses them.”13 The distinguishing feature of the principled public is that it responds with
generalized distrust for the military speaker – and potentially the institution – to perceived
partisan activity. This erosion in credibility, however, is not sensitive to the ideological
substance of such activity; instead, this image assumes an audience that shares a common
preference for the military to remain out of politics, regardless of its direction.

The testable implications of the principled public form the theoretical baseline of this
analysis and the empirical test of this consensus opinion in the civil-military relations literature. An idealized example of this pattern is depicted in Figure 3.2(a); the perceived
credibility of partisan military elites are objectively diminished, while partisan identity plays
no significant role in their evaluation. In this framework, civil-military norms against such
behavior are both highly salient and broadly accepted. As such, the principled public would
respond according to the predictions of the following hypothesis:

13
Quoted in Jim Garamone, “Dempsey: Political Activity Erodes Trust in Military”, Armed Forces Press
Service, August 12, 2012.
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Figure 4.2: Idealized Representations of Credibility Effects

(a) Principled Public Example (b) Indifferent Public Example

(c) Partisan Public Example

NOTE: This figure depicts idealized examples for each of the proposed hypothetical images of public
response to knowledge of military partisan activity. The conditions “Co-Partisan” and “ContraPartisan” refer to the ideological direction of activism by the hypothetical military elite in reference to
that of the individual. The y-axis depicts the change in perceived public credibility in either condition
relative to a non-partisan military elite with no known partisan activity. Figure 3.2(a) depicts the
principled public, with uniform sanctioning of the source across conditions. Figure 3.2(b) represents
the indifferent public, with little response to information across conditions. Figure 3.2(c) shows the
partisan public, combining both a significant sanctioning of contra-partisan elites with a negligible or
marginal increase in co-partisan credibility.
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• H1A – Principled Public (Elite Source) If the public is informed of partisan activity by a
military elite source, that source’s credibility will be less than that of a non-partisan military
elite source.

The principled public hypothesis incorporates the same assumptions regarding the normative value of an apolitical military that much of the civil-military scholarship has advocated. Compared to a non-partisan source with the same expertise and qualifications, the
public would objectively devalue the credibility of a partisan source due to his participation
in partisan behavior that contradicts public preferences. More specifically, we should expect
to see a reduction in the perceived trustworthiness of the source relative to a non-partisan
source. However, if the effects of partisan behavior are particularly strong, the principled
public may even reduce its estimation of the source’s expertise, even if held constant across
elite profiles.

At the second level of analysis, I apply a similar logic by which exposure to such partisan
sources aggregates to attitudes about the larger military institution. While I expect the
effects of partisan activity by a single elite source to have more modest effects on the individual’s judgment of the broader military establishment, the principled public hypothesis
similarly predicts that the public will generally reject this behavior as normatively inappropriate or functionally undesirable. This assertion is strongly represented in civil-military
studies exploring the partisan identity of the military itself and the implications of a perceived partisan shift of the institution (Owens 2015; J. K. Dempsey 2009; Golby, Dropp,
and Feaver 2012; Urben 2017). Once again, the public is envisioned as a principled whole
that broadly embraces a shared preference for an apolitical military:

• H1B – Principled Public (Institution): If the public is informed of partisan activity by
a military elite source, the institution’s credibility will be less than with those exposed to a
non-partisan military elite source.

Collectively, these hypotheses capture the logic of the principled public envisioned by
much of the existing research in this field. Empirical observation of such patterns would
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have several significant implications for the quality of civil-military relations into the future.
First, the validation of such a principled audience would confirm a long-held belief that not
only is the apolitical norm salient among the public, but that partisan or ideological variation among the public itself is not a significant factor in updating perceptions of military
elite credibility. This would also confirm the existence of a mutually-valued political norm
that has escaped polarization or self-serving partisan attitudes. Second, the appearance of
such a sentiment among the public would indicate that the incentive structure for military
politicization is, as Golby, Feaver, and Dropp (2017) argue, “a self-negating tool”. Military
elites seeking to leverage the high public esteem of the institution for their own purposes
risk, as scholars suggest, reducing the public’s valuation of both individual and institutional
credibility.

The Indifferent Public
The second image of the public I hypothesize portrays a starkly different set of observable implications. While the principled public broadly embraces the apolitical norm, the
indifferent public places little value in adherence to such standards of conduct by military
elites. As previously discussed, there is strong reason to believe that, across several areas of
interest, there has been a weakening of civil-military norms in society with regards to the
proper role of the military institution in politics. Golby, Dropp, and Feaver (2012) conduct
one of the few empirical efforts in evaluating the impact of political activity by military
elites; while they find that political endorsements can have localized effects in swaying public opinion, they find that knowledge of such endorsements did not produce negative effects
on estimations of public trust in the institution. Respondents who were told of military endorsements for presidential candidates were, on average, no less likely to express confidence
in the military than those without such information.

The basic intuition of the indifferent public is that military elite participation in partisan activity only marginally effects military credibility and that weakened or non-existent
norms regarding such activity contribute to indifferent attitudes. There are several reasons
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why such patterns might be observed. First, the broader trend of low confidence in traditional elite or expert communities may be drawing individuals to attend to sources they
perceive as credible, regardless of the propriety of their engaging in public opinion-shaping.
Second, it is possible that the public already views the military and its elites as influenced
by partisan attitudes, making additional information about such activity relatively unpersuasive (Golby, Dropp, and Feaver 2012). Third, frustration over government performance
in foreign policy may be leading to the emergence of new norms where the military is asked
to perform more active roles in policy planning and execution. This may be the result of
the perceived “unwinnable” nature of modern wars (Schake and Mattis 2016), the belief
that military failures are due to unwise civilian policy (Hill, Wong, and Gerras 2013), or a
resulting desire for more activist military elites (Feaver 2011; Milburn 2010; Kohn 2002). In
either case, the indifferent public’s estimation of military elite credibility is neither strengthened nor weakened due to partisan activity.

Accordingly, the observable implications of this image at the individual (endorser) level
are quite clear. Figure 3.2(b) reflects an idealized example of the indifferent public, with
partisan behavior resulting in insignificant effects on perceived credibility relative to a nonpartisan source. If civil-military norms are indeed generally weaker than previously theorized, than being informed of political activity by a specific military elite source should
elicit a minimal response in accordance with the following hypothesis:

• H2A – Indifferent Public (Elite Source) If the public is informed of partisan activity by
a military elite source, that source’s credibility will not be significantly different than that of
a non-partisan military elite source.

This hypothesis predicts that individual sources who engage in partisan political behavior will not suffer noticeable damage to their perceived credibility with the public. It is
possible that such a pattern, even if it appears in the aggregate, could be localized to separate heterogeneous political subgroups in society. For instance, evidence of an indifferent
public may be present among partisans of one identification, but not another. Alternatively,
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it may be the case that the broader audience embraces such indifference, indicative of a more
generalizable degradation of the apolitical norm across the public. In either scenario, the
incentive structure for continued military elite influence would be very different than that
predicted by the principled public; elites would not need to worry about losing credibility
with the public when engaging in political debates.

Such an incentive structure for partisan activity would be even more durable if the
public rendered such indifferent attitudes regarding the larger military institution. An
indifferent public at the endorser level (H2A) would make political activity a low-cost enterprise for individual elites; however, a similar attitude at the organizational level would
make such activity even less costly. The common-pool credibility problem predicted by
many civil-military scholars does not exist in this framework, as neither the institution nor
the individual suffers in terms of credibility with the public for the partisan activity of
representative elites:

• H2B – Indifferent Public (Institution): If the public is informed of partisan activity by
a military elite source, the institution’s credibility will not be significantly different than with
those exposed to a non-partisan military elite source.

These hypotheses capture the broader logic of the indifferent public. While the principled public indicates that the apolitical norms of civil-military theory are salient and
objectively viewed, patterns reflective of the indifferent public are representative of substantially weakened norms regarding the same behavior. As previously discussed, recent
survey instruments examining civil-military attitudes and the findings of Golby, Dropp,
and Feaver (2012) suggest there is reason to believe this may be the case. Public perception
of trustworthiness and expertise will remain largely unchanged in response to information
about partisan activity, showing that such behavior is not informative to the public nor offensive to its normative sensibilities. Such weakened norms pose little obstacle to increased
future military politicization.
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The Partisan Public
The third image of public response to military political activity I propose is the partisan
public. In this framework, individuals sanction military elites for partisan behavior not
because it is normatively prohibited, but because it is politically incongruent to the individual’s partisan identity or ideology. This hypothesis departs from the previous two images
in several significant ways. First, while the principled public takes as given a strong normative consensus among the public against partisan military behavior, the partisan public
hypothesis assumes that these norms are weak or non-existent. Second, the partisan public
engages in selective sanctioning of elite credibility based on partisan leaning, rather than
the objective patterns of credibility loss predicted by the indifferent and principled public
images.

Additionally, I allow for the prospect that the partisan public may not only selectively
lower their estimation of elites on the other side of a political debate, but may actually
increase their perceptions of credibility among military elites who endorse an opinion closer
to their own. This assertion draws on existing study on social polarization and the biasing effects of shared partisan identity on objective thought processes (Mason 2015; Mason
2016). I expect that erosion of contra-partisan elite credibility will outweigh any potential
increase in co-partisan credibility in magnitude. This is largely in line with past study
that has found that out-group animosity is both strongest when phrased in partisan terms
(Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012) and substantively more powerful than in-group favoritism
(Iyengar and Westwood 2015). In its simplest form, the partisan public weighs military
elite credibility as they would any other source of information, not according to principled
adherence to civil-military norms, but according to partisan like-mindedness:

• H3A – Partisan Public (Elite Source) If the public is informed of partisan activity by a
military elite source, that source’s credibility will be less among those of the opposite partisan
identity, compared to the non-partisan source. Source credibility among like-minded partisans,
however, will be unaffected or will increase.
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The observable implications of this hypothesis can take on several forms. Figure 3.2(c)
depicts the most likely manifestation of the principled public, wherein elite credibility is
asymmetrically sanctioned by the public based on the individual’s partisan or ideological
leaning. The partisan public assumes a subjective audience; sanctioning of credibility is
limited to contra-partisan elites, rather than the objective sanctioning observed among the
principled public. In accordance with H3A, I expect that individuals will devalue the credibility of contra-partisan elites, while evaluations of co-partisans will be marginally affected.
Particularly strong indicators of this hypothesis include co-partisans evaluating the military
source as more credible for having engaged in such behavior, relative to the non-partisan
source.

Extended to the institutional level, the partisan public should similarly weigh the military’s credibility in the context of the source’s direction of partisanship, not the normative
implications of that partisanship. As before, I expect these effects to be more modest than
at the endorser level; however, the same general pattern should emerge, where ideologicallyincongruent military activism negatively influences attitudes on the institution’s credibility,
while exposure to a co-partisan elite elicits marginal effects:

• H3B – Partisan Public (Institution) If the public is informed of partisan activity by a
military elite source, the institution’s credibility will be less among those of the opposite partisan identity, compared to those exposed to the non-partisan source. Institutional credibility
among like-minded partisans, however, will be unaffected or will increase.

In both hypotheses, total expressed credibility should be much lower when the military
elite’s partisan activity and the individual’s partisan identity are in conflict; I expect this
to manifest mostly as a shift in perceived trustworthiness of the source or institution. However, particularly strong partisan effects may even influence the perceived expertise of these
sources relative to the non-partisan source, even if the qualifications of both profiles were
held constant. This extreme version of the partisan public not only changes their impression
about the more subjective reliability of the source, but also the seemingly more objective
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experience or knowledgeability of that same source based on partisan thought processes.

The theoretical implications of such a public are numerous and significant. First, the
incentive structure for continued military politicization is very different from that predicted
by the principled public. Civil-military scholars concerned with a common pool problem of
military credibility, where individual elites draw on the institution’s credibility for political advocacy, appeal to the inherently self-defeating logic of such activity. J. K. Dempsey
(2009) argues that this “paradox of prestige” ensures that the institution will be seen as
increasingly partisan and less credible with each new foray into partisan affairs. However,
the partisan public creates an even more problematic incentive structure, because this credibility loss is compartmentalized only among those who already disagree with the military
elite’s position. Furthermore, the prospect of gaining public credibility with a specific subset of the polity may actually embolden such activity by individual military actors. This
image of the public not only depicts a weak state of civil-military norms across individuals,
but suggests that the self-defeating logic of military politicization predicted by many civilmilitary scholars is similarly inert.

Testing Elite Credibility and Partisan Activity
Research Design
In order to test the validity of these hypothesized images of the public – and by extension,
the strength and salience of the apolitical norm – I incorporate the results of original survey experimentation designed to measure how partisan political activity by military elites
affects public perceptions of credibility. As discussed, empirical study towards this question
has been limited, while the extant body of knowledge has revealed minimal effects (Golby,
Dropp, and Feaver 2012). This experimental survey contributes to the theoretical and
empirical understanding of elite credibility and military partisan activity in several ways.
First, I improve on the measure of credibility by utilizing existing metrics from the business research literature. As I will discuss, these scale metrics have high internal construct
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validity and allow for more precise measurement of the two principal components of elite
credibility: expertise and trustworthiness (McGuire 1969; Lupia and Mathew D. McCubbins 1998; Ohanian 1990). Second, I focus on the role of retired military officers as part
of this elite community. Given the increasing prevalence of these figures in government,
political advocacy, media commentary, government service, and academia, I envision this
subset of the military elite as perhaps the most influential and the most likely to have engaged in partisan political activity. Third, I evaluate how political behavior affects public
impressions of elite credibility at both the individual and institutional levels. Measuring the
public’s patterns of sanctioning at both levels is important for understanding the incentive
structure elite actors face when considering partisan activity.

The survey was fielded in November 2017 to an opt-in panel of 1,038 respondents acquired through the survey firm Qualtrics; respondents were prompted that the survey’s
intent was to ascertain public attitudes on several policy issues under debate. Before answering these questions, however, respondents were randomly assigned to one of three conditions and asked to view a profile of a prominent elite who had offered public opinions
on these issues. In all three categories, respondents were exposed to a profile of a retired
military officer that contained information on six broad attributes. The first three included
overseas experience, academic qualification, and command responsibility, attributes that
speak directly to expertise and experience of the profiled elite and that were fixed across all
treatment conditions. The profile also included information about post-retirement activity,
such as media presence, partisan alignment and endorsements, and policy advocacy or criticism, which were intended to provide an image to the public of the elite’s affiliation and
level of partisan involvement.

These latter three attributes varied according to the assigned treatment condition of
the respondent. In the baseline and functional control group, non-partisan, respondents
were exposed to the profile of a retired senior military commander with multiple combat
tours, command experience at the highest levels, and several academic degrees, whose postretirement activity included historical research, non-partisan research council membership,
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and a lack of political endorsements for major party candidates. In the second and third
groups, respectively categorized as activist left and activist right, the elite’s military experience and qualifications were the same as the non-partisan; however, their post-retirement
activity included prominent media presence on cable news networks, joining major party
campaigns as national security advisors, and public advocacy or opposition to administration policy. These profiles were developed using attributes from several prominent military
commentators and political activists, with the post-retirement attributes designed to draw
maximum contrast to the non-partisan category and ensuring the respondent has a clear
picture of the elite’s partisan alignment and behavior.14

After being exposed to the elite’s profile, respondents were asked two four-question batteries measuring the perceived credibility of (1) the individual source and (2) the source’s
organization, in this case the military. Both of these measurement scales are adapted from
an analogous literature in business research; as previously discussed, the concepts of “endorser” and “corporate” credibility in this literature can be effectively applied to the realm
of political information. It is an assertion of this analysis that the credibility of individual elite voices or “endorsers” and their organization’s “corporate” reputation are just are
important to the sale of a political message as they are to a business’s sale of a product.
The connection between these two measures has been well-established as reinforcing and
influential, with impressions about endorser credibility affecting larger “attitudes-towardthe-brand” that shape corporate or organizational reputation (Goldsmith, Lafferty, and
Newell 2000). I depart from this framework in that this design adapts the same general
logic to assess not how perceptions of credibility affect attitudes towards an endorsement
(termed “attitude-toward-the-ad”), but rather how negative information measurably affects
these perceptions of credibility.

In order to capture these attitudes of endorser credibility, I adopt a strategy similar to
Goldsmith, Lafferty, and Newell (2000), which uses a modified version of the Likert scale
14

See Appendix B for military elites used to compose the composite profiles used in the experimental
conditions and basic logic for development of the experimental profiles.

203

Chapter 4: What Discord Follows: Partisan Polarization and Civil-Military Norms

measures of individual expertise and trustworthiness developed by Ohanian (1990) in measuring credibility.15 The measure of individual source expertise asked respondents to offer a
seven-point score on the degree to which the source is “experienced” and “knowledgeable”;
similarly, respondents were asked for the same measurement on the source’s perceived level
of being “trustworthy” and “reliable” as an analogous measure for the source’s trustworthiness. These attributes were selected from a longer list provided by Ohanian (1990)
based on their high internal construct validity and in order to reduce survey fatigue and
unnecessary redundancy. This four-question battery provides three dependent variables for
later analysis: (1) a 14-point additive scale for expertise, (2) a 14-point additive scale for
trustworthiness, and (3) a collective 28-pt scale for total source credibility of the individual
military elite.

Next, I utilize the literature on corporate credibility in order to develop a similar additive construct for measuring institutional credibility. Newell and Goldsmith (2001) build an
eight-question battery designed to measure perceptions of corporate reputation and credibility that exhibits similarly high internal construct validity. Similarly to the measurement
for individual credibility, this scale is built from two four-question batteries that gauge attitudes on institutional expertise and trustworthiness, respectively. Just as for the previous
dependent variable set, I use a modified version of this larger battery that limits redundancy
and employs those questions with the highest factor loadings from the confirmatory analysis conducted by Newell and Goldsmith (2001). After registering individual elite credibility
attitudes, respondents were then asked for a seven-point, semantically-anchored Likert measurement on the degree to which they agreed or disagreed that the military “has a great
amount of expertise” and “is skilled at what they do” (expertise) and that the respondent
trusts the military and believed it “makes truthful claims” (trustworthiness). This again
15

The scale as developed by Ohanian (1990) includes three scales for expertise, trustworthiness, and
attractiveness, the last category being in accordance with McGuire (1969) on the significance of source
appearance on perceived credibility. The modified scale used by Goldsmith, Lafferty, and Newell (2000) and
others focuses more specifically on the expertise and trustworthiness dimensions, placing it closer in line with
established political science theorization on the key components of elite credibility (Lupia and Mathew D.
McCubbins 1998).
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provides three measures for subsequent analysis: (1) a 14-point additive scale for institutional expertise, (2) a 14-point additive scale for institutional trustworthiness, and (3) a
collective 28-point scale for total institutional credibility. Finally, respondents were asked
for their opinions on two issues under debate, after exposure to the position of the military
elite being reviewed. These included the level of support for a pre-emptive strike on the
North Korean nuclear program, in which the military elite is on record as an advocate, and
a federal budget proposal for reducing funding to the State Department and foreign aid, for
which the military elite was a vocal opponent.

Data Analysis
The first dimension of this analysis is the effect of partisan activity on the measurable credibility of an individual elite source. As previously discussed, this is a level of analysis that has
escaped close empirical scrutiny and speaks more directly to the micro-foundational incentives for military elites to engage in partisan activism. The images of the public described
by the individual-level hypotheses (H1A, H2A, H3A) have distinctly different features and
significant implications for the strength and salience of civil-military norms among the
public; the validity of these hypotheses depends not only on the aggregate trends among
the public, but how these patterns emerge among established partisans. Figure 3.3 depicts the aggregate effects of partisan activism on perceptions of individual elite credibility.
Immediately clear is the statistically and substantively significant decrease in the credibility of activist military elites across each metric. Partisan military elites with left- and
right-alignment suffered a 3.3% and 9.1% loss to their total assessed credibility, respectively.

There are several significant observations that result from these initial findings. First,
that right-activist military partisans are subject to a significantly higher loss in credibility
from the general public than activist-left partisans. This trend was apparent across both the
expertise measure (-7.7%) and the trustworthiness measure (-10.6%). This is due to the attitudes of political independents responding to knowledge of partisan military elite activity.
Second, there is a surprising decrease in the perceived expertise of the elite source (-2.6%
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Figure 4.3: Loss of Credibility for Military Activists, Aggregate Results

(a) Individual Expertise/Trustworthiness Measures

(b) Individual Credibility Measure

NOTE: This figure depicts the change in perceptions of expertise, trustworthiness, and credibility
for military partisans in reference to the non-partisan elite profile. This measure pools across all
respondent attributes including partisan identity and education. Posted figures reflect magnitude of
effect and p-values for two-tailed test for difference in means between activist categories and the
non-partisan reference category. Respondents assembled from opt-in panel from Qualtrics during
November 2017, N=1038.

and -7.7%, respectively); despite the source’s qualifications remaining fixed across conditions, partisans are actually viewed as less knowledgeable or qualified than non-partisans.
Finally, these pooled findings do not allow for outright dismissal of H1, in that partisan
military figures of both types are sanctioned by the larger public. Validation of this hypothesis requires analysis of these trends among political partisans; for H1 to be accurate,
this seemingly principled response to military political activity should be robust to consideration of individual partisan identity.

However, analysis of these heterogeneous treatment effects provides little support for
this claim. Figure 3.4 depicts the change in measured expertise, trustworthiness, and total
credibility for military activists among political subsets of the public. These results, which
show consistently selective and asymmetric sanctioning of contra-partisans, provide strong
evidence for the predictions of the partisan public hypothesis (H3A). Across both partisan
groups, these results are strikingly similar and substantively significant. Among Republicans, activist-left military elites experienced significant reductions in both perceived trustworthiness (-22.6%) and expertise (-17.2%), losing substantial overall credibility (-19.9%).
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Figure 4.4: Loss of Credibility for Military Activists, by Partisan Identity

(a) Individual Expertise Measure

(b) Individual Trustworthiness Measure

(c) Individual Total Credibility Measure
NOTE: This figure depicts the change in perceptions of expertise, trustworthiness, and credibility
for military partisans in reference to the non-partisan elite profile, according to self-identification on
three-point partisan identity scale. Posted figures reflect magnitude of effect and p-values for twotailed test for difference in means between activist categories and the non-partisan reference category.
NDem = 402, NInd = 367, and NRep = 269.

However, these same measures for activist-right elites were marginally positive and statistically insignificant. A similar pattern is observable among Democrats: activist-right military
elites suffered lower perceived trustworthiness (-18.4%) and expertise (-15.5%), resulting in
a sizable erosion in total credibility (-17.0%). Perhaps even more indicative of the partisan
public than their Republican counterparts, Democrats not only sanctioned contra-partisan
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military elites, but expressed a statistically significant increase in the perceived trustworthiness (+8.0%), expertise (+5.6%), and overall credibility (+6.8%) for co-partisan activist-left
elites.

This strong asymmetry in response reflects the expected patterns of the partisan public
(H3A). Individuals strongly sanction the credibility of contra-partisan military elites, while
the reliability of co-partisans is either unaffected (Republicans) or increased (Democrats).
The difference in magnitude reflects the predictions of previous study in partisan affective
biases, in which out-group animosity is a more potent force on political perception than
in-group favoritism (Iyengar and Westwood 2015). In short, once the aggregate treatment
effects are analyzed conditional on individual partisan identity, there is comparably little
support for either the principled (H1A) or indifferent (H2A) publics, but considerable support for the partisan public (H3A).

Even among political independents, there is little support for H1 and the image of a
principled public. This bloc should theoretically be the most likely to exhibit the characteristics of the principled public. However, there is a demonstrable asymmetry in that
group’s sanctioning of partisan elites. Independents ascribed significantly less trustworthiness and overall credibility (-12.7%, -9.0%) to activist-right elites compared to activist-left
figures (-2.2%, -1.0%).16 While this analysis does not argue for a specific explanation of this
trend, it is possible that independents – more sensitive to partisan activity – find conservative political activism more problematic to democratic governance than liberal activism.
Regardless, the magnitude and direction of suppressive effects regarding elite credibility
among all political subgroups provides little support for either the indifferent public (H2A)
or the principled public (H1A). As I will discuss later, this evidence of a partisan audience
indicates (1) that the apolitical norm of civil-military theory may be much weaker than
previously believed and (2) as military elites engage in increasing level of partisanship, they
16

Respondents who identified as independents in this sample were asked for the major party that they
“leaned” toward if forced to choose; the asymmetry observed in these responses cannot be attributed to a
left-leaning independent sample, as this group broke 55%-45% Democrat-Republican when coded according
to their leaner party.
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more closely resemble elected politicians in terms of the audience they attract and their
inherent reliability.

The second dimension of this analysis is the impact of exposure to such partisan sources
on individual attitudes of institutional credibility. As previously discussed, the significance
of “corporate credibility” on the influence of individual representative elites is a highly developed field of the relevant literature in business research; Lafferty and Goldsmith (1999)
argue that “the impact of the endorser, even if highly credible, will not be as important as
the credibility of the company” when rendering opinions about that organization’s trustworthiness and expertise. Of particular interest in this analysis is the reverse effect: how
attributes of individual representative elites might influence attitudes about the organization. Civil-military scholars that warn against the politicization of the military elite
frequently focus on the institutional ramifications of such activity, including the prospect
of a significant common-pool problem if partisan activism results in a loss of institutional
credibility rather than individual sanctioning (J. K. Dempsey 2009).

The sequence of the survey makes the partisan activity and behavior of the individual
elite “newly-salient information”, providing a useful opportunity to allow such calculations
to influence attitudes about the broader institution by bringing this information to the
“top of the head” (Zaller and Feldman 1992). In order to evaluate the image of public attitudes about the institution, I conduct a similar analysis using the credibility metrics from
Newell and Goldsmith (2001) employed in the survey. As in the individual-level analysis,
the aggregate results are more balanced, with exposure to left- and right-aligned activists
resulting in a modest but statistically significant reduction in the overall credibility (-1.6%,
-2.8%) of the military institution. However, it is again necessary to examine these patterns
among political subsets of the public in order to more directly test the institutional-level
hypotheses (H1B, H2B, H3B).

This method of analysis regarding the credibility of the broader military institution again
reveals evidence of the partisan public (H3B). Figure 3.5 depicts this change in measurable
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Figure 4.5: Loss of Credibility for Military Institution, by Partisan Identity

(a) Institutional Expertise Measure

(b) Institutional Trustworthiness Measure

(c) Institutional Total Credibility Measure
NOTE: This figure depicts the change in perceptions of expertise, trustworthiness, and credibility
for military partisans in reference to the non-partisan elite profile, according to self-identification on
three-point partisan identity scale. Posted figures reflect magnitude of effect and p-values for twotailed test for difference in means between activist categories and the non-partisan reference category.
NDem = 402, NInd = 367, and NRep = 269.

expertise, trustworthiness, and overall credibility of the military institution among the same
political subgroups. Though more modest in size, exposure to contra-partisan military elite
activism translated into similar effects as we observed at the individual level. Democrats exposed to activist-left elite profiles found the military marginally more trustworthy (+3.1%)
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and credible (+1.4%); however, those exposed to activist-right profiles found the same institution far less trustworthy (-6.4%) and credible (-5.2%). Again, the same trend emerges
among Republicans, who found the military less trustworthy (-7.7%) and credible (-5.5%)
when exposed to activist-left profiles when compared to the non-partisan condition. These
trends are comparable in magnitude and inverse in direction, largely in line with the predictions of H3B. Similar to the results at the endorser level, there is little support for the
other hypotheses as the effect on co-partisan credibility is marginal (in opposition to H1B)
and substantively significant (against the predictions of H2B). As I will discuss later, this
selective pattern of response at the institutional level has potentially damaging implications
for the salience of the apolitical norm and the prospect of de-politicizing the military elite.

The principal findings of this experimental design are numerous and potentially significant for the study of civil-military relations amidst substantial partisan polarization.
Collectively, the results present strong support for the partisan public hypothesis. Individual elites lose substantial credibility among the public when engaging in partisan behavior, but only among those on the opposite side of the political debate. This asymmetry
seems to contradict both the empirical case for an indifferent public and the theoretical
claim of a principled one. With regards to the former, there are several explanations for
why my results differ from previous empirical findings. As previously discussed, my design utilized a stronger treatment for partisan identity of the military elite, including not
only endorsement history, but media presence and policy activism as well. Incorporating a
more sensitive measurement device in the credibility score allowed for detecting changes in
perceived trustworthiness and expertise that would have gone unnoticed in the five-point
Gallup scale. Examining effects at both the individual source and institutional levels provided visibility on both the macro-level effects on the military’s corporate reputation and the
micro-foundational effects on single elites. Finally, the existing work in this vein explored
only effects in the aggregate; analyzing the heterogeneity of these effects among political
partisans allowed for more granular investigation of individual responses to knowledge of
partisan activity.
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These findings also challenge the hypothesis of a principled audience with an objective consideration of the apolitical norm. Indeed, military elites with established partisan
records are viewed as less trustworthy – making political messaging more difficult to a substantial portion of the public – and less qualified, even when these objective facts about
the source were held constant. However, this effect is compartmentalized to politically incongruent military elites; sanctions to credibility occurred not because military activity in
politics principally offends the public’s sensibilities, but because it was of the wrong type.
Not only do military elites suffer only among contra-partisans, they may actually benefit from increased perceptions of credibility among co-partisans for having engaged on the
“correct” side. As I will discuss later, this could indicate a significantly different incentive
structure for military elites weighing a partisan role or political ‘afterlife’ to their military
careers. Finally, the exposure to a single profile of a partisan military elite resulted in a
similarly skewed pattern when evaluating the military’s “corporate” credibility. Though
the effects are more modest, it is reasonable to argue that as military involvement in the
political information space increases in scope and frequency, these effects could accumulate
considerably.

Discussion
These findings have several significant implications that warrant further discussion. First,
evidence of the partisan public casts substantial doubt on the broadly-accepted assertion
among civil-military scholars that not only is the apolitical norm important to individuals in society, but that military elite credibility is conditional on its preservation. The
starkly asymmetrical pattern of sanctioning that we observe among partisans reveals that
while partisan activity by military elites clearly degrades their credibility with individuals across the political aisle, co-partisans consistently find little issue with this activity.
In fact, like-minded individuals on nearly every measurable scale ascribe slightly higher
levels of credibility to the military elite under analysis. These patterns call into question
the strength and salience of the apolitical norm; if partisan activity by military elites is not
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principally opposed by the public, but only insofar as that activity is politically incongruent
to the individual, then what are the ramifications of such a weakened state of civil-military
norms?

First, evidence of such a partisan-minded public is potentially damaging to traditional
standards of democratic regime quality and civilian control of the armed forces; the weakening of norms designed to keep the military out of politics are even more problematic given
its co-occurrence with a broader rise in anti-democratic sentiment across US society. As
previously discussed, the attitudes of Americans – particularly those in the “millennial” age
cohort – possess far less attachment to traditional democratic institutions and processes
than their predecessors. Americans on the whole have increasingly favorable views of both
technocratic and authoritarian approaches to governance, while support for strictly democratic structures has experienced a noticeable decline (Foa and Mounk 2016). In 1995, only
9% of Americans in the World Values Survey described having a democratic system as a
“bad” or “very bad” mode of government; in 2011, this had risen to 17% (for comparison,
this bloc of respondents in the Russian Federation was 18%).17 Combined with a similar
increase in support for military rule, this concurrent weakening of both traditional norms
against partisan military activity and against authoritarian governmental structures is both
unsurprising and potentially damaging to democratic governance.

A shifting sense of propriety with regards to military elite activity has also been observed
on numerous instruments measuring public attitudes. As previously discussed, a weakening
of traditional civil-military norms is evident in the increasing acceptability of actions like
media leaking or protest resignations in response to “unwise orders” (Schake and Mattis
2016). The same 2013 YouGov survey also found that a plurality of respondents (34%)
believed that modern wars were indeed “winnable”, but that civilian policy decisions are
17

The pattern among millennials is similar across the two countries as well, with 26% and 23% of Russian
and Americans, respectively, categorizing a “democratic system” as a “bad” or “very bad” form of government in the 2011 Wave 6 survey. Yascha Mounk and Roberto Stefan Foa, “Yes, people really are turning
away from democracy”, The Washington Post Wonkblog, December 8, 2016.
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responsible for preventing the military from achieving decisive victory.18 The notion that
civilian overreach, politicization, or unwise policy is responsible for security failures has
gained increasing notoriety, leading to advocation of a more activist role for military advisors in policy planning and execution in line with a particular reading of “McMasterism”
(Milburn 2010). This divide in public confidence between military and civilian leaders has
manifested both in the aggregate trust individuals express in political and military institutions and the confidence they express regarding management of foreign policy crises.19 If
public frustration over democratic political processes has led to acceptance of authoritarian
solutions at the cost of traditional norms, it is not unreasonable to suggest that a similar
frustration over foreign policy failures would lead to acceptance of an activist military at
the cost of civil-military ones.

Collectively, evidence for the partisan public in my experimental design presents a significant challenge for civil-military theorists: the weakening of political norms among the
public has seemingly reached into attitudes regarding the proper place for military elites in
the political discourse. The increasing acceptability of illiberal governance – such as military rule – has occurred alongside an erosion of public opposition to military assertiveness
in policy planning, media leaking, and now partisan activity. As a result, the weakened
state of the apolitical norm revealed in this experimental analysis presents a rebuttal to
the argument that military credibility is conditional on the appearance of non-partisanship.
While my design focused on retired military elites rather than serving officers, it is exactly
these figures who have the ability to leverage public esteem for the military institution
towards personal gain, doing so with increasing visibility.20 The increasing frequency and
18
Respondents were asked which statements were closer to their own beliefs: “Modern wars are unwinnable”, “Modern wars are winnable, but our military hasn’t figured out how to win them”, “Modern
wars are winnable, but civilian policy decisions prevent the military from winning”, and “Modern wars are
winnable, and our military is winning them”. After those responding “Don’t Know” (28%), the next largest
bloc of respondents believed that modern wars were “unwinnable” (19%) (Schake and Mattis 2016).
19
Scott Clement and Philip Rucker, “Poll: Far more trust generals than Trump on N. Korea, while
two-thirds oppose preemptive strike”, The Washington Post, September 24, 2017. In a 2017 Washington
Post-ABC News poll regarding the North Korean nuclear threat, 72% of Americans expressed positive
confidence in the military to handle the situation responsibly, only 37% expressed similar confidence in the
commander-in-chief.
20
Jim Michaels, “What’s at risk when retired generals plunge into partisan politics”, USA Today, August
4, 2016; Leo Shane III, “Retired generals keep pushing their politics; some say it’s getting uncomfortable”,
Military Times, August 6, 2016.
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acceptability of this behavior finds an empirical validation in this analysis: while the individual elite risks losing credibility with contra-partisans, they also have the ability to gain
credibility with a like-minded, if narrower audience.

This leads to a second point of discussion: for military elites weighing political activism,
the partisan public reflects an environment that can incentivize such activity, rather than
deter it. As discussed earlier, much of the existing civil-military scholarship argues that the
image of non-partisanship is what preserves the credibility of the endorser and the institution (Owens 2015; Liebert and Golby 2017a; Burbach 2017; Hill, Wong, and Gerras 2013).
J. K. Dempsey (2009) argues specifically that such political activity would create a considerable common-pool problem: if the public does not sanction individual military elites for
partisan activity, but rather the larger military institution, than the very credibility that
these endorsers draw on for influence will be continually degraded over time. However, the
results of this analysis suggest that while a common-pool problem may indeed exist, the
incentive structure for military elites to avoid politics is not as self-defeating as previously
theorized. Instead, there is strong reason to believe that military elites can garner increased
credibility and influence – or at least not lose them – among a select and politically likeminded audience, losing influence only among those on the opposite side of the ideological
spectrum. While this environment may deter those seeking a broad audience among the
public, it would have no such effect on those trying to cultivate a political ‘afterlife’ to their
career, seeking favor with an major partisan establishment, or searching for a suitable base
for policy activism.

This prospect is easier to observe by visualizing how narrow partisan audiences may be
attractive to military elites due to the environment of the partisan public. As the result of
the previous experiment demonstrate, military elites risk losing considerable influence with
contra-partisans by wading into political issues, regardless of direction; however, they also
have the opportunity to benefit from increased credibility and influence with co-partisans
for the same action. Understanding how the partisan public may incentivize continued
partisan behavior can be understood through analysis of the demographies which allow for
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Figure 4.6: Ternary Graph of Demographic Influence on Partisan Military Elite Credibility

NOTE: This figure is a ternary depiction of the relative proportions of Democrats, Independents,
and Republicans in any given US demography. The area shaded blue indicates those demographic
arrangements, based on my data, that predict an increase in credibility for displaying politicallyleft partisan behavior relative to a non-partisan with the same qualifications. The area shaded red
indicates those demographic arrangements where politically-right activism yields a similar increase
in credibility relative to an equally-qualified non-partisan. The dotted-black area graphically depicts
the range of actual US demographies since 2004 according to Gallup’s collection of national partisan
identity. The blue circles and red squares indicate the partisan demography of select media outlets
according to 2012 data collected by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press.

that benefit. Figure 3.6 graphically depicts this reality: along the three axes are potential
demographic percentages for Democrats, Independents, and Republicans in the US, envisioning each possible division of the electorate in the triangular space. Those areas shaded
blue or red indicate the demographies in which, based on my experimental results, leftor right-activism is beneficial to the military elite in terms of increased credibility, relative to a non-partisan with the same qualifications. The ’feasible’ range of demographic
arrangements is depicted in the black dotted-line area, which represents the limits of actual
demographies since 2004 according to Gallup’s collection of national partisan identification.

Immediately evident is that there are far fewer opportunities for partisans to gain influence on the whole rather than lose it. All areas not in blue or red indicate areas of negative
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credibility change. If one assumes an environment where all partisan activity by military
elites is made known to all individuals, there are narrow avenues for individual benefit for
Democrats and even fewer for Republicans. However, this may not present military elites
with the ostensibly self-defeating logic this graphic implies. First, a total information environment of this type is unlikely. It is important to consider that partisan audiences are not
equally likely to be exposed to contra-partisan military elite activism, which can also shape
the incentives for military figures to engage in such behavior. One key finding in Chapter 2
of this dissertation is that during a critical phase of the Iraq War, conservative media outlets
were far more likely to report the supportive comments of military elites than critiques from
across the political aisle. While reporting biases also respond to the newsworthiness of elite
conflict, it is reasonable to assume that media outlets with in-party or out-party alignment
are unlikely to report military elite partisanship with equal frequency.

Second, a loss of broad credibility may still offer seemingly positive outcomes for elites
who do not value a broad audience. While the total US demography may never approach
the extreme areas depicted as favorable in Figure 3.6, news audiences provide partisan demographies more suitable for political activism. The blue circles and red squares in Figure
6 respectively represent the demographic breakdown of the audiences for left- (MSNBC,
The Rachel Maddow Show, CNN, and the New York Times) and right-leaning (Hannity,
Rush Limbaugh, FOX News, and the Wall Street Journal ) media outlets as collected by
the Pew Institute in 2012.21 While Republican military elites are still unlikely to replicate
the environment shaded in red, conservative media outlets offer an opportunity to get close.
This incentive is even stronger for Democratic elites, where several cable news and print
media sources offer demographies amenable to partisan activism. Though they are unlikely
to observe this environment directly, it is more difficult for conservative military elites to
cultivate an increase in their credibility through revealed partisanship compared to their
more liberal counterparts.

21
“Trends in News Consumption 1991-2012: In Changing News Landscape, Even Television is Vulnerable”,
The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, September 27, 2012.
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Finally, military elites can replicate these favorable demographies by tailoring political
audiences through social media. In order to illustrate this point, I utilize data collected
on the social media follower networks of several military elites. As thoroughly studied by
Urben (2017), social media platforms have become an increasingly popular mechanism for
military servicemembers to communicate political information; as such, I examine the ideological identity of the followers that military elites draw based on their level of activism.
This process leverages the principal assumptions used by Barbera (2015) in modeling political ideal points through Twitter data. Individuals incur a cost by deciding to receive
information from specific sources through “following”, both in terms of minimizing cognitive dissonance and in the opportunity cost of forgoing access to competing information; in
short, “these decisions provide information about how social media users decide to allocate
a scarce resource – their attention”. While Barbera uses follower network information for
Bayesian analysis of elite ideal points, the distributions themselves are of specific interest
here in understanding the audience attracted by certain military elites. In a similar fashion,
I utilize the political ideal points estimated through the CFScore measurements based on
campaign finance contributions developed by Bonica (2014), a metric for ideological measurement that has demonstrated strong internal validity and adaptive use over traditional
roll call measures (Poole and Rosenthal 2007). Using this ideal point measurement for political elites, we can construct ideological distributions for the follower networks of different
military elites.

Figure 3.7 depicts the distributions of these military elite follower networks on a single
ideological dimension provided through the CFScore measure, from -1.5 (most liberal) to 1.5
(most conservative).22 Perhaps unsurprisingly, active duty officers such as Army Chief of
Staff Mark Milley, Chief of Naval Operations John Richardson, Marine Corps Commandant
22
These distributions were calculated using information gathered through the Twitter API, capturing
the follower networks user identification numbers and similarly capturing the CFScores for all political elites
followed by the military elite follower network. The ideological distribution is based on the subset of followers
who followed at least two politicians on Twitter (excluding Barack Obama). Extreme ideology values were
coerced to maximum (1.5) or minimum (-1.5) for ease of observation, leaving a total number of 505,696
observations across all military elite profiles. Military elite accounts were chosen based on senior or elite
status possessing at least 1,000 base followers, in order to examine those with the greatest audience reach
and latent/practical influence.

218

Chapter 4: What Discord Follows: Partisan Polarization and Civil-Military Norms
Figure 4.7: Military Elite Follower Network Distributions (CF Score Ideology)

Note: This figure depicts the ideological distributions of military elite Twitter follower networks,
measuring political ideal points based on Bonica’s CF Score measurement of other elected officials
followed by the same users. Height of distribution re-scaled based on distribution maximum values.
Darker coloration indicates more extreme mean values for the distribution. Bold faced military elites
indicate elected officials whose principal pre-political careers were as military officers. Italicized elite
profiles indicate active-duty serving figures at time of collection. Figures depicted in parentheses are
counts of ideologically-assessed users who followed at least two political officials, not a count of the
entire follower base. Profile information gathered between October-November 2017.

Robert Neller, and Air Force Chief of Staff David Goldfein have decidedly balanced distributions, indicating access to a broad political audience. As partisan activity by uniformed
officers is the most closely scrutinized and easily detectable, such centrist follower networks
conform to expectations.23 Similarly balanced military elite accounts include those of the
Joint Staff and retired Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey, who has been
23

Among active duty officers, the only potential outlier in this regard is that of Coast Guard Commandant
Paul Zukunft, who received media visibility for openly contradicting a series of July 2017 tweets by President
Donald Trump calling for a ban on openly-serving transgender soldiers and sailors. Zukunft gave a speech
shortly after to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in which he stated he would
continue to support transgender servicemembers under his command. It is possible the increased density in
the left of the distribution is due to this action, seen as subversive of the Trump administration’s directive.
Ron Nixon, “Coast Guard Still Supports Transgender Troops, Commandant Says”, The New York Times,
August 1, 2017.
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particularly vocal in his opposition to partisan activity by military elites.

However, we can observe that these distributions become increasingly skewed towards
a more narrow audience as elites become more involved in political opinion-shaping. Just
as the previously discussed experimental conditions took care to draw a strong contrast between different types of post-retirement media exposure, policy activism, and political endorsements, so too do we observe that activity along these dimensions draws an increasingly
partisan follower network. For substantive comparison, I have included the distributions of
elected officials (in bold) whose principal pre-election careers were military service, in order
to demonstrate a theoretically upper bound for perceived partisanship by military elites.
For balance, I include members of both parties in both houses of Congress (Senators Tammy
Duckworth (D) and Tom Cotton (R), and Congressmen Seth Moulton (D) and Ryan Zinke
(R)). Retired officers who have since taken posts in academia, such as Yale senior fellow
Stanley McChrystal and Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy dean James Stavridis, possess slightly less centrist distributions, though they maintain access to a generally broad
audience.

Military elites serving as media commentators or security analysts on major cable
news networks, such as Mark Hertling (CNN), Jack Jacobs (MSNBC), Barry McCaffrey
(MSNBC), Morris Davis (MSNBC), and Jack Keane (FOX), instead possess some of the
most partisan audiences in the sample. Elites with notable records of policy activism possess similar follower networks. These include Russel Honore, the former commander of
Hurricane Katrina relief efforts who criticized Trump administration efforts in Puerto Rico
following Hurricane Maria, and Jerry Boykin, the former commander of the Army’s Delta
Force, whose politically-divisive evangelism and “incendiary rhetoric regarding Islam” generated significant controversy in military circles.24 Advocacy for specific issue domains with
24

For Honore critiques of Hurricane Maria relief, Jack Healy, Frances Robles, and Ron Nixon, “Aid Is
Getting to Puerto Rico. Distributing It Remains a Challenge.”, The New York Times, October 3, 2017;
for fallout from Boykin’s remarks and his subsequent removal from a prepared speech at West Point, Erik
Eckholm, “General Withdraws From West Point Talk”, The New York Times, January 30, 2012.
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established partisan bases of support, such as climate change policy, evangelicalism, or immigration may be just as influential in drawing a partisan audience as more direct political
endorsements or contributions.

Military elites who have found post-retirement service as political appointees attract an
expectedly one-sided audience as well. Former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn
drew a follower network strikingly similar to elected Republican officials on the same side
of the ideological spectrum. At the same time, former NSA and CIA chief General (Ret.)
Michael Hayden drew an audience more akin to Democratic politicians. Hayden was a frequent critic of the Trump administration’s relationship with the US intelligence community
and management of Russian cyber intrusion, going so far as to caution serving intelligence
analysts to “think twice” before taking assignments in the White House.25 Finally, it is
also clear that military elites with high visibility – even without high rank – are capable of
garnering partisan audiences through activism. Medal of Honor recipients Dakota Meyer
and Florent Groberg, though relatively junior in rank and responsibility, demonstrate this
potential. Meyer appeared on FOX News segments in support of Trump administration
policies and its relationship with the media; Groberg, a “self-described lifelong Republican”, was a speaker at the 2016 Democratic National Convention and a public supporter
of the presidential candidacy of Hillary Clinton.26 Both figures attract distributions of followers more representative of elected partisans than active-duty officers.

While, as Barbera (2015) concedes, the “self-selected minority” of Twitter users constitutes a small sample relative to the American electorate, it is cross-sectionally diverse
and allows for measuring the partisan appeal of non-political figures, such as military officers. Across the spectrum of measurable military elites, increased political activity results
in ideologically far narrower audiences. At the highest levels of media presence and partisan activism, these military elites are indistinguishable from elected politicians in terms
25
Joe Uchill, “Former intel chief Hayden: Think twice on a Trump job offer”, The Hill, November 13,
2017.
26
“Dakota Meyer: Trump is Following Through on His Promises to Veterans”, FOX News Insider, July
3, 2017; Miranda Green, “Medal of Honor recipient explains why he’s a Republican voting for Clinton”,
DecodeDC, July 28, 2016.
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of the public audience they attract. As our experimental results demonstrate, it is possible that co-partisans who attend to these types of military elites may even view them
as more credible than non-partisan or contra-partisan elites. However, this comes at the
cost of access to a broad audience in shaping policy preferences, with potentially negative
consequences for the ability of this expert community to influence public attitudes on policy.

The uneven and selective nature of the partisan public’s response to political activity
represents a departure from the previously theorized assumptions of the principled public.
The latter assumes an objective audience, in which individual elites engage in political behavior to the detriment of the very institution that provides its credibility; taken in repeated
interventions, partisan activity that “trade[s] on the reputation of the active force” results in
decreasingly credible military elite voices across the whole of society (J. K. Dempsey 2009).
However, the partisan public presents a different incentive structure. A similar commonpool problem of credibility exists, but rather than individuals leveraging the institution’s
credibility to the detriment of both, politically-active military elites can potentially increase
their favor among like-minded partisans while only damaging institutional credibility among
those on the other side of the political debate. The narrow and ideologically coherent follower distributions articulated previously, in addition to the experimental results of this
analysis, demonstrate that the partisan public is an environment susceptible to increasing
military politicization, rather than the self-defeating logic of the principled public.

This leads to my third point of discussion: if weak apolitical norms continue to draw
more military elites into the political discussion, what impact could this have on the future
of policy decision-making? First, an increasingly vocal retired military elite could create
friction with serving members of the active force, who rely considerably on the credibility
of their military counsel when advising civilian leaders on the proper courses of action in
foreign and security policy. As the results of this analysis reveal, the partisan public creates an environment amenable to military elites who (1) do not necessarily value a broad
audience, but also (2) wish to cultivate an ideologically coherent audience. Though the
prospect of increasing credibility broadly is unlikely, it is also worth noting that elites risk
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very little through activism in support of co-partisans. Previous study has examined the
relationship between military elite campaign contributions and nomination to positions of
advanced responsibility by co-partisan presidents (Golby 2011). Political activism provides
an alternate currency for retired elites to similarly gain favor with a partisan establishment
and cultivate a political ‘afterlife’ with no loss to their credibility.

However, such activity among the retired military elite risks jeopardizing the veracity
of advice given by uniformed officers ostensibly representative of the same institution. This
prospect is potentially problematic for forming coherent policy; retired senior officer David
Barno argues that “Civilians will now be asking, ’is the J.C.S a Democrat or Republican?’
and men and women in uniform will begin to wonder whether some day they can become
the secretary of defense, or national security adviser.”27 The negative externalities of such
behavior are heightened in that the retired community draws on the same pool of credibility as their active-duty counterparts. In response to retired senior officers speaking at
both major party conventions during the 2016 presidential campaign, former Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey stated that “They were introduced as generals.
As generals, they have an obligation to uphold our apolitical traditions. They have made
the task of their successors – who continue to serve in uniform and are accountable for our
security – more complicated”.28

The challenges that such activity can cause to the active-duty force have become evident in the growing politicization of military efforts. For example, disaster relief efforts in
Puerto Rico following Hurricane Maria in 2017 were complicated by considerable friction in
the media between President Donald Trump and local Puerto Rican leadership, including
harsh criticism of the president’s efforts by Honore.29 The resulting partisan skirmish forced
serving Lieutenant General Jeff Buchanan, commander of the relief efforts in Puerto Rico,
to have to actively distance himself from the conflict, stating to the press that “I’m not a
27

Quoted in Mark Perry, “Are Trump’s Generals in Over Their Heads?”, Politico, October 25, 2017.
Quoted in Richard Sisk, “Former Joints Chief Chairman Slams Retired Generals’ Political Remarks”,
Military.com, August 1, 2016.
29
Brandon Carter, “General who oversaw Katrina response slams Trump for Puerto Rico attacks”, The
Hill, September 30, 2017.
28
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Republican. I’m not a Democrat. I’m not a member of the blue party, I’m not a member
of the green party. I’m a soldier and I’m here to help people.”30 A similar politicization of
the active duty elite occurred several months earlier, when statements made by the military
service chiefs denouncing extremism and violence were viewed by many as a repudiation
of Trump’s efforts to “evenly redistribute blame” over a violent white supremacist rally in
Virginia.31 Even if the active force is able to keep itself out of the partisan sphere, the
actions of the retired military elite or the heightened state of political polarization can still
directly influence their ability to offer objectively-valued military advice.

A second potential challenge that this environment poses to policy decision-making is
the influence of such elites on specific issues. While partisan activity may result in garnering
a like-minded, if narrow audience among the public, one must consider that input from these
elites will be less broadly influential. Following the primary experimental measurements of
the survey detailed in the previous section, respondents were asked for their level of support
or opposition to a proposed pre-emptive strike on the North Korean nuclear program, while
being informed that the military elite whose profile they had reviewed was in support of such
a policy. Table 4.1 displays the levels of support for the strike across treatment conditions
and respondent partisan identity. While Democrats and Independents are less supportive
of the action when advocated for by an activist-right military elite, Republicans fall below
50% support themselves when the same policy is proposed by an activist-left elite. The effect among strong partisans is also substantively large, with Democratic support halved by
activist-right advocacy and Republican support increasing by 11 percentage points when an
activist-right elite called for the strike. Though these results escape statistical significance
in all but a few cases, the shifting direction of public attitudes reveals how partisan elites
elicit support among co-partisans while creating “backfire” effects among contra-partisans.
30
Quoted in Richard Sisk, “General Tried to Avoid Political Firestorm over Puerto Rico Relief”, Military.com, October 2, 2017.
31
While spokesmen for the service chiefs ensured the press that such remarks were “not meant as a stab at
the president”, the furor that such seemingly benign statements of opposition to violent extremism generated
because of their contrast to the commander-in-chief’s highlights the state of political polarization in the US
and the extent to which this affects perceived military credibility. Andrew deGrandpre“Trump’s generals
condemn Charlottesville racism – while trying not to offend the president”, The Washington Post, August
16, 2017.
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Table 4.1: Support for North Korea Pre-emptive Strike, by Partisan Identity

Partisans

Non-Partisan
Activist Left
Activist Right
N

Strong Partisans

Aggregate

Democrats

Independents

Republicans

Democrats

Republicans

30
28
26

17
18
12

26
25
19

56
48
57

20
13
11

58
53
69

1,038

402

367

269

249

155

NOTE: Reported figures depict percentage of respondent in each treatment condition who “strongly
support” or “somewhat support” pre-emptive action in North Korea with military elite endorsement of the
policy. Column 1 aggregate category pools across all political identities. Columns 2-4 partisan categories
represent respondents who identified as Democrat, Independent, or Republican on a three-point scale
(PID3). Columns 5-6 strong partisan categories are those respondents who identified as “strong” Democrats
and Republicans on the extended six-point scale (PID6).

Both of these challenges are intended to bolster the argument that partisan activity, particularly by undeterred retired elites, can limit their ability to influence a broad public while
compromising the integrity of military advice offered by active duty elites.

Collectively, the principal findings of this analysis present several significant challenges
to the future quality of civil-military relations, democratic norms of civilian control, and
the value of military advice on policy matters. Empirical evidence for a partisan public is indicative of a deeper weakening of the apolitical norm, long-held to be both salient
and broadly-accepted among the public by civil-military scholars. Such a lack of aversion to
military intervention into political affairs provides little reason to doubt that military politicization into the future will continue, particularly among those elites seeking to cultivate
favor with a partisan establishment. The prospect of garnering an ideologically coherent
and attentive audience is evident in the types of networks different military elites draw conditional on their level of partisan behavior. The weakening of the apolitical norm is more
problematic for the preservation of democratic regime quality when viewed alongside the
concurrent rise in public acceptance of authoritarian processes, illiberal rule, and unprofessional military elite behavior. Finally, there is strong reason to believe that with repeated
forays into the political arena, retired military elites risk jeopardizing the integrity of the
larger institution with civilian leaders who rely on their objective counsel.
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Conclusion
The study of civil-military relations has consistently embraced the imperative of maintaining an apolitical military, as both a normative defense of liberal standards of civilian control
and a functional requirement for coherent and successful security policy. While the military
has emerged as one of the most trusted organizations in society, civil-military scholars often
contend that this is because of the careful maintenance of an objective image to the public.
The very credibility of the institution is, in this framework, conditional on the institution’s
appearance as non-partisan. However, amidst broader trends in selective information exposure, partisan polarization, and the discrediting of expert communities, the perceived
trustworthiness and expertise of the military institution makes it a source of considerable
latent influence regardless of the norms against political activity. Indeed, the level of military elite activism – whether in commentary, advocacy, or partisan endorsements – has
steadily increased despite these traditional norms. However, reconciling these seemingly
contradictory narratives has gone largely unstudied.

In this analysis, I have outlined several theoretical images of the public’s preferences with
regards to the “apolitical norm”. These included the principled image theorized by much
of the existing civil-military literature and the indifferent image suggested by the limited
empirical work towards this question. I add to these constructs the partisan image of the
public, in which the apolitical norm is weakened to the extent that military elites only risk
suffering a loss of credibility among a specific political subset of the public and may even be
able to gain credibility among another. Using original survey experimentation designed to
measure how exposure to partisan military elites effects both individual- and institutionallevel perceptions of credibility, I find that there is little evidence for an objectively-enforced
and mutually-embraced apolitical norm across the public. Instead, military elites with a
record of partisan behavior are only sanctioned among political opponents; as such, these
elites more closely resemble partisan figures or elected officials, but with the imprimatur of
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the military institution. The institution itself similarly suffers a loss of credibility among
those exposed to contra-partisan elites, drawing a firmer connection between the actions of
representatives and the preservation of the military’s corporate credibility.

This environment creates several challenges for the stability of civil-military relations
and the durability of traditional norms of liberal governance. First, this analysis reveals a
weakened state of civil-military norms amidst broader shifts in public sentiment away from
other traditionally taboo concepts, such as military, technocratic, or authoritarian rule. Increasing military politicization is therefore a potentially damaging prospect for the maintenance of traditional democratic processes, even if the regime is not existentially threatened.
Second, the partisan public creates a unique incentive structure for military elites seeking
to cultivate a political ‘afterlife’ to their careers, by allowing access to an ideologicallycoherent – if narrower – audience. Third, if the environment of public sentiment presents
fewer obstacles to military politicization, this could complicate the relationship between
serving active-duty elites and civilian leaders who rely on non-partisan military counsel.
Finally, trading a broad audience for a partisan one possibly limits the reach and potential influence of military elites when they offer political information on issues of importance.

Future study into this question would benefit from analysis of different types of partisan behavior and the marginal effects of each on public perceptions of credibility. While
this analysis focused on creating an ecologically realistic profile of a partisan military elite
figure, more refined study could examine how specific actions – such as public criticism,
political endorsements, or partisan fundraising – individually influence the perceived credibility of the source. Similarly, the continued use of social media platforms by military elites
may allow for the calculation of their political ideal points in a fashion similar to other
non-political occupations. Measuring military and political figures on a common ideological
spectrum would allow various opportunities for understanding at what level of advocacy
military figures begin to resemble political ones in the public’s vision. As retired military
officers continue to play an increasing role in government service and public discourse, understanding the implications of this political activity will remain an important target of
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research.
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Appendix A: Covariate Balance and Regression Results
A.1 Descriptive Statistics and Balance Checks
Table 4.2: Balance and Covariate Balance Statistics
Respondent Demographic
Party Identification
Democrat
Republican
Gender
Male
Female
Age
25th Percentile
50th Percentile
75th Percentile
Race
White
Non-white

Non-Partisan

Activist Left

Activist Right

39.60
27.63

37.46
23.63

39.11
26.47

45.58
54.41

50.14
49.85

50.29
49.70

33
46
59

29
40
58

30
44
59

68.66
31.33

73.19
26.80

64.70
35.29

NOTE: Reported figures depict average percent of daily newshole dedicated
to segments on Iraq War stories across the entire 2007 news year. Values in
parentheses () indicate p-values for two-tailed t-test for difference in means
between reported news source and FOX News as reference category.
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Table 4.3: Randomization Check: Logit Regression on Dichotomous Assignment Variable
Dependent variable: Treatment Condition Assignment
Non-Partisan

Activist Left

Activist Right

(1)

(2)

(3)

Democrat

0.114
(0.155)

−0.178
(0.153)

0.067
(0.155)

Republican

0.223
(0.172)

−0.281
(0.173)

0.057
(0.173)

Male

−0.230∗
(0.136)

0.128
(0.135)

0.104
(0.136)

Age

−0.001
(0.011)

0.006
(0.011)

−0.005
(0.011)

GenX

0.108
(0.272)

0.089
(0.279)

−0.203
(0.276)

Millenial

−0.329
(0.429)

0.496
(0.431)

−0.171
(0.430)

Constant

−0.535
(0.724)

−1.110
(0.728)

−0.452
(0.726)

1,038
−658.491
1,330.983

1,038
−657.105
1,328.210

1,038
−655.712
1,325.425

Observations
Log Likelihood
Akaike Inf. Crit.

∗

Note:
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p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01
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A.2 Additional Survey Statistics
Table 4.4: Mean Values for Endorser Credibility Metrics, Non-Partisan Treatment Condition (By
Respondent Party ID)

Partisans

Strong Partisans

Democrats

Independents

Republicans

Democrats

Republicans

Knowledgeable
Experienced
Trustworthy
Reliable

5.57
5.72
5.20
5.38

5.26
5.48
5.00
5.04

5.95
5.97
5.67
5.60

5.54
5.56
5.18
5.36

5.93
6.00
5.72
5.64

Expertise
Trustworthiness

11.30
10.58

10.74
10.05

11.93
11.27

11.11
10.55

11.93
11.37

Credibility

21.88

20.79

23.21

21.66

23.30

139

115

97

90

62

N

NOTE: Reported figures depict mean values for measured endorser credibility metrics in the
non-partisan condition. Columns 1-3 partisan categories represent respondents who identified
as Democrat, Independent, or Republican on a three-point scale (PID3). Columns 4-5 strong
partisan categories are those respondents who identified as “strong” Democrats and Republicans on the extended six-point scale (PID6). Rows 1-4 indicate items utilized for construction
of additive measures on scale of 1-7; rows 5-6 indicate additive scores for expertise and trustworthiness, respectively, on a scale of 1-14. Row 7 depicts mean total credibility scores, on
scale of 1-28.
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Table 4.5: Mean Values for Endorser Credibility Metrics, Activist Left Treatment Condition (By
Respondent Party ID)

Partisans

Strong Partisans

Democrats

Independents

Republicans

Democrats

Republicans

Knowledgeable
Experienced
Trustworthy
Reliable

5.89
6.03
5.64
5.78

5.24
5.51
4.84
4.97

4.76
5.10
4.20
4.51

5.86
6.00
5.64
5.68

4.71
4.95
4.17
4.31

Expertise
Trustworthiness

11.93
11.43

10.76
9.82

9.87
8.71

11.86
11.32

9.66
8.48

Credibility

23.36

20.58

18.59

23.18

18.15

130

109

82

79

45

N

NOTE: Reported figures depict mean values for measured endorser credibility metrics in the
activist left condition. Columns 1-3 partisan categories represent respondents who identified
as Democrat, Independent, or Republican on a three-point scale (PID3). Columns 4-5 strong
partisan categories are those respondents who identified as “strong” Democrats and Republicans on the extended six-point scale (PID6). Rows 1-4 indicate items utilized for construction
of additive measures on scale of 1-7; rows 5-6 indicate additive scores for expertise and trustworthiness, respectively, on a scale of 1-14. Row 7 depicts mean total credibility scores, on
scale of 1-28.

Table 4.6: Mean Values for Endorser Credibility Metrics, Activist Right Treatment Condition (By
Respondent Party ID)

Partisans

Strong Partisans

Democrats

Independents

Republicans

Democrats

Republicans

Knowledgeable
Experienced
Trustworthy
Reliable

4.55
4.99
4.17
4.45

4.93
5.23
4.25
4.51

6.01
6.03
5.74
5.91

4.61
5.12
4.13
4.47

6.27
6.08
5.97
6.22

Expertise
Trustworthiness

9.54
8.63

10.16
8.76

12.04
11.65

9.73
8.61

12.35
12.20

Credibility

18.18

18.93

23.70

18.35

24.56

133

117

90

80

48

N

NOTE: Reported figures depict mean values for measured endorser credibility metrics in the
activist right condition. Columns 1-3 partisan categories represent respondents who identified
as Democrat, Independent, or Republican on a three-point scale (PID3). Columns 4-5 strong
partisan categories are those respondents who identified as “strong” Democrats and Republicans on the extended six-point scale (PID6). Rows 1-4 indicate items utilized for construction
of additive measures on scale of 1-7; rows 5-6 indicate additive scores for expertise and trustworthiness, respectively, on a scale of 1-14. Row 7 depicts mean total credibility scores, on
scale of 1-28.
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Table 4.7: Opposition for Federal Budget Decrease to State/USAID, by Partisan Identity

Partisans

Non-Partisan
Activist Left
Activist Right
N

Strong Partisans

Aggregate

Democrats

Independents

Republicans

Democrats

Republicans

37
36
39

42
51
47

37
28
40

29
27
24

38
57
45

31
33
27

1,038

402

367

269

249

155

NOTE: Reported figures depict percentage of respondent in each treatment condition who “strongly oppose” or “somewhat oppose” budgetary decreases to the State Department and USAID with military elite
opposition to the policy. Column 1 aggregate category pools across all political identities. Columns 2-4
partisan categories represent respondents who identified as Democrat, Independent, or Republican on a
three-point scale (PID3). Columns 5-6 strong partisan categories are those respondents who identified as
“strong” Democrats and Republicans on the extended six-point scale (PID6).
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Appendix B: Survey Experiment Supplementals
B.1 Questionnaire Design
Programming Instructions: Assign random integer from 1 to 3, record this integer as assignment. Assignment of this integer is recorded and dictates the value of [Prompt1],[Prompt2],
and [Image].
Assigning Textual Prompt

The variable [Image] takes on the following values depending on integer assignment:
• Assignment=1, see Figure 4.8
• Assignment=2, see Figure 4.9
• Assignment=3, see Figure 4.10

The variable [Prompt1] takes on the following value:
• “General (Retired) Wilson has publicly written and spoken in support of the proposed strike,
considering such a move to be necessary. In a recent interview, Wilson stated that “the risk
posed by North Korea is too great; the US needs to take action”.”

The variable [Prompt2] takes on the following value:
• “In several editorial articles and interviews, General (Retired) Wilson has argued against the
reduction, calling instead for Congress to increase funding to the State Department and the
US Agency for International Development (USAID).”
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Figure 4.8: Experimental Military Elite Profile (Non-Partisan)

Note: This figure represents the elite profile viewed in the nonpartisan category, ASSIGNMENT=1.

235

Chapter 4: What Discord Follows: Partisan Polarization and Civil-Military Norms

Figure 4.9: Experimental Military Elite Profile (Non-Partisan)

Note: This figure represents the elite profile viewed in the activistleft category, ASSIGNMENT=2.
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Figure 4.10: Experimental Military Elite Profile (Non-Partisan)

Note: This figure represents the elite profile viewed in the activistright category, ASSIGNMENT=3.
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Survey Progression
Standard demographic battery precedes the experimental portion of the survey.
This survey is being conducted by Qualtrics on behalf of researchers at varying organizations.
The survey will ask you about a variety of topics, and the results will inform academic research
and press releases. Your participation is voluntary and your responses will be held confidential.
As specified by the online research panel which invited you to participate in this survey, you will
receive an incentive for your participation. We have tested the survey and found that, on average it
takes approximately 15 minutes to complete. This time may vary depending on factors such as your
Internet connection speed and the answers you give. To indicate that you consent to participate in
this research, please click on the ”Next” button below.
We are interested in public attitudes on different policy issues in American society. In the following short survey, you will be presented with a few short questions on several issues currently under
debate, along with the opinion of one of many relevant voices on these subjects. We have included
a brief summary of the qualifications and experience of the commentator as well. Please read all
information carefully and offer your honest opinion on each of the questions.

Question 1: SINGLE CHOICE. Manipulation Check
Before considering your position, this is the profile for one of the voices that has offered their
own opinion on the issue we’d like to ask you about.

[IMAGE]
Before proceeding, we just want to make sure you have read the above information about this
individual’s background. Which media outlet did this individual appear on as a commentator?

• MSNBC
• National Public Radio
• FOX News
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Question 2A-D: SLIDER. Individual Endorser Credibility
On a scale from 1-7, how would you rate General Wilson on the following characteristics?
Rows [randomized order]
• Knowledgeable
• Trustworthy
• Reliable
• Experienced
Columns [1-7]
Question 3A-D: SLIDER. Institutional Credibility
Please indicate to what extent you agree/disagree with these statements with regards to the following institution: The military
Rows [randomized order]
• The military is skilled at what they do.
• The military makes truthful claims.
• The military has a great amount of experience.
• I trust the military.

Columns
• 1 (Strongly Disagree)
• 2
• 3
• 4 (Neither Agree/Disagree)
• 5
• 6
• 7 (Strongly Agree)
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Question 4: SINGLE CHOICE. North Korea Strike
North Korea
As you may know, there is a lot of debate over potential military action in North Korea. The
North Korean regime has defied the international community and US warnings against developing
and testing their nuclear weapons. One of the options being considered is a pre-emptive strike with
conventional weapons on the North Korean military.

[PROMPT1]
What is your opinion on the proposal to pre-emptively strike North Korea?
Choices [random direction]
• Strongly oppose
• Somewhat oppose
• Neither support nor oppose
• Somewhat support
• Strongly support

Question 5: SINGLE CHOICE. Foreign Aid/Federal Budget
Federal Budget
Another issue being discussed is how to spend taxpayer money in the federal budget. One proposal has
been to dramatically reduce funding to the State Department, the agency that manages US diplomatic
efforts around the world, and to cut its spending on foreign and humanitarian aid to other countries.

[PROMPT2]
What is your opinion on the proposal to decrease funding to the State Department and foreign
aid programs?
Choices [random direction]
• Strongly oppose
• Somewhat oppose
• Neither support nor oppose
• Somewhat support
• Strongly support
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B.2 Military Elite Profile Analogs
As discussed in the main body of the analysis, the characteristics of the military elite profiles
used in this experimental design encompassed six broad categories. The overseas experience, academic qualification, and command responsibility portions of each profile were kept
fixed, with values representative of many high-ranking retired military elites. Overseas experience values reflect the current pool of retired elites, which include those with experience
in the Vietnam War to those with more recent command tenures in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
various peacekeeping missions. The composite profile developed here used recent overseas
deployments, as this subset of retired officers is considerably larger and more politically
active.

The information regarding academic qualifications and command responsibility was developed using the experiences of several high-profile military elites with both experience
commanding large formations abroad and advanced degrees. These included H.R. McMaster, David Petraeus, David Barno, Stanley McChrystal, and James Stavridis, all retired
elites with undergraduate degrees from the country’s military service academies and graduate or post-graduate degrees in international relations, history, public policy, national
security, or law and diplomacy. Most of these figures also commanded at the three- and
four-star level during their military service, from regional combat headquarters elements
such as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan to major combatant commands such as Central Command (CENTCOM) and EUCOM (European Command). While command at these levels is not necessarily a common trait among politically
active elites, nor is it a requisite for engagement in media commentary or partisan activism,
setting the expertise at its highest realistic levels made all subsequent devaluing of that
expertise based on partisan behavior easier to measure.

The remaining three characteristics, experimentally varied in the above design, were
also drawn from the profiles of existing military elites. This was done in order to develop

241

Chapter 4: What Discord Follows: Partisan Polarization and Civil-Military Norms

an ecologically realistic set of characteristics that was both rooted in realism while also allowing for the maximum contrast between partisan and non-partisan elites. I briefly detail
some of the actual figures used to develop these categories below according to each of the
experimental dimensions varied in the experimental design used for this analysis.

Media Presence

Perhaps one of the most visible methods by which military elites can engage in activism or
partisan behavior is through media commentary, editorialism, or analysis. This avenue has
few barriers to entry and can magnify the voices of even relatively junior elites by providing
a larger, and potentially partisan audience. The media presence value was varied across
treatment conditions in order to reflect the different outlets that military elites might appear on in order to broadcast information. I chose to have the non-partisan elite appear
on National Public Radio, the activist-left elite on MSNBC, and the activist-right on FOX
News, in order to attach decidedly partisan audiences to their messaging. While print
media outlets would have been equally realistic in terms of an avenue that military elites
often utilize for messaging, it is more difficult to draw strong liberal-conservative contrast
using these outlets than to use cable new outlets with decidedly partisan followings, such
as MSNBC, CNN, or FOX.32 The current media environment makes it difficult to establish
a truly non-partisan source for broad messaging. I chose the non-partisan elite to appear
on National Public Radio, despite it appearing as left-leaning in some political circles; to
mitigate this, I ensured that the elite’s comments were infrequent (in that Wilson’s media
presence was low) and benign (in that they were observational rather than critical).

Some examples of military elites used to develop this profile include cable news analysts,
media commentators, or print media editorial writers. Military elites such as former US
32
These outlets have both large audience followings and stark partisan divergence on trustworthiness. In
2014, 52% of those classified as consistent liberals expressed trust in MSNBC as a news source, against 9%
who distrusted it. The same category of liberals contained only 6% who trusted FOX News, compared to
81% who distrusted it, by comparison. Consistent conservatives included 7% trusting MSNBC against 75%
distrust, and 88% trust for FOX News over 3% distrust. “Political Polarization and Media Habits: From Fox
News to Facebook, How Liberals and Conservatives Keep Up with Politics”, Pew Research Center, October
21, 2014.
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Army Europe commander Lieutenant General (Ret.) Mark Hertling, former Army Vice
Chief of Staff General (Ret.) Jack Keane, former SOUTHCOM commander General (Ret.)
Barry McCaffrey, and Medal of Honor recipient Colonel Jack Jacobs appeared regularly
on cable news outlets CNN, MSNBC, and FOX News, respectively.33 Recently, Hertling
and Jacobs have commented regularly on President Donald Trump’s relationship with veteran familites, Keane on the state of national security policy and US military efforts in
Iraq and Syria, and McCaffrey on the state of US-North Korea affairs.34 These networks
frequently include interviews or editorials with other retired military elites including former Guantanamo Bay military prosecutor Colonel Morris Davis, former Supreme Allied
Commander for NATO Admiral (Ret.) James Stavridis, who both appear on MSNBC, and
Medal of Honor recipient Dakota Meyer, who appears on FOX News. The strong contrast
offered by appearance on these networks was incorporated into the experimental profiles
by ensuring the partisan conditions made clear that media exposure was both frequent and
politically-charged; the substance of the manipulation check question also sought to embed
this information more directly with the respondent. The ubiquitous appearance of these figures on cable news networks demonstrates their potential reach. However, the perception of
a partisan slant to the elites themselves is not merely a product of their appearance through
an outlet with established partisan audiences, but also in the substance of the commentary
itself.

33

“Lt.
Gen.
Mark Hertling:
Military Analyst”, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/profiles/
mark-hertling-profile; “Col. Jack Jacobs: MSNBC Military Analyst”, MSNBC, December 14,
2007; “Jack Keane: Retired army four-star general”, FOX News, http://www.foxnews.com/person/k/
jack-keane.html; “Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey, USA (Ret.)”, MSNBC, January 17, 2008. All accessed
December 21, 2017.
34
“Col. Jack Jacobs: Trump Gold Star Family remarks ‘almost obscene”’, video clip, NBC Nightly News
with Lester Holt, October 17, 2017; Hertling quoted in Stephen Collinson, “Trump has repeatedly politicized
military service and sacrifice”, CNN.com, October 18, 2017; “Trump’s national security strategy a departure
from the past”, video clip, FOX News, December 19, 2017; “Gen. Barry McCaffrey: Trump could lead U.S.
to war with N. Korea”, video clip, The 11th Hour with Brian Williams, MNSBC, October 13, 2017.
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Political Activism and Advocacy

In addition to regular exposure to partisan audiences through outlets such as cable news, the
tone and tenor of military elite activism is itself revealing of partisan sentiment. The previously mentioned cable news analysts often provide commentary which exceeds objective
analysis, instead mounting an ardent defense of or attack on specific political leaders. However, certain elites engage in regular policy activism even if their media profile is comparably
low. Former Katrina relief commander Lieutenant General (Ret.) Russel Honore became
a staunch environmental activist after retirement and in 2017 was an outspoken critic of
administration response to the devastation in Puerto Rico following Hurricane Maria; Honore made headlines by reprimanding the president directly during the crisis, stating “the
mayor’s living on a cot, and I hope the president has a good day at golf”.35 Former special
operations commander Lieutenant General (Ret.) William Boykin engaged in a variety of
evangelical activists groups upon retirement. He was removed from a speech at the United
States Military Academy at West Point in 2012 due to a record of comments characterizing
US military efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan as “Christian battle”, denouncing Islam as a
“totalitarian way of life”, and offered that the religion should not protected under the First
Amendment.36

Policy advocacy or criticism has also included security policy more directly. Major
General (Ret.) Robert Scales denounced Obama administration efforts in managing the
humanitarian crisis in Syria in 2013, describing them as “amatuerism”.37 As mentioned in
the main body of the analysis, blocs of military officers have collectively denounced Trump
administration policy on a host of issues, including its position on torture, relations with
the media, climate change, immigration, and diplomatic efforts with North Korea. While
a sizable bloc also opposed a Trump administration directive to ban transgender soldiers
from openly serving in the military, 16 retired general and flag officers, including regular
35
Quoted in Brandon Carter, “General who oversaw Katrina response slams Trump for Puerto Rico
attacks”, The Hill, September 30, 2017.
36
Erik Eckholm, “General Withdraws From West Point Talk”, The New York Times, January 30, 2012.
37
Robert H. Scales, “U.S. military planners don’t support war with Syria”, The Washington Post, September 5, 2013.
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FOX News commentator Lieutenant General (Ret.) Thomas McInerney, penned a letter
of support for the ban through Boykin’s Family Research Council in 2017.38 The partisan
overtones of military activism, in some cases on both sides of an issue, were adapted into the
design of the experimental profiles by ensuring that while the non-partisan profile contained
no such policy advocacy, the partisan profiles had an established record of opposition or
support to the agendas of specific political elites.

Partisan Endorsements

Finally, the experimental profiles drew on established actions of partisan support or endorsements to political candidates, a form of military elite activism that is occurring with
increased frequency and visibility. Though the impact of these types of endorsements has
been found to be relatively small, their significance to the perceived objectivity of military
elites and the institution of the armed forces is potentially large (Golby, Dropp, and Feaver
2012). This pattern was readily observable during the 2016 presidential campaign, in which
retired general officers played a prominent role in both major party conventions and in public endorsements for the candidates. Despite Martin Dempsey’s admonishment that “the
military is not a political prize”, nearly 200 former officers offered public endorsements of
either Secretary Hilary Clinton or Donald Trump during the campaign. The majority of
the four-star officers, the highest ranking elites in the military, who offered endorsements
supported Clinton, including former Democratic presidential candidate and Supreme Allied
Commander for NATO General (Ret.) Wesley Clark. Female officers were also outspoken
supporters of the Clinton campaign, including former intelligence chief Lieutenant General
(Ret.) Claudia Kennedy. Trump’s position on torture also drove elites such as Major General (Ret.) Antonio Taguba, the former Abu Ghraib investigator, into the Clinton camp
as well. However, Trump drew support from evangelical activists like Boykin, as well as
from McInerney, who made headlines in 2010 for supporting an Army officer who refused
to deploy to Afghanistan because he believed President Barack Obama was not born in the
38
Letter enclosed in Peter LaBarbera, “Retired generals praise Trump’s ‘courageous’ transgender military
ban”, LifeSiteNews, August 1, 2017.
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United States.39
Both major party conventions included high-profile speeches by senior officers, with
former Afghanistan commander General (Ret.) John Allen speaking at the Democratic
Convention and former DIA commander Lieutenant General (Ret.) Michael Flynn speaking at the Republican Convention, actions which were decried by a host of civil-military
theorists, political commentators, and retired officers such as Dempsey. Medal of Honor
recipient and self-professed Republican Florent Groberg also spoke at the convention in
support of Clinton’s campaign. Again, while the magnitude of these endorsements is debatable, their increasing regularity has significant implications for the perceived credibility of
the military and its representatives. Furthermore, the profiles included reference to these
elites having advised campaigns in national security and foreign policy. Both Lieutenant
General (Ret.) Keith Kellogg and Flynn served on the Trump campaign as security advisers
and members of transition team.40 Former CIA chief and CENTCOM commander General
(Ret.) David Petraeus advised the Clinton campaign, while Stavridis was vetted as a possible vice presidential candidate.41 As such, the experimental profiles used in this analysis
incorporated similar endorsements for or services on the staffs of political candidates in the
2016 election. In addition to high media presence on partisan networks and open policy
advocacy or criticism, the profiles were designed in this way to maximize contrast to the
non-partisan category while remaining to the the form of actual military elites in the informational environment.

Supporting Media Sources

(Bailey 2009; Baker 2009; Bender 2017; Burns 2009; Cahn 2016; B. Carter 2017; P. Carter
et al. 2016; Clement and Rucker 2017; Cloud and Schmitt 2006; Dao 2009; deGrandpre
2017; M. Dempsey 2016; Dinan 2012; Drezner 2017; Dwyer and Worth 2006; Eckholm
2012; Faiola 2010a; Fifield 2017; Garamone 2012; Haddick 2010; Healy, Robles, and Nixon
39

Eric Schmitt, “Clinton and Trump Each Lay Claim to Military Brass”, The New York Times, September
7, 2016.
40
Michael Crowley, “Trump’s foreign policy team baffles GOP experts”, Politico, March 21, 2016.
41
Gabriel DeBenedetti, “Clinton to convene meeting with Petraeus, other national security experts”,
Politico, September 8, 2016.
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2017; Henderson 2011; Kenning 2017; Lamothe 2017; McMaster and G. D. Cohn 2017;
Michaels 2016; Foa and Mounk 2016; Mullen 2008; Mullen 2017; Petraeus 2004; Phillips
2017; C. L. Powell 1992b; K. Roberts 2007; Rowlatt 2015; Scales 2013; Schmitt 2016; Shabad
2016; Shalikashvili 2007; Shane III 2016; Shear, Fandos, and Steinhauer 2017; Usher 2015;
Whitlock 2014; Zegart 2017; Zelizer 2018; Barno and Bensahel 2017; BBC News 2016;
Dugan and Auter 2017; Farley 2016; Kennan 1948; Margolick 2007; Merica 2016; Moore
2016; Moore 2015; Newport 2017; Sisk 2016; Sisk 2017; Tau 2012; Uchill 2017; D. Wright,
Browne, and Lim 2016)

247

Chapter 4: What Discord Follows: Partisan Polarization and Civil-Military Norms

Appendix C: Social Media Distribution Supplementals
C.1 Ideological Distributions for Select Military Elite Follower Networks
Figure 4.11: Social Media Distributional Data (Davis, Duckworth)

Colonel (Ret.) Morris Davis

Sen. Tammy Duckworth (D-IL)

Figure 4.12: Social Media Distributional Data (Moulton, Hertling)

Rep. Seth Moulton (D-MA)

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Mark Hertling

Figure 4.13: Social Media Distributional Data (McCaffrey, Hayden)

General (Ret.) Barry McCaffrey

General (Ret.) Michael Hayden
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Figure 4.14: Social Media Distributional Data (Honore, Kirby)

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Russel Honore
RADM (Ret.) John Kirby

Figure 4.15: Social Media Distributional Data (Jacobs, Groberg)

Colonel (Ret.) Jack Jacobs

Captain Florent Groberg

Figure 4.16: Social Media Distributional Data (Zukunft, Barno)

Admiral Paul Zukunft

Lieutenant General (Ret.) David Barno
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Figure 4.17: Social Media Distributional Data (Stavridis, Dempsey)

Admiral (Ret.) James Stavridis

General (Ret.) Martin Dempsey

Figure 4.18: Social Media Distributional Data (Richardson, Milley)

Admiral John Richardson

General Mark Milley

Figure 4.19: Social Media Distributional Data (Goldfein, Neller)

General David Goldfein

General Robert Neller
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Figure 4.20: Social Media Distributional Data (Odierno, McChrystal)

General (Ret.) Ray Odierno

General (Ret.) Stanley McChrystal

Figure 4.21: Social Media Distributional Data (Welsh, McRaven)

General (Ret.) Mark Welsh

Admiral (Ret.) William McRaven

Figure 4.22: Social Media Distributional Data (Zinke (R), Zinke (Sec))

Rep. Ryan Zinke (R-MT)

Secretary of the Interior Ryan Zinke
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Figure 4.23: Social Media Distributional Data (Cotton, Flynn)

Sen. Tom Cotton (R-AL)

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Michael Flynn

Figure 4.24: Social Media Distributional Data (Meyer, Keane)

Sergeant Dakota Meyer

General (Ret.) Jack Keane

Figure 4.25: Social Media Distributional Data (Boykin)

Lieutenant General (Ret.) William Boykin
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